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1 	  	  	  I	  N	  T	  R	  O	  D	  U	  C	  T	  I	  O	  N	  	  
1.1 Overall 
 
Affiliates are a common form to structure different types of museums and make a museum 
in the region stand out in terms of mission and vision. Affiliation in the museum field can 
give a museum specialization - an agenda opposed to other museums, e.g. that of the 
devotion solely to contemporary arts. This is the case with MoMA PS1 (formerly known as 
P.S.1 Contemporary Art Center, New York) and Museum of Contemporary Art Kiasma, 
Helsinki: two prominent contemporary art museum affiliates in two different countries and 
cultural ecosystems that are both well known. They are the two subjects of this case study 
research. The collected data is primarily based on eleven personal interviews: nine in-depth 
interviews and two preliminary interviews with Museum Directors, Senior Specialists, 
Managing Directors, Heads of Development, Senior Curators, Curators, Assistant Curators, 
Communications Managers, Project Managers, Development Officers and other museum 
and contemporary arts professionals in Finland and in The United States. Secondly, the 
data is based on other sources & media such as documents & articles, annual reports & 
budgets, literature, articles and findings in the internet, as well as conversations with other 
professionals and peers in the field and personal notes of the researcher during the process 
of interviewing and writing.  
In the light of recent strategy and leadership theory as well as organizational theory and 
museum studies, the effects of the global economic crisis are researched in the two case 
affiliate museums. 
1.2 Contemporary Art Museum Affiliates in a Changing World 
 
The position of the contemporary art museum affiliates is always strongly dependent on 
their mother organizations. Especially when it comes to financing and budgeting. The Free 
Dictionary by Farlex defines affiliates as being “organizations or establishment associated 
with another as subordinates, subsidiaries, or members”. Yet the museums have a strong 
self-governance as to strategic outlines & content through own decision-making ecosystem 
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& a director. The boards report to the mother organization. The dual task of independence 
through a special agenda is a challenge for the affiliates devoted to the presentation, 
collecting and audience development of contemporary visual arts.  
In recent years, funding of the museums has been discussed in the press both in Finland 
and the United States. In Finland, it has been debated whether a museum should have other 
than state funding, and how much to maintain an independent voice in curating and 
collection the arts. In the U.S the ethics of different forms of fundraising from grant 
making to philanthropy have caused lively discussion. The economic crisis hit The United 
States in 2008. The interest of this study was to research how and what kind of effects the 
crisis possibly had on the affiliate museums` funding, strategy and leadership, and in what 
way the possible changes, if there were any, hit the museums coming from two different 
funding and ecosystems.  
The question of funding had been scarcely researched before, and in museology previous 
research data was not easily found in the domain of contemporary art museum affiliates 
partly due to the recent nature of the economic crisis. Nonprofit strategy theories, as well as 
for-profit, suggested that some research had been made previously in the field, but it 
became clear very soon, that a case study research of the affiliates in relation to the effects 
of the economic crisis could result more accurate knowledge in the field of the 
contemporary art museums. 
Arts & Economic Prosperity IV – The Economic Impact of Nonprofit Arts and Culture 
Organizations and Their Audiences depict the effects of the economic crisis on cultural 
organizations in the U.S:  
”Arts and culture organizations are resilient and entrepreneurial businesses. 
They employ people locally, purchase goods and services from within the 
community, and market and promote their regions. Arts organizations are 
rooted locally; these are jobs that cannot be shipped overseas. Like most 
industries, the Great Recession left a measurable financial impact on the 
arts—erasing the gains made during the pre-recession years and leaving 2010 
expenditures 3 percent behind the 2005 levels. The biggest effect of the 
recession was on attendance and audience spending” (National Statistical 
Report, 2010:2). 
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1.3 Financial Crisis – the Economic Crisis – the Subprime Crisis 
 
The recent financial crisis, also known as the Subprime mortgage crisis as part of the 
economic crisis, hit in 2008 - 2012. The economic crisis initiated first in the United States 
as the global financial servicer firm, Lehmann Brothers, went bankrupt. The global 
economic crisis landed to the European continent with a delay in the beginning of the year 
2012. However, the aim of this research is to investigate whether if there were some effects 
in the Finnish museum affiliate field already prior to 2012. In the U.S the possible effects 
occurred already earlier, and continue to affect the industry even today. 
Business Dictionary defines the economic crisis as “a situation in which the economy of a 
country experiences a sudden downturn brought on by a financial crisis. A nation facing an 
economic crisis will most likely experience a falling GDP, a drying up of liquidity and 
rising/falling process due to inflation/deflation. An economic crisis can take the form of 
recession or a depression. Also called real economic crisis.” (Source: 
businessdictionary.com). About the general effects of the crisis, many were in the labor 
markets as the country hit a deep recession and people lost their jobs by the thousands as a 
consequence. The crisis in Europe had a somewhat different nature: 
 “The (subprime mortgage) crisis had severe, long-lasting consequences for 
the U.S and European economies. The U.S entered a deep recession, with 
dearly 9 million jobs lost during 2008 and 2009, roughly 6% of the workforce. 
U.S housing prices fell nearly 30% on average and the U.S stock market fell 
approximately 50% by early 2009. As of early 2013, the U.S stock market had 
recovered to its pre-crisis peak but housing process remained near their low 
point and unemployment remained elevated. Economic growth remained 
below pre-crisis levels. Europe continued to struggle with its own economic 
crisis.” (Source: Wikipedia) 
 
1.4 Turbulence in the Museum Field 
 
In relation to the museum field, how did the crisis affect the non-profit museum field in 
general? And in particular, the contemporary art museum affiliates in the U.S, PS1, and in 
Finland, museum of contemporary art Kiasma? What are the differences between the two 
ecosystems in funding and culture in general?  
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Financially both are dependent on their mother organizations, as the decision-making is 
tied to MoMA in the case of PS1, and to The Finnish National Gallery in the case of 
Kiasma. The U.S. funding system of museums is strongly dependent on private money, as 
little as 1-3% of the budget comes from governmental or state funding in PS1. In Finland, 
the state funds the museums mainly. The proportion of private money in Kiasma is very 
small, mainly acquired through the Kiasma foundation, established in 2007. 
The research concentrates in the possible effects of the economic crisis on the affiliates in 
Finland and United States as to museum funding, leadership, strategy and curatorial 
decision-making. It seeks overall effects of the crisis in the museum field, and specifically 
effects to the art museum affiliates in question. 
 
1.5 Aim of the Thesis 
 
The aim of the thesis is to identify and compare the differences and effects of the economic 
crisis in 2008 - 2012 in nonprofit contemporary art museum affiliates` strategy and 
leadership in the U.S. and Finland. The data is acquired through a case study of two 
prominent art museums, personal in-depth interviews with the museum staff, directors, 
curators, specialists, development officers and other relevant professionals in the 
contemporary arts field, media sources and personal notes.  
The research concentrates in the two cases in depth: case of Kiasma Museum of 
Contemporary Arts Helsinki as part of the Finnish National Gallery (later referred to as 
Kiasma), and the case of MoMA PS1, as part The Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), New 
York, formerly known as P.S.1 Contemporary Art Center (later referred to as MoMA PS1 
or PS1). The research seeks to find both direct and indirect effects of the economic crisis in 
leadership, strategy, funding and curatorial practices of the affiliate museums. The data 
consists of nine in-depth personal interviews and two preliminary personal interviews, 
notes, documents, articles, budgets and annual reports, comments of the museum 
professionals based on discussions and other literary and media source data. 
The cases of MoMA PS1 and Kiasma have been chosen from two very different  
ecosystems as to funding, finance, strategy and museum leadership. The main  question 
concentrates in the direct and indirect effects of the economic crisis in the affiliate 
museum´s everyday life, budget, agenda and leadership. Despite the obvious differences of 
funding and a different cultural environment, has there perhaps been something similar to 
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the situations that the two prominent museums have been through? The research seeks to 
find answers to both these concrete & abstract questions. 
 The first research question addresses changes in 2008 – 2012 in museum leadership: What 
kind of changes were there after 2008 in the (affiliate) museum leadership and strategy? 
The sub-questions relate to the primary question: 
• How do the museums experience `change`?  
• Which of the assumed changes have been directly and which indirectly experienced 
among the museum staff? 
• Did the crisis, in all, have an effect on the affiliate museums` leadership? In what 
way(s)? 
The second research question is related to museum strategy. How did the (economic) 
crisis change the museums` strategy – or did it have an effect at all? 
• Was there any strategy for crisis situations prior to the economic crisis?  
• If yes, how was the change strategy conducted? What areas it covered in terms of 
funding, budget, leadership and management? Who were the people responsible for 
conducting the strategy? 
 
1.6 Significance to the Field 
 
No previous record of research concerning the contemporary art museum affiliates and the 
effects of the economic crisis have been found in Finland, partly due to the recent nature of 
the crisis and partly due to lack of research data in museum funding related to the economic 
crisis of 2008. In the United States, some research has been made through statistics about 
the subject, such as the NEA annual publications. Stulz (2009 has studied hyper 
competition and risk analyses in the global environment, and emphasized that in the global 
field of hyper competition, traditional risk-based analyses do not work. Victoria D. 
Alexander (1996) has studied museum funding on relation to organizational theory, but the 
challenges of the economic crisis in relation to museum affiliates has not been addressed 
directly in the research. 
In Finland, the annual publications of the National Board of Antiquities have been 
researched for this thesis, and conversations with the museum field specialists show that 
the subject of the effects of the economic crisis in the cultural sector has not been studied 
enough. There are studies in the field of museology and in the field of financial studies as 
well as sociology related to funding of museums, as mentioned (Victoria D. Alexander 
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1996), but the combination of these in the affiliate contemporary art museum field has not 
been to found. Previous research has been done in the field of strategy literature, leadership 
or funding of museums, but studies that combine all of these and researching the effects of 
the recent (global) economic crisis are scarce. Therefore the research has traits of a 
somewhat pioneering nature. 
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The aim of the Theoretical Framework Chapter is to demonstrate and identify differences 
between traditional, management-based leadership theories with the 21st century need for 
visionary leadership. To conclude the Theoretical Framework Chapter, I will assess the 
pros and cons of all five theories and analyze how well they fit to the research question of 
museum strategy and leadership after the economic crisis in 2008.  
 
In the next chapter, Research Methodology, collected data such as personal, in-depth 
interviews, observations, articles, annual reports and newspaper clippings will be shed light 
on. The chapter focuses on describing the methodological choices made in the study. 
 
Description of the cases assesses the mission, history, strategy and funding of the two 
cases, Kiasma and MoMA PS1 in short, and reflects on the cultural policies of the two 
different countries and cultural ecosystems. 
 
Results and Analyses assesses the results of the collected data in relation to the theory and 
the cases presented. 
 
As part of the chapter in Ethical Considerations, I assess liability questions and possible 
biases. I also contemplate on my dual role as both an artist and an administrator in the field 
of contemporary arts, and how it affects the outcomings of the thesis. 
 
In the Conclusions chapter, I estimate all the five theories of strategy and organizational 
leadership and compare them with the findings of the interviews, personal notes, 
documents and other data collected in the study, and discuss topics for further research.  
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2.1 Strategy and Leadership in Organizations 
 
In this chapter, I will present different approaches to strategy and leadership theories. The 
aim of the chapter is to present and demonstrate differences between traditional, 
management-based leadership with the 21st century need for visionary leadership and 
organizational approaches that have been influenced by sociology.  
 
Strategy as a tool for achieving a better led cultural organization is essential. Theories of 
Michael Porter, Risto Santalainen and  Neil, Philip & John Kotter address the question of 
communicating ideas inside the organization. Porter and Santalainen take an economical 
approach into the theory of strategy making and Porter stresses competition and threats 
whereas Santalainen takes a more holistic view on leading an organization as a thinking 
organization. Kotter builds his strategy theory on the concept of transformational 
leadership. Kotler, Kotler and Kotler build on this experience and stress the meaning of 
communication as strategic marketing as a part of the solution. He carefully builds strategy 
step systems and lists to achieve a functioning and healthy organization and discusses how 
to lead an organization in practice. Victoria D. Alexander sees deeper into museology and 
combines her research on museum funding with strategy and sociology theories. 
Alexander´s research brings us closer to the challenges of the contemporary art museum 
affiliates and the way they should approach turbulence through external and internal scan. 
 
The structure of the Theoretical Framework chapter is as follows: 
• Identifying concepts, conceptual frameworks and theories  
in strategy literature 
• Identifying main camps and schools in the field of strategy, leadership and 
museum theory  
• Contrasting and comparing strengths and weaknesses of the theories 
• Comparing differences between strategy theories in the United States and 
Finland in the light of a different organization, funding environment & a cultural 
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ecosystem 
• Building a path to the future and further research: Where has museum strategy 
led since?  
 
In the  Strategy and Leadership in Organizations chapter, I analyze and compare three 
strategy-making ideologies and identify schools, camps and differences in approach to 
organizations. The Responding to the Competition chapter questions if Michael Porter´s 5 
forces theory still answers to the demands of the 21st century leadership and strategy. In 
Towards a Thinking and Acting Organization chapter Timo Santalainen builds a more 
holistic view on leading a company, but the viewpoint is still more of a large business 
rather than an arts organizations. Santalainen manages perhaps best to articulate the needs 
of the new leadership through his concept of the `learning organization`. The concept is 
applicable to the field of art museum affiliates` leadership and strategy formation today, it 
is found in the study. The Tools of Management and Leadership chapter describes the 
strengths and weaknesses of the most commonly used strategy tools among organizations. 
In Securing Resources and The Strategic Role of The Resources -chapters we take a closer 
look at the resources as a basis of an organization to be followed by Recognizing Core 
Competences chapter in relation to the question of resource allocation. Types of 
Organizations defines the three structural types of organizations. Kotter´s concept of 
`transformational leadership` and change management theory is investigated before the 
Transformational Leadership Summary.  
 
The eighth chapter, The Field of Museums, approaches the problematic of (affiliate) 
museum leadership and strategy in specific. Victoria D. Alexander challenges traditional 
strategy theory with organizational sociology and museum funding. She introduces the 
notion of the “External and Internal Environments” essential to the research that 
concentrates in the effects of the economic crisis. Finally, we conclude Victoria D. 
Alexander´s sociological approach to museums with a more traditional view on strategic 
museum marketing in Kotler, Kotler & Kotler´s Strategic marketing of Museums chapter. 
 
 In the chapter Strategic Management of Museums, the path built by the five theoretical 
strategic and organizational approaches to leadership and strategy theory are presented, 
summoned and analyzed though Table 4. The aim of the Theoretical Framework chapter is 
to reflect theoretically what kind of challenges the museum field of today on one hand and 
strategic management and leadership on the other will face in the future. The theoretical 
ideas will be united in the end of this chapter. In the final chapter of this study, all the 
theories presented will be assessed again together with the data acquired through the 
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research process.  
2.2 Responding to the Competition - The Question of Rivalry 
 
What happens when an organization faces competition in the field that it operates in? How 
to manage rivalry? These are the questions that Michael Porter´s strategy theory 5 forces 
wants to find answers to.  
 
The 5 forces theory was created as opposed to the SWOT analysis that was seen as 
insufficient, ad hoc, and not answering the question of rivalry accurately enough. It draws 
upon industrial organization economics and refers to the overall industry profitability 
(Porter 1993-2005: 16:2:44, JSTOR).  When all the five forces; bargaining power of 
suppliers, bargaining power of customers, threat of new entrants and threat of substitute 
products act to drive down overall profitability, the industry is described as "very 
unattractive", the opposite of this being attractive industry. Porter calls these forces the 
`micro environment` as opposed to macro environment, meaning that the five forces are the 
closest forces to affect the company to serve its customers and make a profit. 
 
 
Table 1: Michael Porter´s theory of 5 forces. Source: Porter 1979. 
 
But does Porter´s theory of 5 forces answer to the specific questions & circumstances in the 
field of cultural organizations? It is accurate perhaps in describing the strategic field of 
entrepreneurship, but what about museums and cultural organization´s leadership? How 
does the concept of rivalry sit in the cultural field in terms of inner and outer threats?  
 
Competitive	  Rivarly	  within	  an	  	  Industry	  
Bargaining	  Power	  of	  Suppliers	  
Bargaining	  Power	  of	  Customers	  	   Threat	  of	  New	  Entrants	  
Threat	  of	  Substitute	  Products	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The analysis of the five different arenas for rivalry widens strategic thinking, because in 
addition to the traditional rivalry changes it assesses the parties in the beginning of the 
stakeholder chain as well, and their effect on the ecosystem. The most radical changes 
often happen due to the birth of new competitors in the field, or of replacing products, 
services or overall solutions (Santalainen 2009:39). Porter also studied further the Rivalries 
of Nations (1990), implicating his strategy theory by researching closely the strategy-
making of nations. 
 
 Scenario analysis is another, alternative and effective means of mapping out the future 
threats and advantages for organizations. In addition to the five forces strategy, (Wheelen 
& Hunger 2006) have come up with a roadmap consisting of six instructions for scenario 
analysis: 1) Defining of the construction materials and anticipating changes 2) Making 
scenarios 3) General assessment of professional domain in different futures 4) Defining 
competitive advantages and factors for success 5) Anticipation of competitive situations 
and behavior and 5) Choosing the “wanted” future scenario for the basis of the strategic 
work. However, scenario analysis does not work best during an acute crisis of management 
or e.g. fiscal problems such as challenges due to an economic crisis (Santalainen 2009:38).  
  
2.3 Towards A Thinking and Acting Organization 
 
Timo Santalainen points out that Michael Porter´s five forces strategy for rivalry (1985) 
gets the more relevant, the more radical the changes in the ecosystem. The economic crisis 
and its effects can be seen as a radical environmental change. Looking further - what kind 
of changes are identified in the organizational environment after Porter´s 5 forces theory?  
Are there challenges? How should the challenges be addressed, and is something left out of 
Porter´s theory, especially in relationship to arts organizations and museum strategy? The 6 
forces theory was established as opposed to Porter´s 5 forces theory that was seen as 
inadequate. The theory points out that the 5 forces theory did not explain the environment 
accurately enough (Porter 2002), leaving out the sixth factor, the complementary products, 
or in the case of organization theory - the government and the public (Kevin P. Coyne & 
Somu Subramaniam 1996). 
 
Santalainen takes a different approach to leadership: in the core of his strategic theory are 
the organizations. Whereas Porter analyses rivalry through the 5 forces theory, Santalainen 
takes a leap forward and looks into organizations as thinking and acting 
units. Their task is to build strategic thinking instead of merely following the results of it. 
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“When rooting (implanting) of a strategy into an organization is done both as thinking and 
acting, the work succeeds” (Santalainen 2009: 341). 
 
According to Santalainen, there are several reasons why an organization must be active. 
One is the ever-changing international context, the other the strive for innovation and need 
for vigilance. Santalainen (2009:7) emphasizes intellectual discipline and sensible thinking: 
“On sovitettava yhteen julkisen palvelun ja liiketoiminnan logiikka”. The business and 
public domains must meet. 
 
Do the existing models of leadership support the creation of future, Santalainen debates, 
and continues to question the traditional approach to leadership as both a practice that 
enables and acts against renewability and flexibility: “Voidaan väittää, että perinteiset 
johtamisen ja organisoinnin ratkaisut yhtä usein estävät kuin mahdollistavat uudistumisen 
ja joustavan toiminnan.” (Santalainen 2009:7). Sometimes traditional leadership is the 
disease itself that prevents the organization from recovering and renewing itself. 
 
According to Santalainen, “Gary Hamel insists on a revolution of leadership” (Hamel 2007 
cited in Santalainen 2009:13). The systematic style of leadership of ´scientific 
management` has been questioned. Santalainen sees the Six Sigma as an example of the 
scientific management - its by-product with a rating system, which seeks to improve the 
quality of process outputs by identifying and removing the causes of defects in the 
organization (errors and minimizing variability such as in manufacturing and business).	  It 
simply isn`t enough anymore, Santalainen points out (Santalainen 2009:13-14).	  
Weber created the concept of the ideal organization as a bureaucracy - which he also 
criticized – as it’s actions are based on strict control and on the high level of technical skill 
of the management and human resources (Weber 1905 cited in Santalainen 2009:14). 
Hamel defines the need for a revolution in leadership through six thesis: (Hamel 2007 cited 
in Santalainen 2009:13) :  
 
1. The life span of strategies are getting shorter  
2. Regulation is dismantled, the obstacles of entering a field are becoming fewer 
3. Organizations are more often than not a part of ecosystems or of added value 
networks  
4. Globalization and declining costs of communication some industries make space 
for cost-effective competitors (India, China)  
5. The internet & accessibility to information shifts negotiating power away from 
producers to consumers  
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6. Digitalization threatens sellers of intellectual capital (publishers, movie producers, 
fashion designers etc.). Problem-solving oriented strategy making creates the future 
(Hamel 2007 cited in Santalainen 2009: 15).  
 
As to leadership terminology and strategic planning, Santalainen stresses that the concepts 
have developed mainly as answers to a new environment and changes inside the 
organization. Santalainen sees the effects of strategies in three categories: he distinguishes 
a rational, evolutionary and processual viewpoint (Santalainen 2009:17). In rational 
viewpoint, the organization´s leadership is looking for an optimal plan on how to proceed 
towards the goal. This is the most common way to interpret what a strategy is. 
Evolutionary view accepts the fact that the future is not foreseen nor predictable.  The 
processual viewpoint is a combination of the two. It acknowledges the fact that strategy-
making is a continuous process of learning and anticipation. It is thinking and acting 
combined, Santalainen explains. 
 
Santalainen points out that skeptics such as Mintzberg (Mintzberg 2003 cited in 
Santalainen 2009:17) accentuate the fact that a strategy cannot be understood beforehand. 
Only afterwards can the means used be analyzed. As to the turbulence of the environment, 
the skeptics might be right, he continues. The multi-layered and complicated changes in the 
environment of an organization can take up to a decade to realize. (Santalainen 2009:17)  
 
“Strateginen ajattelija ei etene tavanomaisen taakse, ellei hän kykene reflektoimaan. Kyky 
reflektoida onkin nousemassa yhdeksi tulevaisuuden johtajien avainosaamisista.” 
According to Santalainen, contemplating means searching, wondering, finding connections 
between things in a different way. It is analysis, synthesis and a conscious effort by the 
organization. (Santalainen 2009: 22) 
 
The best results will be obtained by analyzing differentiations or creating new, exceptional 
and not-foreseen solutions, Santalainen continues. Complicated sources of information or 
statistical data provided by researchers are not needed. What is needed instead, according 
to Santalainen, is a deeper understanding of the domains and the change factors affecting 
them. He concludes by saying that also benchmarking should take into account other than 
success stories, and take a closer look at different kinds of best and not-so-perfect practices. 
Organizations and businesses should learn from all of them. Success is sometimes based on 
coincidence: “Itsestäänselvästi benchmarking kohdistetaan eri alojen parhaiten 
menestyneisiin organisaatioihin. Etsitään parhaita käytäntöjä. Menestyksen valo voi 
kuitenkin sokeuttaa” (Santalainen 2009:31). Denrell has pointed out that studying failures, 
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rather than the successful ones, might be even more useful to an organization (Denrell 2005 
cited in Santalainen 2009:31). 
 
Santalainen states: “Ajattelevan organisaation strategia perustuu enemmän ajatteluun kuin 
mekaaniseen mallien ja työvälineiden soveltamiseen.” The idea of a contemplating 
organization is that of an organization in a continuous process of thought, not of an 
organization that simply mechanically performs strategic models and implications of these 
(Santalainen 2009:33). Contemplating is the act that unites strategic thinking into action: it 
“unifies strategic thought into action and vice versa” (Santanlainen 2009:27). 
 
Crossan, Lane & White (Crossan, Lane & White 1999 cited in Santalainen 2009:32) have 
emphasized the advantage of transmitting strategic thinking of an individual to the 
organization. The advantages can be seen on three levels, and are always for the benefit or 
the organization:  
 
1)    Strategic thinking that has originated from an individual should be build into 
a useful form for the organization. This means applying the strategy to the 
language used in the organization´s inner dialogue. The result is a deeper 
consciousness of the organization´s reality - approving & acting in 
accordance with it.  
2)    In a group, integrating the thoughts into understanding and action. This leads 
to greater commitment.  
3)    On the level of the organization, strategic thinking slowly institutionalizes 
itself into the organization´s (core) processes and structures,  rules and 
routines. These routines and processes can be both a key to a renewal and 
guarantee a continuum for the organization in the future. (Crossan, Lane & 
White 1999 cited in Santalainen 2009:32-33) 
 
2.4 The Tools of Management & Leadership 
 
The global strategy consulting company Bain & Co structures the different strategy tools in 
four categories: blunt tools, basic tools, power tools and special instRumelts. Some of the 
strategy tools that are most commonly used by the organizations stress statistical data, 
others scenarios, visions and segmentation. The former have been as blunt tools, whereas 
the latter, which require visionary leadership, have been proved especially efficient tools 
for leadership and management (Santalainen 2009:27).  
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Table 2. The Tools of Management and Leadership. Source: Bain & co (Bain & co 2007 cited in Santalainen 
2009:27). 
 
The emphasis on medium and implementation tools in an organization leads easily to 
inertia, meaning `active slowness`. The more turbulence, the more the organization seeks 
patent solutions. (Santalainen 2009:27).  The solutions might, however, not always be the 
right ones, as Table 2 (Bain & co 2007 cited in Santalainen 2009:27). Some of the strategy-
making tools are experienced in practice as empowering, such as strategic planning and 
scenario planning, whereas some seem to lead to an arsenal of dispensable tools (e.g. 
Balanced Scorecard) instead of results. 
 
The Management Institute of Finland made a strategy survey in 2006, that confirmed, that 
the situation with the strategy tools, described by Bain & co is accurate. In average the 
organizations used six to eight strategy tools. From the results obtained by JTO can also be 
 
 
BLUNT	  TOOLS	  
 
 
• Balanced Scorecard 
 
• Knowledge leadership  
 
POWER	  TOOLS	  
• Strategic planning  
• Scenarios 
• Core competence 
• Segmentation 
• CRM 
	  
BASIC	  TOOLS	  
 
• Six Sigma 
 
 
 
	  
	  	  	  SPECIAL	  	  
	  	  	  INSTRUMELTS	  
• Mergers &  
Acquisitions 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  Tool	  u
sa
ge
	  
	  usage	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Satisfaction	  
	   21	  
derived that the organizations that used more than just a few of the strategic tools were 
more successful than the ones that did not or used only one. (Santalainen 2009: 28) 
 
Richard D`Aveni´s (1995) concept `hyper-competition` describes the turbulent situation of 
the global environment of the organizations (D`Aveni 1995 cited in Santalainen 2009:65). 
The concept was first launched by D´Aveni in the turbulent times of the 1990s recession. 
Its core dilemma is that sustainable advantage is no longer attainable for organizations in a 
world that changes too quickly.  
 
This leads, according to D`Aveni, to the fact that role of the intermediary organizations 
changes: Some are not needed, whereas new intermediaries that are born can obtain a lot of 
space and develop fast. Technology and internet are factors that quickly shape every-day 
environment in which the organizations struggle for existence. The hyper-competition era 
can be described as postmodern and complex (Juuti 2006 cited in Santalainen 2009:65). 
Essential traits to the era are jumping from one domain to the next, overcoming traditional 
barriers,  overall fragmentation and a very quick change  
 
How the organization react to hyper-competition varies: several factors of the hyper-
competition can be recognized that define how the organization´s leadership take a stand 
towards change (Santalainen 2009: 65-66). According to Santalainen, three different 
approaches are found: 
 
1) Defense. If an organization has a dominant position due to size or a 
monopoly, status quo and continuing of daily activities without risk-taking is 
a possible choice. In practice, defense tactics or isolation have been shown 
to lead to erosion in the long term. 
2) Quick adaptability. An ability to read changes essential to the 
environment and flexibility are qualities which help to create an 
organization that stays vital when drastic changes occur.  
3) Shaping the future. The most renewable organizations create the  
future. Their strategists are able to think of what has not realized itself yet, 
and they have the ability to transform the thoughts into action and results. 
During the hyper competition era, the relative power of the companies in 
creating environments has increased in comparison with  legislative power 
and politics. Companies` actions are multinational, global, as opposed to 
local decision-making. They shape the future globally. 
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How can we create strategies that are agile in a global environment, and at best, shape the 
environment?, Santalainen asks (Santalainen 2009:65-66). The four winning traits, 
according	   to Harvard professor Nohria (2003) in a strategy are: clearly thought strategy, 
strategic resources, flexibility of structures and processes & creating of a successful 
(organizational) culture. Professor Nohria studied 160 organizations strategic tools and 
techniques for the past ten years (Nohria 2003 cited in Santalainen 2009:66).  
 
Professor Saloner from Stanford University (2011) stresses that positioning can create 
competitive advantage by a) the favorable structure of the domain (a monopoly) b) 
differentiation strategy (do things differently) or c) unique networking (Saloner 2011 cited 
in Santalainen 2009:68). Hardball and curveball are examples of strategies that seek to 
mislead competitors and are considered as rough and competitive rival strategies in 
business world. From Santalainen´s definition can be derived that they are only used in 
extreme circumstances, such as when fighting over very scarce resources (organizations), 
or wanting to take a leading market position over a competitor, such as over key markets 
(business) (Santalainen 2009:71-72). Can the hardball, curveball and Saloner´s 
differentiation strategy be applied to the cultural sector at all? Are we competing against 
our rivalry organizations, or just peacefully living in the same environment as good 
neighbors? 
 
Traditional strategy making can also be an obstacle for an organization to create its future. 
Saloner (2011) has identified the misleading principles of traditional strategy-making, 
stressing that strategic thinking is not in the least routine implementation of planned 
frameworks, mediums and techniques, but instead mapping the field conceptually and a 
continuous renewal (Saloner 2011 cited in Santalainen 2009:75). A strategy is the need for 
re-mapping and renewal of an organization. An example of problematic strategic thinking 
is a strategy that is bind to the organization´s fiscal year – according to this kind of strategy 
making, thinking in the organization is allowed only during a certain period of the year. 
However, Especially in turbulent times, Saloner argues (2011) the questioning and finding 
of answers should be constant in the organization and be bind to the core structures of its 
every-day life, if the organization is to survive. 
 
2.5 Securing Resources: Physical, Financial & Organizational 
 
One aspect of strategic thinking, and a central one to this study, is a resource-based 
allocation, thinking inside out from the organization. The resources must then first be 
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identified. Santalainen identifies six resources within and organization: 1) physical, 2) 
financial, 3) organizational, 4) HR, 5) intellectual and 6) network-based partnerships 
(2009:82-83). The balance between these resources is the key to a resource-based planning. 
Signals coming from within the organization are crucial in this thinking – only after that 
the signals have been heard can creative solutions be considered. The use and combinations 
of these must start however from the signals, Santalainen writes.  Regarding the subject of 
this study of the economic crisis, we need to take a closer look at the resource-based 
strategic thinking in the next few chapters.  
 
Physical and financial resources are important for a result-oriented organization such as a 
company that strives to make profit. Grant (2008) suggests a doctor-like structure for the 
strategy making of an organization, where first a diagnosis is done based on the prominent 
situation, and then, based on the diagnosis, criteria are created for the future well being of 
the patient (Grant 2008 cited in Santalainen 2009:83).  
 
Greed and profit-based thinking can sometimes shorten the life span of an organization, 
and affect it especially long-term: Quarter-year thinking is dangerous, Santalainen argues 
(Santalainen 2009:84). Such can be the case of an arts organization: “Vaikka talouden 
tunnuslukuja seurataan vuosineljänneksittäin, organisaation strategien on uskallettava 
ajatella ja tehdä pidemmällä aikajänteellä tulevaisuutta rakentavia valintoja. Pitkään hyvin 
menestyneet yritykset toimivatkin joustavasti uudistaen jatkuvasti strategiaansa, 
rakennettaan ja toimintatapojaan sen sijaan, että tutkittaisiin pelkästään numeroita ja 
juututtaisiin toistamaan samaa menestyksen mallia.” The arts organizations must see 
further than the quarter-year thinking allows: to future possibilities, change factors, 
circumstantial and resource-based facts, Santalainen debates (Santalainen 2009:84). 
 
The global financial crisis has, according to Santalainen, proved the traditional risk 
management skills simply unreliable:  “Globaali talouskriisi demonstroi monia 
riskienhallinnan sudenkuoppia muuttuvassa toimintaympäristössä.” Stulz (2009 cited in 
Santalainen 2009:85) shows that in the environment of the hyper-competition risk analyses 
and tools based on historical data simply do not work. Some risks are even in the 
complicated reports of the experts, that the others do not understand: ”Kommunikaatiokuilu 
estää toiminnan.“ For the next crisis Stulz suggests a “what if“ scenario planning. 
Santalainen sees scenarios as a good strategic rehearsal for the organization. (Santalainen 
2009:85) In the case of the economic crisis and museums, a worst-case scenario has partly 
already happened during the 2008 turbulence. Could it have been foreseen through scenario 
planning, is another question we take a closer look at in the Conclusion chapter. 
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Experience from working life shows, according to Santalainen, that the hierarchical 
structures of the organization can rather complicate than facilitate the individual´s work. It 
is a victory if the organization does not substantially harm the practical work of its 
employees. Continuous restructuring of the organization is nevertheless a sign of a non-
working organization. On the other hand, it creates belief on the structure as a resource, 
Santalainen decides. (Santalainen 2009:85) An organization is an organic entity, consisting 
of structure, processes and personal relations. The formal structure creates the daily-life 
processes. Personal networks, on the other hand, create the dynamics. (Santalainen 
2009:85)  
 
2.5.1 Strategic Role of the Resources 
 
According to Salama & Asch (2003), resources can advance an organization´s success in 
five different ways: 1) Resources enable execution. Chandler: “structure must follow 
strategy”, applies here: resources are always submissive. 2) Certain resources affect 
success despite circumstances 3) Strategy is built on resource allocation, the special asset 
of the organization. 4) Strategy is built and executed simultaneously around resources, 
leading to the central importance of the strategists who see to the future. 5) Resources and 
strategy are united into a transformational process. Through transformation, future is being 
created. In this manner, strategic thinking and acting are united. (Santalainen 2009:88) 
 
Hamel & Prahalad (2006) have described how inside out, resource-based strategic thinking 
expands the possibilities compared to outside-in thinking: the core of the competition 
challenge expands from solely the renewal of business processes into the renewal of  
strategy in an organization. Along with the organizational changes, industries are being 
changed. In addition to the competition of the market shares, organizations are competing 
for possibilities. (Santalainen 2009: 88) 
 
Santalainen writes about Hamel & Prahalad´s definition: “Tulevaisuuden löytämiseksi 
strategian tulee merkitä uuden oppimisen rinnalla vanhasta poisoppimista. Asemoinnin 
lisäksi strategian on pyrittävä ennakoimaan tulevaa, jolloin strategia ei ole pelkkä 
suunnitelma vaan kokonainen organisaation arkkitehtuuri.“ –Yksittäisten organisaatioiden 
lisäksi kilpailijoina ovat entistä enemmmän kumppanuusverkostot.  –Pyritään ennakoivaan 
tarpeiden tyydyttämiseen ja joskus tarpeiden luomiseenkin. Tulevaisuuden luominen 
edellyttää venymistä ja resursseja kartuttavan vipuvoiman kehittämistä organisaatioiden ja 
verkostojen sisällä”. The creating of tomorrow starts from the strive to foresee future. In 
	   25	  
addition to single organizations the rivalries are more often than not networks. Therefore 
the creation and implication of a strategy demands flexibility and resources in-between 
organizations. (Santalainen 2009:88) 
 
When the resources have been recognized inside the organization, the work to refine them 
can start.  Johnson, Scholes & Whittington (2006) have been investigating the many 
concepts among strategy literature. According to the authors, strategic assets signify the 
most important factors to the health, success and resource allocation and capabilities of an 
organization. The authors` strategic capability -hypernym consists of resources and assets. 
Visible resources mean physical capital and financial resources. Invisible assets refer to 
organizational resources and HR. Näitä hyödyntämällä ja yhdistelemällä luodaan 
pätevyyksiä. Assets are the manifestation of functioning resources. According to 
Santalainen, Johnson, Scholes & Whittington ´s assets mean those processes and functions, 
which which the organization makes use of its resources in a fiscal manner: “Pätevyydet 
tarkoittavat niitä toimintoja ja prosesseja, joiden avulla organisaatio hyödyntää 
resurssejaan tehokkaasti (Santalainen 2009:89). According to Santalainen, “(core) 
strategic competences are, and should be, only recognized beneath the organization´s 
surface.” (Santalainen 2009:91) 
 
Teng & Cummings (2002) remind that competences and assets in the organization should 
be evaluated at the same time. “Mitä vahvempi yksittäinen resurssi, pätevyys – esimerkiksi 
tietty tekninen osaaminen tai henkilö – on, sitä todennäköisemmin se estää näkemästä 
muiden resurssien arvon. Erilaisten resurssien ja pätevyyksien merkitystä on tarpeen 
ajatella myös siksi, että mikä tahansa ydinosaaminen tarvitsee tuekseen muita resursseja” 
(Teng & Cummings 2002 cited in Santalainen 2009:93).  To see all the strengths takes 
vision, because the core competences often easily hide other assets underneath in the 
organization. 
 
“Sisäinen oppiminen, osaamisen siirto ja kehittäminen ovat paikallaan 
vakaassa toimintaympäristössä ja niissä organisaatioissa, joiden tietopohja 
on monipuolinen. Mitä dynaamisempi ympäristö on, sitä todennäköisemmin 
osaamiskuilujen täyttämiseen tarvitaan ulkopuolisten kehitysvirikkeiden 
avulla tuotettavaa tietoa” (Santalainen 2009:93).  
 
The unique resources and competences in the organization can rely on networks and PR. If 
the organization´s success is about to hit a low record, networking is needed to develop the 
organization. This also creates new domains, new markets and the improvement of rules in 
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the field, Santalainen points out (Santalainen 2009:93).  “Organisaation kilpailuympäristö 
voi joko edistää tai hidastaa ainutlaatuisten resurssien ja pätevyyksien kehittymistä. The 
argument supports Porter´s Research on Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990): “The 
harder the competition, the better. Challenges have a refining impact” (Santalainen 
2009:93). 
 
Helfat (2007) defines dynamic capabilities : they mean the capacity of the organization to 
create, expand and refine its resources and processes. “Dynaamisen kyvykkyyden laatutaso 
mitataan sen mukaan, miten tehokkaasti organisaatio saavuttaa itselleen määrittämänsä 
tulostavoitteet”, Santalainen stresses. The quality of the capabilities is measured according 
to the organization´s performance level: (Santalainen 2009:93-94) 
 
         “Organizaatiot voidaan asemoida eri resurssi- ja pätevyyslajien kautta.-- 
Jäljitys voidaan aloittaa kysymällä, mikä tai mitkä ovat sellaisia täsmällisiä 
resursseja tai pätevyyksiä, joilla organisaatio erottuu muista. Sen jälkeen 
voidaan arvioida, onko organisaation tietty pätevyys ilmaistu näkyvästi 
jossakin vai onko se ajan mittaan kumuloitunutta hiljaista tietoa. Lopuksi on 
pyrittävä tunnistamaan, missä organisaation osassa kyseinen pätevyys 
täsmällisesti ilmaistuna sijaitsee.” (Santalainen 2009:94)  
 
 Processes are the core of dynamic action. The great challenge related to dynamic resource 
strategies is finding the balance between stability and renewability (Santalainen 2009:94) 
Bingham, Eisehardt ja Furr revise the concept and stress that processes are clusters of 
action that repeat themselves over time and thus enable the specific actions of the 
organization (Bingham, Eisehardt ja Furr 2007 cited in Santalainen 2009:94-95). 
Santalainen continues: 
 
 
“Prosessien dynamiikka ohjaa huomion strategisen ajattelun ja toiminnan 
kriittiseen saumakohtaan. Prosessit tempaavat mahdollisuuksien virtaan. 
Passiivinen ajelehtiminen tässä virrassa ei luo lisäarvoa, vaan olennaista on 
kyetä ottamaam mahdollisuudet haltuun. Toisin sanoen pelkkä kokemus ei 
riitä, vaan tarvitaan mahdollisuuksien tiedostamista. Tämä voi tapahtua 
luovan kokemuksista oppimisen tai joskus jopa improvisoinnin avulla. 
Perustavoite on pyrkiä muuntamaan tiedostetut kokemukset tuleviksi 
ratkaisuiksi prosesseja hyödyntäen. Prosessien hallinnasta voi 
parhaimmillaan syntyä strateginen kyvykkyys.”  
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It is easy to conclude, Santalainen debates, that strategic processes should be the 
organization´s core dynamic processes. In practice, instead of different implications and 
goals, a strategy process should be a constant, agile, open, proactive and integrated series 
of actions, Santalainen analyzes (Santalainen 2009:95).  
 
Real options are a concept of resource-based management, that seeks to enhance the 
flexibility of strategic resources and capabilities. Grant (2008 cited in Santalainen 2009:95) 
finds two ways to implement the notion. The first is connected to finance theory. Secondly, 
resource-based management and strategy can find new investments with the notion of real 
options.  Through strategic alliances and partnerships whole new strategies can be 
developed.  Strategic capabilities can be thought as real options as such, because they 
enable future competitive advantages, Santalainen describes (Santalainen 2009:96).  
 
In the era of the hyper competition the barriers of the traditional domains are broken and it 
is more essential to create new real options  in the new, undefined industries Todelliset 
optiot rohkaisevat monipuolistamaan resurriajattelua ennen kaikkea dynaamisten 
ydinpätevyyksien suuntaan”, Santalainen concludes (Santalainen 2009:96).  
 
2.5.2 Recognizing Core Competences 
 
Rumelt (1994) has found criteria for core competences in an organization: they are 1) 
Organizational coverage 2) permanent dominance 3) learning by doing 4) the centre of the 
competition (Rumelt 1994 cited in Santalainen 2009. Separating resources from 
competences in the organization can be difficult, and they often cross. However, the real 
competition occurs on the level of core competences, not that of the single products or 
services.  
 
Core rigidity, on the other hand, is a danger especially in an organization within introverted 
cultures. It can lead to choosing leaders from the inside of the organization, and thus 
impoverishing the organization and neglecting benchmarking : “ Santalainen writes: 
“Yksipuolinen henkilöstön kehittäminen ja avoimien toimien miehitys pelkästään sisäisillä 
valinnoilla, `venäläisellä puunukke- metodilla`, johtaa samanlaisuuden vahvistumiseen. 
Samaan päädytään laiminlyömällä ulkoinen benchmarking. Ydinjäykkyydet esiintyvät 
yhdessä aktiivisen inertian kanssa.” (Santalainen 2009:92). 
 
“Strategy process is - or should be – a core process of the organization, Santalainen 
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reminds” and continues: “its purpose is guaranteeing continuity”. According to 
Santalainen, the recognition of real options and the creation of added value or a 
competitive advantage for the organization is everything but the traditional strategic 
process, in which the strategy is being “updated” (Santalainen 2009:96). 
 
Burgelman (2002): itsenäiset strategiaprosessit. “Muodollisen strategiaprosessin lisäksi 
toteutetaan sitä täydentäviä strategiaprosesseja. -- Autonominen strategiatyö sisältää 
sellaisia strategisia aloitteita tai todellisia optioita, jotka eivät luontevasti sisälly 
varsinaiseen strategiaprosessiin. – Olennaista on, että autonomiset strategiset aloitteet 
yhdistävät erilaisia strategisia resursseja ja pätevyyksiä uudella tavalla.”  
 
It is important to note, that all strategy processes do not lead to results or suit the existing 
organizational structure. According to Santalainen, the strategies created must be linked 
with existing goals and functions: “Uudistusprojektien linkittäminen sekä ilmaistuihin 
ulkoisiin mahdollisuuksiin että olemassa oleviin strategioihin parantaa niiden 
pitkäjänteisyyttä ja elinmahdollisuuksia. Samanaikainen muutoksen aikaansaaminen ja 
jatkuvuuden turvaaminen, radikaalit strategiset uudistukset ja pienten askelten kehitystyöt, 
uudet kokeilut ja aikaisempien kokeilujen tulosten soveltaminen ovat strategisen johdon 
työhaasteita.” The organization must function at the same time that the new strategy is 
made, without that either the core functions of the organization or new experiments and 
strategic endeavors suffer (Santalainen 2009:97).    
 
2.6 Types of Organizations 
 
Santalainen names three categories of the types of organizations: A functional or a line 
organization is an organization that strives to execute its basic functions such as the 
production, funding, accounting, marketing and HR of an organization. The advantages of 
this type of an organization are a clear division of tasks, responsibility and specialization in 
one area of expertise. Disadvantages are often problems in horizontal coordination and 
work routines taking over substance. A functional structure is never a strategic one, 
Santalainen reminds. (Santalainen 2009:85) 
 
 A division- or a unit-based organization is structured around relatively independent units, 
which have been labeled according to products, services or geography. The main 
headquarters offers units support services (such as funding, HR). The advantages of this 
type of an organization are commitment to strategic implementation and profit 
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responsibility, and flexibility of structure. However, problems can arise as to the 
relationship and money /resource allocation between the center and the unit, problems 
related to individual freedom when optimizing the overall profit of the unit and a lack of 
horizontal cooperation. The “headquarters problem” has been diminished with a holding 
structure, in which the independence of the units is being increased. Then the task of the 
central administration is mainly choosing of the businesses (portfolio) and funding. 
(Santalainen 2009:85).  
 
The third organizational type, a matrix structure strives to enhance agility and cooperation 
within the organization, combining both function and the product or services. The more 
international and diverse the organization, the more the matrix structure is seen suitable, 
Santalainen points out. Typically it is the solution of a multi- or transnational company or 
an international organization working on global or transnational level. (Santalainen 
2009:85-86) 
 
Johnson, Scholes and Whittington (Johnson, Scholes & Whittington 2008 cited in 
Santalainen 2009:86) have explored the advantages of matrix organizations in the business 
world. The advantages of a matrix structure are: 1) The commitment of the leadership 2) 
the structure of the matrix that enables a versatile decision-making process 3) Integration 
process of knowledge into the organization strengthens learning 4) Coordination of 
decision-making lessens conflicts and makes facing conflicts easier 5) Adaptation to 
surprises and strategic special situations is easier.  
 
“A matrix organization frequently uses teams of employees to accomplish work, in order to 
take advantage of the strengths, as well as make up for the weaknesses, of functional and 
decentralized forms”  (Johnson, Scholes & Whittington 2008). 
 
Bartlett, Ghoshal and Beamish (2008) have developed a transnational network structure 
based on transnational and global organizations. The cornerstones of the transnational 
structure are: 
 
1. Leadership responsibilities and duties are defined individually, e.g. 
according to each country or area of specialization. This enhances the 
independence of the units and the motivation of their leadership. 
 
2. Every organization unit creates a special contribution to the entity. 
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3. As a result of differentiation, centers of know-how are born. They 
possess a combination of both special knowledge in their field and 
PR/audience development skills.  
 
4. Corporate management directs the network functions and offers 
individual support for each unit separately.  
 
5. Global information production and sharing are developed through 
projects and activity, transnational workshops and diverse strategic 
development projects.  
 
6. The structure of the organization is a paradigm of the leadership, which 
will be strengthened by development of the establishment and functions. 
 
Santalainen explains the dangers of a transnational structure: unclearness of responsibility 
and the unwillingness of the leadership to move as the organization is of a  global nature  
“Transnationaalinen rakenne on -- varteenotettava byrokratiaa vierastaville suurille 
organisaatioille. Tiimiorganisaatio ja projektiorganisaatio antavat pienemmissä puitteissa 
samoja etuja.” Sometimes the same advantages can be obtained through a team (unit) 
organization or a project-based organization (Santalainen 2009:87). 
 
2.7 Transforming the Organization: Change Management and Vision 
 
In his book “Leading Change” (1996), Harvard Business School Professor Emeritus John 
P. Kotter targets leadership and change management. Change, or transformational 
leadership, is described in detail to help organizations in its every-day operative level to 
identify problems and prevent them through effective vision and the communicating of that 
vision instead of micromanagement planning typical to traditional management. The term 
leadership is dealt in a wider sense than management, the latter referring mainly to control 
and the former to a new direction of an organization through change. Transformational 
leadership in a strategic process in which the urgency level of the organization must be first 
raised and leadership coalitions properly created before any implications can take place. 
 
 John P. Kotter identifies eight mistakes why companies fail transforming organizations: 
(Kotter 1996:3) 
• Allowing too much complacency  
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• Failing to create a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition  
• Underestimating the power of vision  
• Under communicating the vision 
• Permitting obstacles to block the new vision 
• Failing to create short-term wins 
• Declaring victory too soon 
• Neglecting to anchor changes firmly in the culture 
 
To prevent these mistakes, Kotter has developed an Eight-Stage Process of Creating Major 
Change (Kotter 1996:21). The stages are: 1) Establishing a sense of urgency 2) Creating an 
effective guiding coalition 3) Developing a vision and strategy 4) Communicating the 
change vision 5) Empowering board-based action 6) Generating short-term wins to keep 
people motivated, 7) Consolidating gains and producing more change and  8) Anchoring 
new approaches in the culture of the organization. 
 
To succeed, an organization must establish a sense of urgency. Creating guiding coalition 
is necessary in developing the vision and strategy, communicating the change vision and 
empowering board-based action. To secure a successful process, it is important to generate 
short-term wins of some kind to keep the people involved motivated. Consolidation of 
gains is needed to produce more change and anchoring new approached in the culture. 
 
So how to do all this, and – more importantly - when people are out of their comfort zones 
and the first steps have been taken, what next? Most organizations settle for setting up 
guiding coalitions and leave the rest to be resolved on its own. According to Kotter, this is 
a major mistake. Nine Ways to Raise the Urgency Level are addressed to the organization 
that have leveled their sense of urgency to attain change, and that are truly willing to start 
the process of transformation (Kotter 1996: 44): 
 
• Create a crisis by allowing a financial loss, exposing managers to major weakness vis-à-vis 
competitors, or allowing errors to blow up instead of being corrected at the last minute 
• Eliminate obvious examples of excess, (e.g. company-owned country club facilities, a large 
airfare, gourmet executive dining rooms) 
• Set revenue, income, productivity, customer satisfaction, and cycle-time targets so high that 
they cannot be reached by conducting business as usual. 
• Stop measuring subunit performance based only on narrow functional goals. Insist that more be 
held accountable for broader measures of business performance. 
• Send more data about customer satisfaction and financial performance to more employees, 
especially information that demonstrates weaknesses vis-à-vis the competition. 
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• Insist that people talk regularly to unsatisfied customers, unhappy suppliers, and disgruntled 
shareholders. 
• Use consultants and other means to force more relevant data and honest discussion into 
management meetings. 
• Put more honest discussions of the firm´s problems in company newspapers and senior 
management speeches. Stop senior management "happy talk". 
• Bombard people with information on future opportunities, on the wonderful rewards for 
capitalizing on those opportunities, and on the organization´s current inability to pursue those 
opportunities. 
 
The nine ways to raise urgency level are a good reality check for the organization too often 
absorbed in their own daily routines and agendas. Kotter wants to wake them up and pull 
out of their hibernation. So how should a good coalition then be created? The leadership 
issue is essential. Creating a powerful guiding coalition (Kotter 1996:51) means, that the 
coalition must have the right people, good connections and high credibility. It must based 
on trust and a common goal. Clarity of vision is needed, too: managers and employees can 
figure out themselves what to do without checking with a boss or their peers. In short: what 
is needed is 1. Position power 2. Expertise 3. Credibility and 4. Leadership.  
 
Vision (Kotter 1996:67) helps to break through the Status Quo better than authoritarian 
decree or micromanagement. Creating a vision takes both the head and the heart, and some 
time and is therefore a messy, difficult and sometimes emotionally charged exercise. An 
operating plan confused by most managers with vision is not a vision. More closer to a plan 
- yet a plan can never inspire action the way a vision can. A good vision is an important 
investment in creating a better future. Communicating Change Vision (Kotter 1996:85) has 
many threats, such as under communication and inconsistent messages. The challenge of 
simple and direct communication is that it demands great clarity of thoughts and courage. 
To empower employees a good vision must (Kotter 1996:101): 
 
• Focus on the customer 
• Give more responsibility to the lower-level employees 
• Increase productivity 
• Speed everything up  
 
Structure is needed as well. Yet there should be responsibility for products and services, 
since often layers of middle-level managers second-guess and criticize employees, huge 
staff groups are expensive and initiate costly programs and independent employees do not 
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communicate, but only slow things down. Even short-term wins help put the team back on 
track. Highly successful transformation efforts, those who do not last just for a while, 
combine good leadership with good management according to Kotter (Kotter 1996:129). 
 
Sometimes New Approaches in the (Organizational) Culture are needed. Norms of group 
behavior are somewhat invisible and hard to change - shared values are invisible and 
extremely hard to change. Both exist in an organization. Here key is to talk about the need 
for change: where the old habits come from and how they served the organization well for 
a certain period of time, and why they do not do the trick anymore and have therefore to be 
replaced by more up-to-date ideas. Anchoring change in a culture (1996: 145) means 
alterations in norms and shared values come last in the transformational process, a lot of 
change talk, a turnover is possible in the organizations management level and, finally, all 
practices must support the new practices. 
 
 Kotter envisions A Twenty-First Century Organization: its structure is non-bureaucratic, 
with fever employees, it has fewer levels, it is organized for the upper management to lead 
and lower to manage and it is characterized by policies and procedures that produce 
minimal interdependence. The systems in the 21st century organization depends of many 
performance information systems, providing data to customers, distributes data on 
performance widely and offers management training. 
Its culture should be externally oriented, empowering, quick to make decisions, open and 
candid and more risk tolerant, than that of a traditional organization. 
 
2.7.1 Transformational Leadership Summary 
 
The key to organizational success according to transformational leadership and change 
strategy is life-long learning. This means, according to Santalainen and Kotter, building a 
`learning organization` where leadership is present also in the lower levels of management, 
including an adaptive organizational culture and unnecessary interdependence. Persistent 
sense of urgency, team work at the top, broad-based empowerment and a selection of 
people who can make change visions, and a delegated management for short-term projects 
and wins. (Santalainen: Kotter:) 
 
	   34	  
 
                                                      
Table 3: John P. Kotter: Leading Change – A Learning Organization. 
 
2.8 The Field of Museums 	  
The Museum studies take us closer to the contemporary art museum field. Whereas Porter, 
Kotter and Santalainen see a more general approach to strategy making and leadership in 
organizations, Neil G, Philip and Wendy I. Kotler and Alexander address the museum 
challenges specifically. The Kotlers explore museums in relation to strategic marketing. 
Victoria D. Alexander builds theory from sociology through an organizational approach to 
museum funding. Both theorists bring new aspects to the dilemma of the external 
environmental changes in museum leadership as opposed to internal, that are essential to 
the study´s approach in dealing with the possible effects of the economic crisis. 
 
2.8.1  External and Internal Environments 
  
Victoria D. Alexander, Associate Professor at Harvard University, takes a different 
approach to the museums through an organizational sociology research on funding. 
According to Alexander, organizations are profoundly shaped by their environment 
(Alexander 1996:12). In Museums and Money: The Impact of Funding, Alexander plunges 
deeper into the museum world: how does funding affect museums both on organizational 
and curatorial levels of decision-making? “The environment is not a pool of demands to be 
Persistent	  sense	  of	  urgency	   Strong	  Empowerment	   Delegated	  management	   Adaptive	  organizational	  culture	   People	  who	  make	  and	  communicate	  change	   Team	  work	  on	  top	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passively met”, she writes (Alexander 1996:12). 
 
From strategic decision-making theories, Alexander stresses the fact that they concentrate 
in organizations as something that tries to fit in to and manage their environment. Strategy 
management orients museums to the art world (Alexander 1996:13, Chaffee 1985, Child 
1972, Miles, et al. 1978).  
 
“Museums may choose to be less attuned to exhibitions if they wish to attract 
elites. External scholars may be more interested in catalogues of museum 
collections and in in-depth research on particular artworks published as 
articles in museum bulletins. Each of these strategies implies a somewhat 
different external orientation. Though most museums do some combination of 
all of these activities, the particular mix of orientations dictates internal 
arrangements and suggests the direction of future strategies.” (Alexander 
1996:13) 
 
According to Alexander, strategic contingency theory suggests that internal conflict in 
museums will increase with the introduction of new environments that add new types of 
employees inside the organization, or when the old ones are strengthened (Alexander 
1996:13). Museum is an easily unbalanced organization. “In museums, the conflict 
between factions is likely to affect the content of art exhibitions, since exhibitions are 
shaped by various ´stakeholders`- curators, administrators, educators, funders and 
audiences. As any of these groups gets stronger, weaker or changes its point of view, 
exhibitions are likely to change.” Alexander forgets one important group from her list 
essential in a contemporary art museum– the living artists that supply the exhibition 
content entirely. This power perspective of the organizational leadership can be seen, 
however, as accurate, when later in this study me think of the economic crisis and its 
effects. The changes in the museum´s environment can have dramatic effects in the 
museum´s core functions. In the next subchapter we take a closer look at the theory related 
to the environment(s) of the museums. 
 
Institutional theorists argue that the decision-making in an organization is rather based on 
legitimacy as well as tangible resources (Alexander 1996:14). A resource flow approach is, 
institutional theorists stress, therefore perhaps more accurate and can be applied to the 
research in relation to museum leadership and the economic crisis  (Meyer & Scott 1992, 
Powell & DiMaggio 1991, Scott 1995 cited in Alexander 1996:14). The environments also 
shape organizations, so we take a closer look at the environments in the next chapter to 
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gain a deeper understanding of all the factors affecting the leadership.  
 
2.8.2 Strategic Museum Environments 
 
Neil G. Kotler, Philip Kotler & Wendy I. Kotler address museums in a changing 
environment: “Museums operate in a continuously changing environment. The 
environment, both external and internal, is the starting point for adopting a realistic mission 
and goals and strategies to achieve the mission.”  
 
Strategic planning can be defined as “the determination of basic long-term goals and 
objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of the courses of action and  the allocation of 
resources necessary for carrying out those goals “. Strategic planning is led by the 
institution’s senior staff and the heads of different departments and units. It involves 
generating different scenarios of the future and planning for them. Strategic planning 
engages the museum in a three- to five-year planning process. The process provides a 
perspective on where the museum has been. Where it is, and where it should go given new 
opportunities and threats and internal organizational strengths and weaknesses. “ (Kotler, 
Kotler & Kotler 2008:43)  
 
According to Kotler, Kotler & Kotler, a strategic plan confers several benefits: (1) 
checking on and improving the museum´s performance, (2) providing a framework for 
decision making, (3) creating a basis for planning new initiatives, (4) identifying ways to 
motivate museum staff, and (5) scanning changes in the external environment and its 
effects on a museum organization. “Private donors, foundations, and corporation and other 
funders increasingly, review museum strategic plans to determine whether a museum is 
performing well and deserves support. “  (Kotler, Kotler & Kotler 2008: 44-45) 
 
The museums live in an environment, that finds and reshapes itself constantly. An external 
environmental scan helps the institution to see its standing point in the art world and 
independently assess its core functions and values: 
 
 “Museums operate in a rapidly changing and frequently unstable competitive 
environment. The microenvironment consists of forces and conditions that 
shape opportunities and pose threats to an organization: demographic shifts, 
economic and business cycles, cultural value and attitude shifts, political 
realignments, and government and regulatory programs and policy changes, 
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for example. Organizations have to monitor these forces for their effects on 
both short-range and long-term planning” (Kotler, Kotler & Kotler 2008: 47-
48). 
 
Kotler, Kotler & Kotler´s environmental scan for museums is especially accurate when 
considering the leadership situation during the economic crisis: 
 
“For example, during an economic recession, corporate contributions are 
likely to be reduced, thereby requiring a museum to seek revenue from 
alternative sources or retrench. Similarly, museums ought to be sensitive to 
demographic shifts, targeting younger groups, for example, so that they are 
not only serving largely aging audiences?” (Kotler, Kotler & Kotler 2008: 47-
48). 
 
2.8.3 Strategic Management of Museums – A Summary 
 
In this chapter, the theories of organizational leadership, museum studies and strategy have 
been compared in Table 4. They are evaluated in relation to each other regarding the 
research questions and the purpose of the study. Which one(s) are best applicable to the 
situation of the economic crisis affecting the affiliate museums? Which theories are 
implicated best in the industry in Finland, and which ones in the United States? Which are 
the differences in ecosystem, in funding and culture organizations` leadership? 
 
Michael Porter´s 5 forces strategy is a useful classic in the field of nonprofits and well as 
for-profits. But, does it serve nonprofits in the museum field accurately? The notion of 
rivalry is also a debated one, a controversial issue in the museum field. Do the museums 
really compete against each other, or rather, operate in the same industry being 
interdependent of each other in a fruitful way, and cooperate? How should museum 
strategy be defined in all? The 5 forces strategy can useful when it comes to the effects 
caused by the economic crisis, on the other hand. As a threat from the exterior comes and 
causes large-scale changes in the leadership, the strategic approach of Michael Porter might 
be accurate. But as the critics of this theory point out,  there is perhaps after all a gap in the 
theory, the sixth force  missing, that of the environment/state/the public. That is the factor 
that mostly relates to the main research question of this study, the effects of the economic 
crisis (Porter 1995). 
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Timo Santalainen´s definition of the thinking and acting organization serves nonprofits in 
the museum field perhaps better. Santalainen possesses a holistic view on organizational 
leadership, that encourages the organization to grow in ambition in relation to its mission, 
values and daily functions (Santalainen 2009).  
 
John P. Kotter addresses a `learning organization`. Like Santalainen (2009), he questions 
traditional strategy-making as something that is more likely to prohibit the organization 
from growing internally and developing a functioning strategy than help it. The ambitious 
concept of transformational leadership, is nevertheless perhaps best implied to businesses 
than nonprofits. The notion of the classical micro-management not being suitable for  the 
21st century leadership, is accurate however, as to especially the economic crisis and its 
effects. The impact of the crisis is global, the crisis largely taking place outside the 
organization yet effecting it profoundly. Visionary leadership, according to Kotter is 
needed in every organization of the 21st century (Kotter 1996).   
 
Victoria D. Alexander sees museums through an organizational sociology approach. 
Alexander assesses museum funding, and comes to the conclusion, that the museums are 
organizations that are profoundly and constantly shaped buy their environments, both 
internal and external. The approach is applicable to the challenges of the economic crisis, 
as Alexander´s theory takes into account both the environmental influences of a museum 
affiliate as well as the impact of the (internal) organizational leadership. It does not solely 
rely on strategic planning (Alexander 1996). 
 
Kotler, Kotler and Kotler use museum marketing as a strategic tool through which they 
question where the museum has come from, where it stands now and where it is going to in 
the future. To achieve a better performance and a more realistic audience development 
programme the museum leadership must ask five questions concerning the direction and 
goals of the organization. During the process, all of the staff of the organization must be 
motivated to enhance the overall performance of the museum and reach a more reliable 
audience segmentation. When asked whom the contemporary art museum affiliates should 
serve, the audience, education, curators, professionals, leadership or the artists, Kotler, 
Kotler & Kotler´s view is accurate. Implementation of the study to the economic crisis and 
its effects is taken into account as a capstone of the theory (Kotler, Kotler & Kotler 2008). 
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Theorist	   Name	  of	  Theory	   Main	  Ideas	   Theoretical	  Aims	  
 
A. STRATEGY 
THEORY 
1. Michael 
Porter 
 
 
5 Forces  
 
Classical SWOT analysis is not enough 
when determining the environment in 
which the company/organization 
operates. 
 
Strategy is best defined through the 
concepts of rivalry, threats and bargaining 
power, both inner and outer. 
 
 
2. Timo 
Santalainen 
 
A Thinking and 
Acting 
Organization 
 
The power of strategic thinking is in the 
individual. Strategy is dialogue between 
the strategist and the environment. 
Strategic vision, individual strategies, 
business plan and strategy context form 
the strategy. The strategist as a leader 
of the self.  
 
 
The aim is to connect the strategic action 
with the inner strategic thinking and to 
sharpen the vision of the strategist. 
Strategic thinking is a  continuous learning 
process of the organization through 
transformation. 
John    
3.         3. John P. 
   K       Kotter 
P.Ko 
 
Change Strategy 
& 
Transformational 
Leadership 
 
Towards a 21st century leadership. A 
`learning organization`. To succeed, an 
organization must have an adaptive 
organizational culture, constant sense of 
urgency, team work on top, strong 
empowerment of employees, delegated 
management and  people who make and 
communicat change. 
 
Preparing the leader to lead through vision 
and lower organization to manage. From 
classical (micro)management towards 
visionary leadership and ability to tackle 
constant change both inside the 
organization and in the environment. 
 
 
B. MUSEUM 
STUDIES 
1. Victoria D. 
Alexander 
 
Museums and 
Money: The 
Impact of Funding  
 
Organizational sociology approach. 
Organizations are profoundly shaped by 
their environment. 
 
How does funding affect museums both on 
organizational and curatorial levels of 
decision-making? Analyzing internal & 
external environments for museums. 
 
2. Kotler, Kotler 
& Kotler 
 
Museum Strategy, 
Marketing and 
Leadership 
 
Where the museum has  been, where it 
is now & where it is going to.  
Museums & strategic marketing. 
 
(1) Checking on and improving the 
museum´s performace, (2) providing a 
framework for decision making, (3) 
creating a basis for planning new initiatives, 
(4) identifying ways to motivate museum 
staff & (5) scanning changes. 
 
                     Table 4: A comparison of the theories of strategy, leadership and organizational studies of museums. 
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3.1 Methodological Approach 
 
The approach of the study is to link the data collected by interviews and documents to the 
research questions through interpretive, qualitative research (Yin, 1984). The method of the 
research is a multiple case study based on grounded theory. According to Robert K. Yin, 
“The case study is but one of several ways of doing social science research. Other ways 
include experiments, surveys, histories, and the analysis of archival information” The 
advantages and disadvantages depend on the research question types, the control the 
investigator has over actual behavioral events and the focus on contemporary as opposed to 
historical phenomena. The distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to 
understand complex social phenomena (Yin 2003:1-2). Should the research want to find 
answers to the “how” and “why” questions, a case study is usually preferred as a research 
strategy. It is used in a study that focuses on contemporary events rather than historical 
ones, and does not require control of behavioral events.  
 
The methodology chapter aims to shed light to the relationship between the collected data 
and the theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967), and the methods which were used to process the 
data. Research method is an instRumeltal case study, aiming at more information about the 
effects of the phenomenon of the economic crisis in the museum field through the two 
different cases. The collected data is analyzed through deductive method focusing on 
transformational and change leadership theories mentioned in Chapter 3.  
 
3.1.1 Case Selection 
 
The two cases, the prominent art museums in Finland and the U.S. were chosen to 
demonstrate the influence of different ecosystems and cultural policies to the leadership 
and strategy of contemporary affiliate art museums in Finland and The United States. I also 
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had the possibility & network to access these two on a fairly high administrative level.  
 
Due to differences in funding structure the two cases are fundamentally different. They 
enlighten the differences on the effects of the Economic Crisis. However, as the 
phenomenon is global, and the data implies similar effects in all two affiliate museums that 
were chosen, the possible findings have been linked and classified to form a result. The 
study is an instRumeltal case study, aiming to provide insight to a specific phenomenon 
and its effects, that of the economic crisis.  
 
The emphasis of analysis of the possible effects of the crisis is on the museums as 
organizations, but also is intended to shed light on the process through which the crisis 
manifested itself in the every-day life of the museum and its employees as well as in the 
strategic decision-making. 
 
United States was chosen from the beginning of the study to be the second case country in 
addition to Finland. There were many different reasons for this. First, the economic crisis 
had struck the U.S. the most severely, initiating in 2008 with the Lehmann brothers 
collapse, with long-lasting consequences not only in the politics and finance, but especially 
in the field of culture and the arts. In the U.S., many of the institutions are privately funded, 
and receive only a nominal amount of funding from the community or the state. Many of 
the museums had been, prior to the collapse, entirely or mostly dependent on private sector 
funding, mainly sponsorships, private donors and foundations. Hence those funds collapsed 
nearly overnight resulting in a multitude of consequences in the museum leadership and 
exhibitions policy. 
 
Secondly, even though the crisis landed in Europe with a delay of three to four years in 
early 2012, Kiasma had fairly recently (2007) founded Kiasma Foundation in order to 
enhance its budget and ability to purchase contemporary visual arts through private 
funding. The benchmark for the foundation was originally Tate Modern in London and 
Aalto University in Helsinki, according to the former Head of Development Sanna-Mari 
Jäntti who was founding the foundation (Jäntti May 11th, 2010). The foundations in general 
are core supporters of the museums in the U.S. and internationally such as the Solomon R. 
Guggenheim. 
 
Third, personal contacts and networking made a big difference. In addition to the 
foundation, Kiasma had had a recent cooperation with MoMA PS1 New York, so the 
contacts could possibly be fairly well acquired. Also, as the President of the Artists` 
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Association of Finland, I was going to work in 2011 January in a joint exhibition project 
curated by Alanna Heiss, The founder and former director of MoMA PS1, Arctic Hysteria, 
in St. Petersburg. The Artists`Association had been working on the cooperation with Heiss 
in the Arctic Hysteria project since 2008 and, through Heiss, had strong personal contacts 
to PS1. 
  
Fourth, choosing two examples from two very different funding and ecosystem structures 
for art museum organizations was one of the core principles of the study. Kiasma, as part of 
the Finnish National Gallery, is a highly subsidized museum with as high as 78% of 
funding coming from the state whereas MoMA PS1 NY receives only a minimal grant of a 
percentage or two from the city of New York annually (McCarthy, January 13th, 2011). In 
comparison: SFMOMA in San Francisco receives no state funding whatsoever, 
nevertheless SFMOMA's budget did not drop that dramatically. On the contrary, other 
institutions with larger endowments, such as the Getty and the Metropolitan Museum, had 
to make layoffs while SFMOMA did not. MOCA in Los Angeles subsequently laid off a 
third of their staff (Zarobell, October 8th, 2010; Boehm/LA Times 11.4.2013). 
 
3.1.2 Data Collection Methods 
 
The data has been collected through multiple data collection methods, which are: personal 
and preliminary interviews, articles, lectures, media & internet sources, archival sources, 
observations, personal notes, conversations with the specialists in the field and documents. 
The interviews were conducted in meetings, email and by telephone with museum 
administrators, curators and staff such as head of sponsorship cooperations, development 
officers, directors and former directors and assistant curators. To complement these, notes 
were made through practical and direct observations by the author, expanded notes, media, 
archives, annual reports & budgets were added, documents, statistical publications and 
internet sites were searched. The data has then been analyzed with the theories chosen 
using deductive method. Through the two cases, the study aims at bringing light to the 
possible different effects of a larger economical phenomenon in the affiliate museum field 
that the organizations face today. 
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3.2 The Interviews 
 
Eleven personal interviews were conducted during a period of two and a half years with 
museum and cultural field experts, directors, curators, managers, development officers  and 
senior specialists: two preliminary interviews and seven in-depth personal interviews for 
research purposes based on the research questions during May2010 - April 2013. All of 
them (100%) were included in the final thesis (see Appendices 1: List of  Interviews, 
including an interview guide & 2: Examples of the Interviews ). The interview material 
consists of five personal interviews in the United States (2010 - 2011) and six in Finland 
(2010 - 2012). The purpose of the two preliminary interviews was to map the field for 
research purposes and to collect data in the form of a personal, short 5 – 25 -minute 
interview and discussion around the theme. From Leevi Haapala´s preliminary interview in 
May 2010 no written record was saved. Communications Manager Piia Laita chose to 
answer the research questions via email and Director of Kiasma Pirkko Siitari read the final 
text in April 2013. The purpose of the in-depth, 15 to approximately 45 minute interviews 
was to go deeper into the challenges of the research questions in the form of a pre-formed 
question list, as specified later in this chapte, and to get as much relevant data of the topic 
as possible.  
 
The following questions were asked from all the nine in-depth-interviewees and the same 
questions underpin the study. Some of the questions were asked more freely if the 
interviewee chose have a discussion on the topic instead of a strict question-and–answer 
type of a conversation: 
 
• In general, how does your museum experience change?  
• What is `change` to you? 
• What are the biggest change(s) in your museum after 2008, both internal and   
   external? 
• How did your organization tackle these changes? 
• Who are the key people leading change(s) in your museum?  
• What kind of changes took place due the Economic Crisis of 2008 in your  
   museum? 
• How did the changes effect the museum´s  
a. strategy  
b. leadership and  
c. every-day life, in your opinion? 
• Does your museum have a change strategy? If Yes, in what way was it conducted after 
2008? 
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Some additional detailed questions related to basic information such as the employees job 
description, how long the interviewee had served in the organization, what was the his/her 
position and title et cetera, were asked in addition in the beginning of the conversation, as 
well as more precise questions directly related to the topic, depending on the answers and 
the field of expertise of the interviewee. 
 
The questions were presented beforehand by email together with a letter of intention and a 
research proposal attached in a minimum of two weeks time prior to the interview. The 
questions were also given as a print in the interview situation. All interviews except the 
preliminary interviews and the interview with John Zarobell from SFMOMA, and the 
preliminary interview of Sanna-Mari Jäntti (Kiasma), that were based on notes, were 
recorded on tape. One interview was recorded on tape but failed due to a technical error in 
the speaker (Miller, Kiasma). It was later reconstructed based on the original interview 
notes together with the interviewee. All the recorded interviews were transcribed by 
Tutkimustie Ltd, a company specialized in scientific transcriptions located in Tampere, 
Finland. 
 
As seen in Appendix 1: Interviews, and stated before, questions and answers around the 
actual topic of the interview in the free form discussion were also allowed to some extent. 
This was done in the purpose of acquiring as much information of the challenges and the 
topic of the study as possible. The in-depth personal interviews were considered the 
preliminary data source and core information to the study´s viewpoint, that of the effects of 
the economic crisis in the organizational level of the museums. Secondary data, documents 
and reports, supported the preliminary data acquired through the personal interviews. In 
addition to the museum budgets (Appendix 3: Annual Reports, Budgets & Documents from  
MoMA, Kiasma & The Finnish National Gallery), considering the subject, the effects of the 
crisis and the changes caused by it seemed to be best tangible through in-depth 
conversation. For this reason, the interviews are emphasized in relation to other data and 
documents in the research. The interviewees in Finland could choose between answering in 
their native language instead of English, which all of them chose to do, and the questions, 
as well as all the quotations and terminology were later translated to English. Since many 
of the research questions were abstract relating to organizational change and 
transformational leadership and the topic of the economic crisis a demanding one, the 
interviewee was first introduced to the subject via email on the form of the question lis and 
a project proposal attached, and was allowed to prepare her/himself specifically for the 
interview session. 
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Some of the questions were very abstract, such as: “How does your museum experience 
change?”, allowing the interviewee to think and define the concept of change him/herself 
from his/hers professional viewpoint and knowledge. Some were more concrete, asking the  
specific means of action during and after the economic crisis inside the organization: “How 
did your museum tackle (these) changes (in practice)?”. All of the questions were formed 
in accordance with the transformational leadership, change strategy and organizational 
leadership theories analyzed in Chapter 3, following the deductive method. This was 
important for getting precise data about change and transformational leadership in the 
organization, even though, in the view of some interviewees, the questions may have 
seemed theoretical and out of the museum´s every day life and context. The interviewees 
were chosen with criteria such as relevance to the topic, relevance to leadership & strategy, 
proximity to the organizations` strategic decision-making, status, job description and tasks, 
relevance or access to the administrative and managerial level of the organization or based 
on the interviewee´s experience on these in other fields of the industry (specialists and 
project managers in other nonprofits).  
 
The research focuses on the effects of the economic crisis in the museum field, not its 
reasons. Therefore, how these changes – if there were such - were handled in the 
organization, was crucial to the study to succeed. Some questions were left as open as 
possible for the interviewees to make her/his own choices that he/she felt relevant to the 
topic in question. Yet the conversation was always directed in the context of the research 
questions and the given topic, and it was first explained in short to the interviewee, how 
they were related to the study in general. This followed from the theoretical assumption 
that the effects of change in leadership can be seen throughout the whole organization, not 
only on the level of the actual leadership (Kotter 1996). 
 
Data collection was made from annual reports, newspaper articles, budgets, statistics, 
media sources, the internet and other personal and general observations. From the two pre-
interviews that took place in Kiasma in May 2010, Jäntti later left Kiasma and an in-depth 
interview did not happen as planned. The interview in SFMOMA took place in San 
Francisco, not New York, in SFMOMA´s premises on the 5th floor, of October, 2010 
(Curator John Zarobell), whereas all the other interviews in the U.S were conducted in New 
York, either on spot or as recorded telephone interviews. The four interviews conducted 
between the 3. and 17th January 2011 in New York consisted of three interviews about  
MoMA PS1 New York, two by telephone (Heiss, Johnson) and one interview about PS1 
was conducted in the premises of the Museum of Modern Art New York, 4th floor 
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(Development Officer Jane McCarthy). About other locations, one interview took place at a 
café near the Finnish Cultural Institute in New York (Project Manager and Interim Director 
Essi Rautiola). All interviews, notes and additional email comments by the interviewee 
were considered and included in the final research (see Appendix 1: List of Interviews) 
together with the data from one preliminary interview (Jäntti). Curator John Zarobell from 
SFMOMA chose to talk freely instead of the Q&A method. The same applies to Founder & 
Former Director of PS1 Alanna Heiss, who spoke freely about the topic. Others answered 
the research questions in the expected order. 
 
Some difficulty was found in reaching and contacting the people in question. The local 
professional culture in New York is extremely hard. To get an audience from the 
management and administration level employees in museums required several tries, emails, 
phone calls and, in most cases, re-scheduling of the planned interviews on spot. Sometimes 
this process required a lot of stamina, some other flexibility. The data gained from each 
interview was valuable. As a researcher, I found it important not to limit the amount of 
topics that the interviewees wanted to share with the interviewer, on top of the research 
questions, if they wanted to speak up, having first informed the interviewees in the 
beginning that all of the conversation will be  recorded. The interviewee could speak as 
little or as much as he/she chose, but were not stopped, should he/she want to continue 
discussing around the topic in-depth. Some of the interviewees did not want to be 
interviewed through traditional research´s question-and-answer technique (Zarobell, 
Heiss), but chose to have a free conversation instead. This was allowed in the limits of the 
topic of the research. The interviewees were also informed about the possibility to choose a 
free conversation in an email letter beforehand.  
 
The crisis seemed to be an abstract and at the same time very sensitive subject to many 
professionals working in the administrative and leadership level of the museums since it 
included funding and money issues. This was somewhat foreseen. A certain respect and a 
feeling of trust and relaxed atmosphere was therefore important to construct. Yet it did not 
always succeed fully. People on the higher administrative level in the museums are often 
independent professionals and busy people, and they choose carefully who to answer to and 
who not to. To understand this and still conduct successful interviews was one of the main 
challenges of the research. For example, the many re-schedulings of the agreed interviews 
on spot as I arrived to New York after more than a year´s planning, could be interpreted, 
and one started to wonder whether it was actually a result of some level of uncertainty to 
speak up of the matter so delicate to the interviewees as their organizations, or a lack of 
trust in a stranger, or half stratnger. Maybe both in some cases. It was therefore important 
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that the research questions could also be freely formed into conversation, should the 
interviewee prefer to speak up more freely in a relaxed atmosphere and not to feel unease 
with direct questions concerning e.g. the museum´s financial situation. At the same time, in 
these cases,  even though the order and conduct did not follow the order of the question list, 
more detailed information was still gained for the thesis. Both gained, and the confidence 
needed for the research was regained. However, this was not especially easy at times (notes 
of the author). 
 
An example below shows what kind of challenges there could be as to the gathering of in-
depth interview data in New York. The example is taken from the researcher´s notebook in 
New York, January 14th, 2011. The example is of one of the interviewees of a high status. 
It is given here as an anonymous example to depict the overall challenges of conducting the 
research: 
 
“I was sitting over a lunch with a Finnish colleague and his partner at the 
Waverly Diner on the corner of 4th Avenue and 8th Street. We were just about 
to get out late lunches at 4pm, as my phone rang. It was the interviewee 
him/herself, apologizing for a million times for being such late in answering, 
and sounding like being in a terrible hurry, but very friendly. I then learned 
that his/her plane was about to leave in an hour. Our interview date had 
already been postponed twice due to sudden overlapping of schedules during 
my brief stay in New York. I had organized the meetings already in October, 
and it was all set – before I came to New York. Now it was down to an hour, 
and he/she was leaving the country. – You see, it was not that you have done 
anything wrong. It is just that I forgot. You were too organized!, he/she told 
me with sudden enthusiasm in her voice. The interview was then done on the 
spot, over the phone, in the windy, 0ºC entrance of the crowded and noisy 
diner, and partly in the restrooms too as the line to the diner got longer and 
longer and the faces of the people queuing got angrier. My meal got so cold it 
was uneatable at the time I finally finished the phone call, to the astonishment 
of my colleagues. I will remember the meal for the rest of my life though. It 
was scrambled eggs with fried tomatoes, no salt, and a diet soda”  (personal 
notes of the author). 
 
3.2.1 Schedule of the Interviews 
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The research started in January 2010 by mapping out the field of research, making inquiries 
and with choosing the topic and research angle. The interviews and contacts were 
confirmed throughout the research process - from April, 2010, until to April, 2013. It 
started with mapping the field and listing of possible contacts and suitable interviewees 
both in Finland and in the United States in organizations relevant and feasible to the subject 
of the study and ending with the actual data, interviews and conversations, taking place and 
finding related documents and other material. In Finland the interviews were conducted 
over a larger period of time than the U.S: between May 2010 and April 2013, and in the 
United States, during two trips; one to San Francisco in October 2010, a study trip by 
Sibelius Academy Arts Management Programme, and the second one taking place 
independently for the specific purpose of collecting data for the thesis to New York in 
January 2011. Both of the data collecting journeys in the United States lasted for 10 days. 
In addition, MOCA in Los Angeles, mentioned by curator Zarobell in an interview during 
the trip to San Francisco, October 2010, as having suffered great loss of budget due to the 
crisis and therefore interesting to the study, was also contacted. Unfortunately at the time, 
in the end of the trip, an audience was not granted with such a short notice as the visit was 
initiated on spot due to the  interview, and not properly prepared in advance. Otherwise, 
and interview from MOCA would most probably have been included in te final thesis as 
well, since it supported the case. This information was thus replaced and required through 
articles, documents and other dources of data. 
 
Finland 
 
Pre-interviews were conducted at Kiasma in Helsinki, Finland, May 2010:  
• Senior Researcher Leevi Haapala, Kiasma, May 2010 (no written record).  
• Head of  Development Sanna-Mari Jäntti (2008 – 2010), Kiasma, May 11th 2010. 
 
One interview was conducted at the Finnish Museums Association 
• Senior Specialist Marja-Liisa Pohjanvirta, The Finnish Museums Association, 25th 
May, 2011. 
 
Three interviews were conducted at Kiasma Museum of Contemporary Art in Helsinki, Finland, 
between February 2011 and March, 2013: 
• Curator, Kati Kivinen, Kiasma, 8th May, 2012. 
• Chief Curator Arja Miller, Collections, Kiasma, 8th May 2012 (completed via email). 
• Communications Manager Piia Laita, Kiasma, May 31st, 2012. 
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In addition, Pirkko Siitari, Director of Kiasma, read the final text in April, 2013.  
 
 
United States of America 
 
One interview was conducted on October 8th, 2010, at San Francisco Museum of Modern Art  
• Assistant Curator John Zarobell, dept. of Painting & Sculpture, SFMOMA dept. 
October 8th, 2010.  
One interview was conducted on January 10th, 2011, at the Finnish Culture Institute in New York  
• Project Manager and Interim Director Essi Rautiola, Finnish Cultural Institute in New 
York, January 10th, 2011. 
Interviews were conducted at MoMA & MoMA PS1 in New York, U.S, during January 13th-16th, 
2011: 
• Development Officer Ms. Jane McCarthy, MoMA PS1, January 13th, 2011, 
interviewed at the Museum of Modern Art New York premises. 
• Founder and Director Alanna Heiss, P.S.1, January 14th 2011.  
• Assistant Curator to Alanna Heiss Beatrice Johnson, MoMA PS1, January 16th, 2011. 
 
Writing of this thesis was conducted over a period of approximately two and a half years 
from December, 2010, to April, 2013. This MA Thesis was handed in on April 29th, 2013, 
in Paris. 
3.3 Formation of Analysis 
 
The theoretical framework was applied to form the research questions as well as the 
analysis. One case was studied in depth together with the theoretical framework, and then 
the successive case. The cases were examined one by one whether if the theory matched 
the data or not. Then, similarities between the two cases were compared to form a pattern 
of the possible effects of the crisis. Also, differences in funding structures between the 
countries in Finland and in the United States were taken into account before drawing the 
conclusions. In the end of the Conclusion chapter, the effects are demonstrated in a critical 
debate stressing the similarities rather than differences in the two different contemporary 
affiliate art museums. Some major similarities between the cases arose from the collected 
data through in-depth personal interviews, which could not be foreseen from the documents 
and other relevant data. Therefore the similarities were not an assumption a priori on 
which the results were build, but rather a spontaneous result of the interviews that the study 
was based on, combined with the theory in question . 
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As seen in the Table 4, change leadership (Kotter) and transformational leadership theories 
(Santalainen) and Alexander´s sociological organization theory can perhaps be more 
directly applied to the effects of the Economic Crisis in the case museums, data from the 
personal interviews shows. Strategy theories such as Michael Porter´s 5 forces theory, 
Kotler, Kotler & Kotler applied perhaps to the crisis itself well, but not to the organizations 
in question, or applied only partially. Concluding from the data, theories that emphasize a 
more direct relationship towards change within the organization itself, applying the 
information to the ecosystem and environment, seem to answer better to the research 
questions.  
 
3.4 Validity and Reliability 
 
The study is mainly built on in-depth interview material, and all of the facts gained from 
the interviews are the interviewees` personal opinions. The interviews were sent for the 
interviewees afterwards in written form for proof reading and fact checking. It is always 
possible, that some of the facts told by the interviewees could have been slightly different 
in reality, changing the results acquired, or that, as some time had gone between the 
interviews and writing the research, the memory of the interview was different from what 
the interviewee actually said. 
 
The museums that do not get state funding, such as SFMOMA and MoMA PS1, also do not 
publish annual reports. For example, as I contacted the Archives at the Museum of Modern 
Art New York during a visit in January 2011, and asked for an audience, the answer I 
received in an email was: “Dear Madame, MoMA has not published annual reports since 
1990”. Some reports could be found, like the Consolidated Financial Statements of MoMA 
2007 - 2010, and some reports on MoMA PS1. In addition, both the affiliates are dependent 
on their parent museums financially. Some of the key annual reports of the museum 
affiliates missing, the research has been therefore, completed with additional articles and 
media coverage, as well as data from internet sites, conversations with specialists in the 
field and with the in-depth interviews mentioned of the professionals in the field, to gain 
more thorough and accurate knowledge on the performance and practices of the museum 
affiliates. 
 
At the time with the study, in the aftermath of the Economic Crisis, there were many 
changes in personnel, as stated before, in both of the two chosen museum affiliates. The 
Head of Development Sanna-Mari Jäntti left Kiasma in the autumn of 2010 and 
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Development Officer at MoMA PS1 Jane McCarthy had been hired during the crisis in 
2008, and left in 2011. The former and long-term Director and Founder of PS1 Alanna 
Heiss resigned in 2009 and in 2010, the new name MoMA PS1 was introduced to the 
museum affiliate instead of the former P.S.1 Contemporary Art Center. Also, Director 
Berndt Arell left Kiasma and the new Director Pirkko Siitari was appointed in 2010. All the 
major changes in personnel & administrative level both in Finland and U.S had happened 
while the study was in process, and to some extent, therefore shaped the study. For 
example, at the time of the newspaper articles about Kiasma´s financial difficulties during 
Berndt Arell´s era hit the media, only the pre-interviews of the intended study had been 
conducted. Also, the major personnel changes have affected the study in a way that it has 
been more difficult to reach the people who are now involved in their new positions about 
the changes in their previous work, and hence, the material possibly lost through the non- 
realized, intended interviews of the people in charge at the time, has been replaced by other 
documents, data and interviews.  
 
Also, due to the highly abstract causes of the crisis still in 2008 - 2010 in Finland, as the 
crisis only made its way to Europe in the beginning of the year 2012, made it difficult to 
gather reliable information through the method of interviews at Kiasma, that still had not 
experienced the effects, or it was still not thought at the time that they had, directly. Every 
person had a different view on the crisis itself, and it can be summoned based on the 
interview data as well as the related articles and media sources that the effects of the 
economic crisis in the arts field in general are yet to be researched thoroughly both in 
Finland and in the United States in a manner that they were after the previous recession in 
Finland in the 1990s. In addition, the long-lasting consequences and effects of the austerity 
policy as a result of the crisis, have not been researched in the cultural sector. Hence, it can 
be concluded from the data gathered for this thesis, that a further study in this field is 
strongly needed at some point in the future. 
 
One ethical consideration that has been taken into account is the researcher´s role in the 
Finnish art world. I was elected the current President of the Artists`Association of Finland 
during the study process in September 2010, having already started writing the research 
proposal and conductiong of the preliminary interviews in May, 2010. In May, 2012 I was 
appointed the Artistic Director of Lens Politica Film & Media Art Festival in Helsinki, in 
addition to being a professional, practising media artist. Especially as to the role of the 
President of the Artists`Association of Finland, before each interview it was carefully 
explained to the contacts and interviewees that the research conducted did not relate to any 
of the posts, and that the research topic had also been chosen, in fact, completely 
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independently from the researchers` daily job. It was also stressed specifically, that the 
research had not been ordered from any of the organizations taht the researcher currently 
represents.  
 
Some attitudes towards the interview process were, nevertheless, clearly reserved. Other 
interviews were not obtained at all – partly due to changes on the organizations and people 
moving away from their previous jobs, and to the many changes inside the organizations 
during the study as well as the financial and organizational uncertainty related to the 
organizations themselves during this time. The situation affected perhaps the attitudes of 
the interviewees and made them more reserved. Partly also the reasons described above 
could have made a difference, since a strict traditional division between the artists and the 
administrators still exists in the artworld. This could not have been foreseen, but 
nevertheless, sometimes occurred during the interview sessions and manifested itself as a 
feeling of tension.  
 
Having possessed knowledge of running art organizations, as well as working as an artist in 
the field of the contemporary arts for the past 13 years has also helped me in understanding 
the reactions and practices of the interviewees and the organizsations, I believe, and helped 
also to consider possible biases. The changes that took place in the chosen museums were 
drastic, especially in the United States. The practical knowledge therefore of the field has 
helped tremendously in understanding the international contemporary arts scene today, 
perhaps even better to some extent, than, say, a person coming from a more traditional art 
history fields. The dual position is special, but has its clear advantages as well. 
 
The complex relationship of the providers of the exhibition spaces, collecting museums` 
and curator´s roles in relation to the artists that provide the context entirely to the museums, 
and the tensions underlying this professional relationship, would be a possible topic of 
another study. The artists and the organizational staff are still seen as two somewhat 
separate worlds, as will be stated later in this study. But going into this topic would lead us 
astray from the actual subject of the economic crisis. Hence, analysis based on personal 
notes by the researcher and other media sources were combined with the data in order to 
add depth to the study, but they were not the topic of this research. Utilizing both the 
experience as a professional artist as well as a bureaucrat gave the research perhaps a more 
practical dimension, though this viewpoint was not especially stressed in the research. To 
understand the museum affiliates` challenges in a more thorough manner in the future, 
however, a research of the artists inside the museum institutions as possible administrators, 
stakeholders, and the benefits of this approach, would be worth considering.
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4.1 Case 1: MoMA PS1 (formerly P.S.1 Contemporary Art Center), New York 
 
MoMA PS1 (formerly P.S.1 Contemporary Art Center), founded by former Director 
Alanna Heiss in 1976, is one of the world's oldest and largest organizations devoted solely 
to the advancement of contemporary art in the United States: Its profile is defined as 
follows: ”An exhibition space rather than a collecting institution, MoMA PS1 devotes its 
energy and resources to displaying the most experimental art in the world” 
(MoMAps1.org). 
The museum affiliate of the Museum of Modern Art since 2000, is housed in a hundred-
year-old Romanesque Revival school building in Long Island City, Queens. MoMA PS1 
presents an extensive program of exhibitions and events in its nearly 125,000-square-foot 
facility. The devotion to the contemporary arts and living artists is central to MoMA PS1´s 
agenda. It distinguishes itself from other major art institutions in its progressive approach 
to exhibitions and its involvement of artists within the museum's framework 
(MoMAps1.org). 
According to the homepage of the museum, ”in October 1997, P.S.1 Contemporary Art 
Center reopened to the public after a three-year renovation project designed by Los 
Angeles-based architect Frederick Fisher. The building's facilities were expanded to 
include a large outdoor gallery, a dramatic entryway, and a two-story project space. Since 
its inception, MoMA PS1 has exhibited the work of more than 2,000 artists and has 
mounted some of the most provocative visual arts exhibitions of the last quarter century.” 
The mission of the affiliate museum is a devotion to the contemporary arts: ”In bringing 
together artists and their audience, MoMA PS1 functions as a living and active meeting 
place for the general public. Its Education Department offers a lively series of programs for 
adults and young people. These programs, ranging from daily gallery talks to salon-style 
conversations among artists, writers, and scholars actively involved in contemporary art, 
build on the museum’s commitment to be both an accessible resource to a diverse audience 
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and a catalyst for new ideas and art practices.” The museum affiliate´s activities range from 
Tours guided by scholars and artists who ”introduce adults and school groups to cutting-
edge contemporary art through interactive discussions of the themes, techniques, and 
imagery of the art on view, as well as the personal perspective of lecturing artists.” An 
internship program by the museum provides graduate and undergraduate students with 
valuable exposure to the inner-workings of a busy arts institution, as well as a prolonged 
involvement with the art of current and upcoming exhibitions. In the past, according to the 
homepage (MoMA.org), ”the Education Department has also organized community 
outreach programs, a National and International Studio Program for promising young 
artists, and a teen curator series.” 
Since 2000, the affiliate museum has closely cooperated with its parent, Museum of 
Modern Art New York, and since 2010 more extensively, as the name of the museum was 
changed to MoMA PS1 to mark a new era: ” The principal, objective of MoMA's 
partnership with MoMA PS1 is to promote the enjoyment, appreciation, study, and 
understanding of contemporary art to a wide and growing audience.” This cooperation has 
been established throughout the years by collaborative programs of exhibitions, educational 
activities, and special projects allow both institutions to draw on their respective strengths 
and resources and to continue shaping a cultural discourse.  
The first significant collaboration between MoMA PS1 and The Museum of Modern Art 
took place in 2000 with Greater New York project, a widely acclaimed exhibition 
showcasing the work of more than 140 emerging New York-area artists concentrating in 
young and emerging art and artists. This ambitious effort was successfully repeated five 
years later with Greater New York 2005. Both shows demonstrated the diversity and 
dynamism of the metropolitan area’s artistic community. ”An ongoing collaboration is the 
MoMA/MoMA PS1 Young Architects Program, an annual series of competitions that give 
emerging architects the opportunity to build projects for the MoMA PS1 facility from 
conception drawing to construction. ”   
In recent years, PS1 and its parent the Museum of Modern Art have collaborated in for 
example performance art field with the Marina Abramovic: The Artist in Present show in 
MoMA 2010 (Source: MoMA.org, Marina Abramovic – The Artist is Present, HBO 
documentaries 2012). The agenda of the museum has overall concentrated in performance 
art strongly since 2010, in the era of the new Director of MoMA PS1, Klaus Biesenbach. 
The annual budget of the museum affiliate was circa 4 million US dollars in 2011, of which 
fundraising consists circa 2 million dollars (McCarthy 13.1.2011).  
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4.2 Funding Museums in the United States 
 
Museums in the United States receive only circa 2.2% of State funding annually, as seen in 
Table 5. ”Established by Congress in 1965 as an independent federal agency, the NEA is 
the designated arts organization of the U.S government ” (NEA 2012). The funding of 
museums rely mostly on Philanthropy, Fundraising and Sponsorship agreements in the U.S. 
 
 
Table 5. Revenue Sources of Museums. Source: NEA – How the U.S Funds the Arts. National Endowment for 
the Arts, 2012 
 
”Direct public support is not used to impose arts policy. Instead, government decisions on 
arts funding tend to be driven by experts in a given field or discipline. -- Direct grants do 
not finance the bulk of artistic activity in the U.S; they fill gaps, enhance arts education, 
nourish arts creation, assist in the presentation and delivery of artworks, and enable 
preservation. These grants thus complement, and do not replace, other means of arts 
funding. As an example, the NEA requires, for most grants, that the recipient organization 
couple the amount awarded with an equal or greater amount of other, nonfederal 
contributions, as will be seen in a brief overview of the NEA. ” (NEA 2012:9) 
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Table 6. NEA Grant Review Process. Source: NEA – How the U.S Funds the Arts. National Endowment for 
the Arts, 2012  
 
”Three Broad Categories of U.S Arts Funding: 1. Direct public funding (NEA; state, 
regional ,and local arts agencies, 2. Other public funding, directs and indirect (various 
federal departments and agencies), 3. Private sector contributions (individuals; foundations; 
corporations).” (NEA 2012:7) 
Arts & Economic Prosperity IV demonstrates that America’s arts industry is not only 
resilient in times of economic uncertainty, but is also a key component to our nation’s 
economic recovery and future prosperity.  
 
4.3 Case 2: Museum of Contemporary Art Kiasma, Helsinki 
 
The mission of Museum of Contemporary Art Kiasma is defined as follows: ”Kiasma is a 
museum of contemporary art under the umbrella of the Finnish National Gallery. Its 
primary role is to educate the public on contemporary art and to strengthen the status of art 
in Finland in general.” (kiasma.fi)  The basic functions of the museum are organizing 
changing exhibitions and augmenting its collection, along with research and presentation of 
the works and active audience development and the programming of the Kiasma Theatre. 
 
Strengthening the role of contemporary art in the society, developing internal and external 
cooperation and communications and being a role model of contemporary art are central 
tasks of the museum (Kiasma´s audience development material 2/2009). ”Augmenting the 
Applicant	   Panel	  review	  (by	  discipline)	  
NaOonal	  Council	  on	  the	  Arts	   NEA	  Chairman	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collection is a major aspect of the operations of Kiasma. The primary focus in the museum 
collection is on Finnish contemporary art. The collection is also supplemented by 
commissioning new work. The collection is presented to the public in annually changing 
thematic exhibitions. Kiasma is an accessible, active and participatory museum. It 
stimulates discussion on art and thereby on topical social issues. A diverse, changing 
programme allows the museum to reach different audiences”, the museum defines itself 
(Kiasma.fi). 
The museum, opened in May 1998, consists of collections and exhibitions, museum 
pedagogy department, Kiasma theatre, Stage and Kiasma café, PR, marketing and 
sponsorship department, audience development and services, exhibition technique 
department, administration, and documentation & conservation department, archives and a 
library. The museum was led by Director Berndt  Arell in 2007 - 2010 and from 2010 
onwards by Director Pirkko Siitari. Kiasma is an affiliate of the Finnish National Gallery. 
Stakeholder activity include Friends of Kiasma, Kiasma Foundation, Kiasma Committee 
and Kiasma Business Club.  
The annual attendance is 200 000 visitors. The highest attendance was reached in 2006 
when Kiasma hosted the ARS exhibition with 239 700 visitors. In addition, the museum´s 
home pages at www.kiasma.fi have over 300 000 visitors yearly. Kiasma's visitors are 
geographically mainly from Helsinki metropolitan area (47%), rest of Finland (22%) and 
other countries (31%). Kiasma is visited by females (64%) more than males (36%), and the 
majority of the visitors are between 25 and 44 years of age. 38% of the visitors are under 
24 years old and only 22% are over 45 years old. The background of the audience is mostly 
academic (49%), polytechnic (33%), technical school (6%) and comprehensive school 
(12%) (Kiasma´s audience development material). According to the advertising company 
Dagmar´s statistics, spontaneous conspicuousness (spontaani tunnettuus) of Kiasma is the 
highest of all the museums in Finland (Nykytaiteen museo Kiasma´s sponsorship material 
2/2009). 
The museum building of Kiasma at Mannerheiminaukio, central Helsinki, was constructed 
through and international architecture competition won by the American Architect Steven 
Holl in 1998. During the opening weekend in May 1998, the museum attracted 30,000 
visitors. Kiasma has subsequently established its position as a national, and especially a 
local, meeting place. The total number of visitors in Kiasma broke three million in 2011”. 
(kiasma.fi) 	  
The annual budget for Kiasma is circa 2 000 000 EUR, of which state funding covers 75%. 
The rest consist of ticket sales, publication sales, other revenues and sponsorship 
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agreements and fundraising (25%). The value of the sponsorship agreements yearly is circa 
300 000 EUR. The budget for purchasing art to collections is circa 300 000 EUR. Kiasma 
Foundation has been functioning since 2008. Its mission is to raise funds for the museum to 
purchase art for its collections (Nykytaiteen museo Kiasma´s sponsorship material 2/2009).  
 
Kiasma´s parent museum, The Finnish National Gallery´s total budget in 2011 was 26,8 
M€ in 2011, of which endowment from the state was 68% (18,2 M€). Its expenses were 
25,6 M€ (Table 7; The Finnish National Gallery´s Annual Report, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. The Finnish National Gallery´s Budgets 2008 - 2010. Source: The Finnish National Gallery´s 
Annual Reports 2008 (bottom), 2009 (center), 2010 (top). 
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4.4 Funding Museums in Finland 
 
The museums are strongly state funded in Finland. The funding of the museums is 
dependent on annual budget neciations of the Ministry of Culture in the fall (Laita 
25.5.2012, Kivinen 8.5.2012). As seen from Table 7, the museum funding has overall 
slightly increased in the state funded museums during 2008 – 2011 (Table 8). 
 
                  
 
Table  8. Museum funding in Finland 2008 – 2011. Source: National Board of Antiquities. 
 
At the same time, the expenses of the museums have steadily risen, as seen in Table 9. Due 
to inflation, therefore, the funding of the state can be said to have slightly diminished in 
relation to the costs over the years.                          
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Table 9. Museum expenditure in Finland 2008 - 2011. Source: National Board of Antiquities. 
 
According to researcher Pasi Saukkonen, the main themes of the Finnish cultural policy 
landscape have been discrepancy between objectives and resources, special arrangements 
rather than mainstreaming in the form of special grants and committed activists. 
Conclusions can be drawn that a long-term realistic perspective in the cultural policy is 
necessary (Saukkonen 23.9.2009). 
 
Resources have to meet policy objectives. Also, the losers of the system and practices 
should not be neglected. The contemporary challenges in Finnish cultural policy have been 
including supporting diversity, strengthening the creative economy and securing the status 
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of cultural and art institutions and the opportunities for freelance artists. The objectives of 
the cultural policy strategy are: Cultural policy strategy´s objectives: culture and economy: 
stronger position, diversification of financial sources, contribution to economy, cultural 
entrepreneurship, cultural export. According to Saukkonen, a closer look at the situation is 
necessary in funding the arts in Finland in the future (Saukkonen 23.9.2009). 
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In this chapter, I will present the results of the data collected from the interviews, articles, 
media, financial reports, documents and other relevant data and notes. I will analyze in-
depth and assess the collected data: the interviews, financial reports, articles, newspaper 
clippings, media sources, personal notes of the researcher and other data from the media 
and internet sources. 
 
5.1 Kiasma´s Change Strategy 
 
In 2012, preliminary information about the Finnish National Gallery´s privatization process 
started to hit the fan in Finland. As a reaction to the new budget cut project of the National 
Gallery (Appendix 3: Annual reports, budgets & documents), the negotiations began 
between the ministry of education and the National Gallery. As a result, possible large-
scale budget cuts in the cultural sector were discussed largely in the media. However, the 
cultural minister Arhinmäki stopped the process and postponed the negotiations to the next 
governmental period. Some preliminary decisions had already taken place among the 
Cultural Ministry´s officers to privatize the National Gallery and remove it from the state 
budget to an independent foundation run by administrators appointed by the ministry. Until 
that, the process had proceeded discreetly, without raising any public upheaval among the  
decision-makers, despite many and repeated warnings and concerns of the consequences of 
the development of outsourcing National Cultural Heritage expressed by the professionals 
in the cultural field and organizations`representatives (researcher´s notes).  
 
The budget of Kiasma is bound to the budget of the state negotiated between the ministry 
of culture and the state in the fall´s fudget negotiations. The results of the fiscal budget 
negotiations are confirmed for Kiasma affiliate always very late in regard of the following 
year´s agenda already been set. In addition, the extra budget negotiations that bring a part 
of the funding are done even later during the additional state budget negotiations. This 
complicated structure of funding challenges strategic planning in general and resource-
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based thinking in particular: “In practice, this means that the museum makes flexible plans 
that can be assimilated to the changes in funding”, Communications Manager Piia Laita 
from Kiasma says (Laita 31.5.2012). 
 
Laita, who has worked in Kiasma since 1999, sees change as a vital part of a contemporary 
art museum´s leadership and as such is a part of its core strategy. Laita thinks that 
Kiasma´s overall strategy is, in fact, a change strategy (Laita 31.5.2012). Of the possible 
effects of the economic crisis, Laita sees that the prevailing, strict funding policy by the 
state due to the economic recession is currently reflected to all funding by the state. 
Another reason for changes in the museum policy, according to Laita, is always the change 
of the director, as mentioned by both Kivinen and Laita (Laita 31.5.2012, Kivinen 
8.5.2012). The effect of the recession after 2008 caused by the economic crisis can be, on 
the contrary, clearly seen in a more precarious approach to sponsorship agreements by the 
companies and their clear return on investment demands (Laita 31.5.2012). 
 
A big emphasis in the results of the collected data is given to the Director as a leader of the 
organizational strategy (Laita 31.5.2012, Miller 2012, Kivinen 8.5.2012). It can be derived 
from the data that some changes in the organizational leadership were related to the natural 
cycle of changing leaders (Miller 8.5.2012, Kivinen 8.5.2012, Laita 31.5.2012, Heiss 
14.1.2011), others to personal abilities. According to the interview data, the new Museum 
Director Pirkko Siitari had started a development strategy already before the organizational 
change plans related to the National Gallery started to take place. The vision, mission and 
values of the museum had been reset in 2010. Thus, the new organizational changes lurking 
behind the corner just added to this development (Kivinen 8.5.2012).  
 
The director took the main responsibility in leading change. Implementation also included 
a prominent role of the museum´s PR department. For the implementation special meetings 
were held regularly for the staff (Laita 315.2012, Miller 31.5.2013). Arja Miller, Chief 
Curator at Collections, Kiasma, says: ”Kiasma´s mission and vision were discussed in 
different workshops, and the whole staff was involved at some stages. I think it was very 
important for the whole organization”.  
 
The new Director Pirkko Siitari started in 2010, whereas the previous Director Berndt Arell 
was in office 2007 - 2010. About the role of the director and the new era in 2010 after 
Siitari had been apppointed, Miller tells the following: 
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”I started to work at Kiasma in 2008. Then the director was Berndt Arell, who 
was a business-oriented director with connections in the business field as well 
as with some private collectors. Under the tightening budget conditions he 
tried to get a broader funding for Kiasma from the private sector, and was 
one of the founding members of Kiasma Foundation, who has donated some 
significant works to Kiasma´s Collections. After Arell left Kiasma for Svenska 
Kulturfonden, Pirkko Siitari was appointed the new director in 2010. Siitari is 
a content-oriented museum director, but also very much orientated to the 
strategy development as well. She started systematically to rethink and 
redefine Kiasma´s mission and vision with the board of directors (johtoryhmä) 
and other staff. Some organizational changes were also made, for example the 
marketing and the communication departments were put together as one 
department” (Miller 31.5.2012) 
 
 
The personal qualities of the Director affect the museum affiliates` strategy and direction.  
The organizational changes caused by the austerity policy by the cultural ministry in the 
recent years, the director has to scrutinize the budget and plan exhibitions more carefully in 
the future. “In the municipal museums, the municipalities have had a concrete target over 
the past few years of cutting expenses, say with 30 000 – 50 000 EUR, and this has forced 
the leadership to cut the costs from wherever they can”, says Marja- Liisa Pohjanvirta 
(Pohjanvirta 25.5.2011). Regional municipalities do not necessarily allocate state funding 
to the regional museums in the regional art museums, leading to the budget cuts. In the 
museums, the results of this have manifested to the audience as shortened opening hours, 
lack of exhibitions and lack of variety, and as joint and circulating exhibitions. Some 
museums try to combine special activities on the side of the exhibition to build a museum 
experience in order to make a visitor consume more goods and services during the visit. A 
ticket price is no longer enough to sustain the basic functions of a museum (Pohjanvirta 
25.5.2011).  
 
About the balancing with a too tight budget, Arja Miller says the following: 
 
”We have been struggling with  a too small budget ever since I started 
working at Kiasma. It feels like the society doensn´t value culture and 
especially contemporary arts. Something which is worrying as to its effects 
oon the long run. The global economic crisis is only one factor in this 
development” (Miller 31.5.2012).  
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The limits have been met: ” On the other hand, struggling with a small budget can help the 
organizations to cooperate more. In my opinion, however, we are now in a stituation in 
which further cuts in the budget are not possible without affecting the content”, Miller 
debates (Miller 31.5.2012). The relationship of strategy-making to the museum´s funding 
was clear: the reasons why the museum exists, to whom it exists and why were considered 
as a fundamental basis for the new strategy. In these circumstances, the museum´s future 
had to be reflected on carefully (Kivinen 8.5.2012).  
 
At the same time, a traditional line organization had been challenged by project 
management. The museum has been developed more into a project-based organization, 
such as in making exhibitions. Exhibitions are more project-based than before. This has 
been done to break a sector thinking of a traditional organization, and to add flexibility 
inside the organization (Kivinen 8.5.2012).  
 
An up-to-date sponsorship and fundraising strategy was created for Kiasma and its vision 
and mission were clarified, as a result of the changes caused by economic crisis in 
sponsorships (Laita 31.5.2012). 
 
Work groups and teams were established to enhance information flow between different 
departments (Kivinen 8.5.2012, Miller 31.5.2012). This led to a process inside the 
organization that was seen as a positive one by many of the interviewees (Kivinen, Miller 
2012). According to Kati Kivinen, energy between different departments had been sought. 
The traditional mass meetings had been questioned and more flexible and smaller groups 
established to enable information flow (Kivinen 8.5.2012). 
 
The synergy gained from this helped the organization internally. The organization being 
small,  maximum results could be only attained through synergy and cooperation between 
the departments and staff. However, external changes came always as a blow since the 
museum´s agenda is always set two years beforehand. This sets challenges both strategy 
and grantmaking, as the funding must be secured with a delay of approximately two fiscal 
years. Flexibility is difficult to attain due to funding especially if quick responses to the 
environment are needed, such as in programming and curating. A beforehand set agenda 
makes reacting to the environment difficult (Kivinen 8.5.2012). 
 
There were many teams and groups created to discuss strategy inside the organization 
(Laita 31.5.2012). As discussed before, Kiasma has a change strategy that is an ongoing 
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process which is a part of the general strategy led by the Director Pirkko Siitari and Maija 
Tanninen-Mattila, Director of Ateneum, accompanied by Risto Ruohonen, Director 
General at the National Gallery and the board of directors (Kivinen 8.5.2012).  
 
On the other hand, a special strategy or a team for the possible changes caused by the 
economic crisis and its aftermath has not been established in the museum. Instead, effects 
of the crisis in the long run can be seen (Kivinen 8.5.2012). The rise of the costs but the 
state funding staying the same, without escalation causes challenges. This has not been 
reacted to fully. Fundraising would be needed, but in a country like Finland (where the 
economy is not large enough) it is difficult. Sponsorship agreements have been made, but 
they do not cover all the costs. The state funding is entirely allocated to salaries and basic 
costs. The ticket sales finance exhibitions. With the new director, a strategy for a more 
specific audience development has been started in Kiasma, including audience 
segmentation, since 2010. The grant-making possibilities are limited because of the strong 
state funding of the museum that prevents the organization, supported by the ministry of 
culture, from applying from the same sources twice.  
 
According to some employees, the new National Gallery Foundation might enable a better 
grant-making for the museum. But hardly in sponsorship agreements, curator Kivinen 
debates. In the negotiations with the ministry regarding The National Gallery privatization 
process the Director General of the National Gallery, Risto Ruohonen, has mainly been in 
charge (Kivinen 8.5.2012). In general, the changes in the artworld caused by the economic 
crisis could have perhaps been foreseen, but this was seen as something quite unlikely in 
the case of specific museums, according to many interviewees among the staff. (Laita 
31.5.2012, Kivinen 8.5.2012,). 
 
The birth of the Kiasma Foundation (founded 2007, started functioning 2008), marking the 
10th anniversary of the museum in 1998, was not directly linked to the economic crisis 
itself, according to Curator Kivinen. Instead it answered the need of extra funding for the 
purchasing of new artworks to collection. The budget for Kiasma´s collection purchases is 
not on the level of the international artworks prices. Without the foundation, some more 
expensive artworks would never have been purchased (Kivinen 8.5.2012). 
 
Marketing has been very dependent on sponsorship agreements and money. Things have 
been moving forward lately. The task of the sponsorship agreements is not an easy one (in 
the tightening economic situation). A continuous development in the marketing and 
sponsorship department in the museum is strongly needed. (Kivinen 8.5.2012). 
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As to a Kiasma´s change strategy, the later suspended privatization process of the National 
Gallery, was still ongoing at the time of the interviews took place. The staff had meetings 
monthly to prepare for the upcoming organizational change. The employees felt that their 
needs had been met in these meetings where questions related to the tasks and changes in 
the organizational structure were discussed openly. The staff has also received leadership 
training by the museum on how to relate to the changes and how to discuss them with their 
subordinates. Some of the staff had also seen a possibility for a positive change in the 
current upheaval of the organization´s forthcoming structural changes in the form of 
enhanced communication on the horizontal level (Kivinen 8.5.2012). 
 
The Museums Association in Finland has a strategy for 2007 – 2013, Pohjanvirta tells, and 
it has been updated in 2008. The core was sustainability and sustainable development of 
the museums. On the other hand, it can be said that the economic crisis resulted in the 
austerity policy that came at the same time, and that had effects on the museums as well as 
the strategy, too. “In a way, the sustainability strategy came in the right time for the 
austerity policy”, describes Marja-Liisa Pohjanvirta, a Senior Specialist at the Finnish 
Museums Association (Pohjanvirta 25.5.2011).  
 
In regional museums, as the municipality´s budget has been cut due to austerity policy, the 
situation has affected the museum budgets as well. Sponsorship agreements are becoming 
more scarce. Museums have sought more project-based funding as a part of their general 
budgets. The economic situation of the museums is multifaceted. In general, state funding 
for museums in Finland has increased steadily. Some organizational changes have shaken 
the municipal museum field the last years. The unifications process of the municipalities 
and re-organization of activities such as in the case of Turku City Art Museum (Wäinö 
Aaltonen Museum of Art), have occurred. The tendency can be seen clearly in the museum 
field that same kind of activity is united under the same roof, even though many of the 
unifications planned are yet to be realized.  (Pohjanvirta 25.5.2011). 
 
The changes can be seen relate to more general changes in population and shifts in centers 
of population. Services are centralized. The museum buildings attract the same amount of 
people steadily year to year, but the municipality´s service costs can be reduced with 
centralization. They lead to deterioration of municipal museums whereas the big museums 
in the population centers get wealthier. It also leads to cuts in the municipal museum 
exhibition budgets. Exhibitions are not as ambitions and wide in scope as before, 
lengthening of exhibition durations and co-operation between exhibitions and collections in 
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the form of e.g. circulating large exhibitions to cut costs. (Pohjanvirta 25.5.2011). 
 
Museum barometer research made by the Museums Association in Finland shows, 
according to Pohjanvirta, that the best surviving museums are more and more in Helsinki 
metropolitan area. Also, a tendency to cut costs and expenditures by the museums in recent 
years was revealed in the study. The results always come with a three quarter of a year´s 
delay. For example, for this study, the Museum Statistics from 2008-2011 were researched. 
The new statistics of the year 2012 are not published before September, 2013. (Pohjanvirta 
25.5.2011, Finnish Museum Statistics 2008, 2009, 2010 & 2011).  
 
5.1.1 Effects of the Crisis: Unification Threats, Budget Cuts and Cooperation 
 
This has many effects on leadership. Layoffs are not common in the museums either, 
according to Pohjanvirta. First, museum staff especially in the municipal museums are 
asked to change holiday extra salaries to days off instead. Second, the strict fiscal policy by 
the state forces museum directors to follow financial matters more and more and plan 
exhibition agendas more carefully. Third, the mentioned HR costs are also under scrutiny. 
In the municipal museums, a concrete programme for cutting costs has forced the museums 
to cut expenditure from all factors. The growth shown by the statistics in the state funding 
(Table 7) does mean that museums especially in municipalities actually receive the money. 
The main reason for this is that the funds have not been allocated to museums specifically, 
but are at the disposal of the municipalities for culture and subject to their decision-making. 
On the contrary, despite the growth in funding, many museums have been forced to cut 
costs and diminish annual budgets (Pohjanvirta 25.5.2011). 
 
The budget cuts have led to some positive aspects, too. The communication and co-
operation of the different cultural sectors has been closer, according to Pohjanvirta, as the 
museums, orchestras, theaters and the leaders of the unions have come together to affect 
decision-makers. Members of the parliament have been addressed with general letters, for 
example. Consultation and support for some museums have also been increased by the 
Association to help them survive the hardship and in getting them in contact with the 
decision-makers (Pohjanvirta 25.5.2011). The unification process of municipalities would 
most likely lead to the centralized museums being more under pressure than before with 
more limited resources, as the amount of work increases while the support from the state is 
diminished, Pohjanvirta debates. In recent years,  government´s long-term plans to unify 
municipalities in Finland have been progressing. “This would lead to the fact that the staff 
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of the museums would have to take care of running smaller museums in municipalities on 
the side of  their normal workload”, Pohjanvirta argues (Pohjanvirta 25.5.2011). 
 
The second effect of the threat of possible large cuts has been that the museums have 
actively sought alternative models to put up exhibitions. In England, good models have 
been developed from the ideology of co-operation and recycling of exhibitions. In Finland 
the Museums`Association has made a publication addressing these issues, and suggesting 
ways for the museum to support e.g. sustainable development in the municipalities. 
Conservation, restoration and other practices and know-how of the constructed 
environment possessed by the museums can be for the financial benefit of the municipality 
in saving costs and materials. This can have a big effect on the municipality´s finance. Not 
everything has to be constructed from zero. On the other hand, this kind of cooperation 
means that the basic resources of the museum are met (Pohjanvirta 25.5.2011). 
 
The lack of money has led to multi-faceted effects in the museum field according to 
Pohjanvirta, in the immediate effect of cutting of costs, but also, in the form of enhanced 
cooperation and shared models between the existing museums. New models of working 
had to be developed and this forced the museums to co-operate and share ideas more 
vigilantly. “In a way, the (economic) crisis has led to the fact that new ways of  doing 
things have had to be invented. This I find to be one of the most interesting sides of the 
phenomenon.” (Pohjanvirta 25.5.2011).   
 
When asked of the concept of change in the museum world in general, Pohjanvirta sees 
three larger changes in the museum world in recent years: 1) organizational changes and 
the unification process of the municipalities 2) enhanced cooperation between 
professionals, especially in relation to technical changes, digitalization of the material and 
EU projects and 3) the diminishing of the overlapping functions. The technical change has 
been great during recent years, and the audience also demands more nowadays. The fiscal 
policy of the state does not support large-scale investments that would be needed to realize 
these technical changes. This has led to more cooperation with universities in the field, and 
taking apprentices, says Pohjanvirta. Also, museums lend out spaces for organizations and 
companies for extra revenue. On the contrary, new museums being born, such as the 
Guggenheim process (that was ongoing during the interview took place), or Emma 
Museum of Modern Art some years ago or the birth of Kiasma, do not change the scene 
that much. “They add to the scene, but do not affect the existing museums that much”, 
Pohjanvirta argues (Pohjanvirta 25.5.2011). 
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Museums have, through cooperation and new buildings and architecture competitions, 
opened up more to the society, Pohjanvirta says. They have had effects on education as 
well, when the recent CUMMA curatorial programme started in Aalto University and 
Sibelius-Academy´s Arts Management Programme earlier have been born on the side of 
the traditional museum education and Helsinki University´s art history programme. “We 
need more multi-faceted expertise in the museum field nowadays”, Pohjanvirta says 
(Pohjanvirta 25.5.2011). As an example, Pohjanvirta takes the role of the director in an art 
museum. She argues that, since there are not that many museums and posts in Finland, an 
artistic director, working aside of an administrative director, could be one possibility. 
 
The key factors and people leading the change in the museum field, according to 
Pohjanvirta, are the Ministry of Culture, the National Board of Antiquities and the Finnish 
National Gallery as well as the directors of the most prominent art museums, depending on 
their individual qualities and strengths.  
 
5.2 MoMA PS1: Reshaping Curatorial Practices & Funding 
 
The overall situation in the U.S during 2008 was rough for the museum field, as the budget 
cuts and losses of sponsorship agreements and fundraising hit the industry. The interview 
data shows drastic and sometimes quite dramatic effects that influences the museum´s as 
well as the networks agendas on a large scale leading to cuts in exhibition budgets, 
cancelling and rescheduling of exhibitions and other changes in curatorial processes. As the 
study focuses on the effects of the economic crisis, the analysis and results for P.S.1 must 
be dealt together with the overall effects of the crisis on the museum field since 2008.  For 
the thesis, The Finnish Cultural Institute´s former Project Manager in New York and 
SFMOMA´s former Assistant Curator in San Francisco were also interviewed, to receive a 
broader sense of the effects that took place in 2008 on museums in the United States. 
 
The Finnish Cultural Institute in New York´s  experiences of exhibition cooperations with 
PS1 during the turbulent year of 2008 and the year preceding the crisis with the Arctic 
Hysteria exhibition tour, a cooperation exhibition between many stakeholders, were not 
always so uncomplicated (Rautiola 10.1.2011). According to the interview data, there were 
many reasons for this. First, according to Essi Rautiola, the former Interim Director and 
Project Manager of the Finnish Cultural Institute in New York, the leadership and project 
management processes for example in 2008 went much on a personal level of expertise, 
that of the Director of PS1 and the Director of the current organization of the project in 
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charge in Finland. PS1 dealt with the Consulate General of Finland in New York mostly 
regarding funding and the artist visa issues (Rautiola 10.1.2011). Some of the challenges 
were thus perhaps due to too many organizations in charge at the same time (notes of the 
author). The financial side of the exhibition projects sometimes suffered as the artistic 
demands of PS1 were on a very high level, and budgets were limited, e.g. the visas of the 
visiting artists alone eating often most of the overall budget. For example, the budget had 
been granted for another purpose than bringing Jimi Tenor and his band over from Finland 
for the opening, but PS1 insisted. The pressure on the budget was always very high in the 
cooperation (Rautiola 10.1.2011). 
 
As the Institute negotiates with many American museums on a yearly basis, some 
negotiations did not succeed very well: the financial troubles of the museums started to 
manifest themselves in 2008. For example, some of the partner museums gave sudden 
announcements during exhibition processes in 2008, that because of their endowments had 
been recently cut, part of the exhibition tours had to be cancelled. They had already been 
set and partially even advertized by the museums (Rautiola 10.1.2011). This had large-
scale effects on the content of the exhibition tours, as they had to be re-scheduled or 
negotiated from zero with another organization.  
 
Some of the museums the Institute negotiated with also replaced the more expensive 
exhibitions suggested by the Institute with other less expensive ones, as the endowment 
cuts had occurred and the original exhibition has been cancelled. For example, The Grand 
Rapids Museum first contacted the Institute, suggesting to take an exhibition, then 
withdraw the project suddenly overnight after having had to face the sudden, 
overwhelming budget cuts. This happened, according to Rautiola, for example in the Eero 
Saarinen retrospective architecture exhibition case, even though the exhibition fees 
demanded by the consortium behind the exhibition were on a moderate level on an 
international scale. “Finally, after negotiations with Guggenheim, MoMA and PS1, we 
ended up doing the New York presentation of the show at the Museum of  the City of New 
York, which was justified regarding the fact that the curator of our exhibition was working 
at the Museum of the City of New York. But this was not our first choice” (Rautiola 
10.1.2011).  
 
Despite the many challenges, Rautiola does not see, however, a direct connection with the 
economic crisis and the Arctic Hysteria exhibition´s curatorial process (Rautiola 
10.1.2011). Overall, the Arctic Hysteria exhibition presenting a variety of Finnish 
Contemporary Arts at P.S.1 Contemporary Art Center, New York, in 2008 was highly 
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successful and resulted for example in many of the participated artists gaining useful 
international contacts to curators and gallerists. This helped them in their careers. It also 
had long-lasting consequences for the Finnish gallery scene in general, as the foreign 
curators found and contacted the galleries of the artists that had been represented by PS1, 
resulting in large-scale international exhibition cooperations by some Finnish galleries 
from Helsinki for example in Tokyo that were entirely based on the networks created 
during Arctic Hysteria exhibition tour (notes of the author). 
 
On the contrary, with the Eero Saarinen retrospective tour, the effects of the economic 
crisis were clearly seen in the museum negotiations policies and cancellations with some 
museums, Essi Rautiola says (Rautiola 10.1.2011): 
 
“The exhibition was originally meant to be shown, first in Cranbrook, 
near Detroit, and then Washington, DC (in the East Coast), Minneapolis, 
and finally in Saint Louis, after which it was scheduled to travel to the 
west coast, and then from there across the continent back east to New 
York and New Haven. West Coast was cancelled entirely, and the 
prospective exhibition space in New York changed several times (as 
depicted above). The negotiations were held with several museums, the 
Guggenheim, MoMA and after MoMA said no, with PS1. After the West 
coast presentation had been cancelled we started preparing a contract 
with one mid-western museum instead and they placed a large 
advertisement in the New York Times. Then came the day that the 
contract should have been signed, and they unilaterally declared that due 
to their endowment being cut they had to cancel the whole exhibition ”—
“The museum ended up replacing it with another, less expensive 
Saarinen exhibition, the father Eliel, instead of Eero produced by one 
other museum. So instead of a West Coast exhibition, or a replacement 
exhibition in Michigan, we ended up having to store the exhibition for 
three months” (Rautiola 10.1.2011). 
 
The Eero Saarinen exhibition had already toured in Helsinki, Oslo and Brussels before it 
was brought to the United States. The overseas shipping costs of the exhibition alone were 
around 50,000 U.S dollars (Rautiola 10.1.2011). Rautiola states that proper sponsorhip 
agreements have also been much harder to obtain since the beginning of the economic 
crisis. This reduced the overall budgets of the exhibitions significantly, as the costs reduce 
the exhibition budgets. The big sponsorship agreements lost or reduced in value must have 
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affected the museums greatly, and therefore have had a indirect effect on the exhibitions as 
the budgets have been cut (Rautiola 10.1.2011). 
 
The other aspect that Rautiola sees in the effect of the sponsorship agreement on the 
exhibition is related to the content of the exhibitions. According to Rautiola, some of 
the larger sponsors might have demands and requests concerning the content of the 
exhibitions. The same thing applies to foundations presenting their art collections in 
large museums as part of the museums`exhibition programs. They must have a say on 
the exhibitions’ overall view as well as on the content, which they provide. “What is 
the limit of the impact of the sponsors’ demands on the content of museum 
exhibitions, and when are the compromises adequate?”, Rautiola debates (Rautiola 
10.1.2011). 
 
According to Jane McCarthy, the former Development Officer at MoMA PS1 New York, 
the organizational budget of PS1 was “definitely revised and cut”, after the 2008 economic 
crisis (McCarthy 13.1.2011). This led to large-scale changes in the agenda of the museum 
as well as the leadership of the curatorial processes McCarthy speaks in a surprisingly 
positive tone about the changes:.  
 
“Which was good, there was a lot of staff turnover happening that wasn't 
related necessarily to the economic crisis, but it was a good opportunity to 
kind of rethink the budget, (--) [00:35] budget for exhibitions, the amount of 
money that we were able to raise. So that was a good chance to kind of 
streamline operations. It also made us think very, on the curatorial side, 
which I don't work for, but it definitely made them think more about what the 
focus of their exhibitions would be, and really kind of what the primary 
programs and shows that they wanted to do, so I think in effect it was difficult 
for a lot of people, but I think the benefit was it made people very focused 
about what was possible, what messages you're really trying to get across at 
the museum, it was an opportunity to become a very lean operation” 
(McCarthy 13.1.2011). 
 
Judging from the data, the economic crisis was not the only reason for the changes in the 
curatorial practices as well as in the revision of the museum´s overall agenda and mission, 
but indirectly it forced the organization to make the changes and think over the whole 
museum concept and the costs of the exhibitions. Therefore McCarthy seems to see a lot of 
positive aspects in the changes after 2008 as well (McCarthy 13.1.2011).  About the overall 
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changes after 2009 after the start of the new Director Klaus Biesenbach in 2010, McCarthy 
sums up the following: 
 
“Thinking about what exhibitions we have. We actually have on program that 
came out of it, that I think (this) was incredible. We, PS1 is a huge, huge 
facility. It's about 125,000 square feet, it's an old Gothic school house. And so, 
while we didn't have a ton of money in our budget to program big exhibitions 
or other events, what we do have is a luxury of a lot of space. So what we did 
is we created a program called Free Space. And the curatorial team contacted 
other non-profits, artists they knew that were doing kind of exciting, cool 
things, or performance artists, and literally gave them gallery space for free, 
to either do a rehearsal for an exhibition, whether it's a performance piece, to 
have a two-day program go on. So we had everything from Marina 
Abramović, which, she did her retrospective here at MoMA, when she was 
staging the works to be shot for the catalogue, they used a bunch of the space 
in the galleries for that. We had this kind of fashion and art festival happen 
over a weekend, where we invited really notable contemporary artists and 
really notable fashion designers to come together and install different works, 
and that was just open for a weekend” (McCarthy 13.1.2011). 
 
The museum was fortunate to have the space that the other organizations and artists could 
never afford. New York being one of the world´s most expensive places to exhibit art and 
the commercial prices of rents and real estate, many organizations suffered or even 
perished after the crisis. In the West Coast, for example, where the crisis his the hardest 
(Rautiola 10.1.2011), MOCA Museum of Contemporary Art California in Los Angeles 
suffered tremendously, and was on the edge of perishing (Zarobell 8.10.2010). 
 
About the change of Director in 2009, when Alanna Heiss left accompanied by a big media 
attention, McCarthy says the following: 
“A lot of changes happened, I wouldn't say necessarily related to the 
economic crisis in 2008, the long-time, the founder and the long-time Director 
of PS1, Alanna Heiss, she left in early 2009.-- Yeah. So she left, (--) for about 
a year we didn't have a Director in place. While they were making a search 
for that, (--) senior staff, so I think it was an opportunity to re-evaluate how 
our exhibitions were being planned and programs. So I wouldn't necessarily 
say that (she --) just because of the economic crisis, I think that it was a 
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combination of what was happening in the world at large, and also what was 
happening internally in the institution” (McCarthy 13.1.2011).  
The changes were not necessarily that dramatic than what the press indicated about the 
financial troubles, McCarthy seems to hint. They existed, of course, but the organization 
was just in a phase of turning a page, like the organizations sometimes do, and to do this 
many people were let go in the turmoil of the financial consequences and the aftermath. 
With the change came a new era and a new Director with a new agenda with new 
challenges, that is it. Nothing more dramatic to that (McCarthy 13.1.2011). 
 
The new Director has his agenda, and performance was emphasized more. With a new 
Director usually comes a new board. About working with the board and the new members` 
abilities and networking after the change of 2010 McCarthy tells: 
 
“I would say there is a change, definitely, with our new Director coming, 
Klaus Biesenbach, who was actually a curator at MoMA PS1 for a long time, 
Head of the Performance and Media Studies Department here as Chief 
Curator. He's very interested in performance art, he's very interested.. in these 
kind of (flows) [05:25] of happenings. So I think that change (would be) 
different exhibitions and programs that will start to take place at the museum. 
There's been a lot of work with the board, to kind of (-) new board members, a 
good combination of people who are passionate about the arts, who are in a 
position, generously (--) to support the museum, with their other contacts or 
other abilities to help us. Just overall, changing a bit (McCarthy 13.1.2011)” 
 
It is challenging to find the right kind of people to the board, who have the right kind of 
passion for the arts, McCarthy says. To understand one´s responsibilities in the board takes 
a while. Yet the board has been pulling together, according to McCarthy, and they trust 
greatly in the new Director (McCarthy 13.1.2011). 
 
When asked about the organizational changes after 2008 in PS1´s every day life, a bit 
surprisingly, McCarthy says that a similar thing happened than in Finland (Pohjanvirta 
25.5.2011, Miller 8.5.2012, Kivinen 8.5.2012, Laita 31.5.2012): 
 
“Did it change.. it did change in the sense that, I mentioned earlier that there 
were some staff turnover, people were leaving, as opposed to refilling those 
positions, those responsibilities just got given to other people. So the staff was 
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reduced, and then not kind of replaced, so it definitely.. (a change makes) 
[07:18] people very busy, working across departments, collaborating with 
other staff members that they might not have collaborated with before, 
interacting with other departments here at MoMA that they might not have 
done before. But I think overall it was good, you know” (McCarthy 
13.1.2011). 
 
McCarthy explains her position in the organization and current working relation to the 
leadership:  
 
“I report to Todd Bishop, who's the Director of Development for PS1. He's 
also the Director of Exhibition Funding here at MoMA, so his team raises all 
the money for the exhibitions. And so, kind of part of his portfolio is PS1. I 
report to him, and then I also report to Klaus as the Director of MoMA PS1.” 
–“Definitely I would say I'm informed in the sense, that because part of my, 
well my job is to raise money, deal with money, kind of be that middle person 
between the (income) and the expenses happening, but I do hear a lot of 
what's happening” (McCarthy 13.1.2011). 
 
The recent changes, According to McCarthy, led to more collaboration, people 
communicating on a horizontal level across departments, interacting each other more, in a 
way that might not have happened before. The style of leadership was different, but 
McCarthy has no specific record of the previous one, being new to the organization: 
 
“I've only worked so long, briefly, for a few months before she left, so I can't 
really speak to the difference of her style of leadership and then Klaus's style 
of leadership, necessarily. As far as my department goes, I'm the one person 
on the ground over at PS1, for all development, and then I report to Director 
of Development here at the museum, and then I also report to Klaus as the 
Director of the museum at PS1. But.. I don't know, uh.. (--) [08:28] are 
incredibly supportive, definitely meet with them very often. I meet with one of 
the Directors here a few times a week, we e-mail every day. So I don't know, I 
wouldn't say there was, related that, (--) crisis”(McCarthy 13.1.2011). 
 
About who is leading the change in the museum, McCarthy thinks for a while, then 
answers the following: 
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“Right now it's actually more Klaus, as Director of the museum, and we have 
a new Curator, Peter Eleey. So they're really, kind of.. they're spearheading 
the mission of the museum, the exhibitions and whatnot. And as they're in the 
process of figuring that out, then that will filter to other areas, I think it's (--). 
[09:47] Our strategy for right now is to cultivate, (--) cultivate more 
individual donors, we have two membership groups, so we're really trying to 
strengthen those. One is for young members that are in their mid 20s to early 
40s, we wanna create a point of access for these young people that wanna get 
involved in the museum. So we're trying to kind of, maybe more formalize 
these points where people can get to the museum. (You don't just have to be a) 
[10:17] big exhibition funder, or a board member, that they can interact with 
the museum, and support it financially. I guess that's a strategy, that we're 
trying to figure out points of access” (McCarthy 13.1.2011). 
 
The future goals in her own work and the audience development of PS1 include audience 
segmentation for the benefit of the young visitors, cultivating donors and philanthropy and 
creating “points of access to people” (McCarthy 13.1.2011). Creating new networks to 
support the museum seems to be one of the core aims in the near future of the Development 
Officer´s work (McCarthy 13.1.2011). The other group cultivated around the museum is a 
network:  
“And then the second group, it's called the Directors' Circle, and we're just 
now starting to form that. We haven't even had our first event yet. And that 
will be a membership group, that's kind of.. Klaus, because he has so many 
colleagues internationally, (--) [10:49] is a very large, affiliate social 
network, it's an opportunity for these people to give on a regular basis to the 
museum, so it's again, (very, again), higher level membership group will get 
time with Klaus, studio visits, you know” (McCarthy 13.1.2011.  
The crisis hit the museums field in the United States in 2008 causing a lot of turbulence. 
How did McCarthy, as an employee in the PS1 experience the changes, and in which way 
was the crisis dealt with on the organizational level? McCarthy sees here that the 
relationship between the parent museum, MoMA, and PS1 has strengthened in a very 
positive way, at least for a short period of time. She stresses the fact that the employees 
were properly informed on a regular basis throughout the crisis, and that this led to a 
feeling of togetherness among the staff of both MoMA and PS1: 
 
Sure. I think that it was handled well, I think that it was handled realistically. I 
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don't think it was a surprise to people at PS1 when staff positions weren't 
fulfilled or raises weren't given, people understood what was going on, 
understood that it was a time (--). [12:11] One thing that MoMA did, that I 
thought was really great, started doing these all-staff meetings, with MoMA, 
it's huge, there's 700 employees here or something, and PS1 which is at 15 
employees. Doing these big, all-staff, (BTM) meetings, and the Director here 
spoke to everyone in very straightforward, plain terms, saying this is where 
we've been the past couple of years, and here's 2009, you could see the 
number of members dropping off, perhaps, or the size of (--), or fund raising. 
So it was a very honest meeting with everybody, and I think it was (--) to have 
that information, to understand where the museum was coming from, and then 
also when decisions were made after that, it wasn't a surprise. People (knew --
), [13:04] so I think they did a great job to just be very honest, 'cause 
everyone felt it personally in their own lives, in their jobs, you know” 
(McCarthy 13.1.2011). 
 
As the National Gallery announced in 2011 that the privatization process will take place 
early 2014, there is no record, based on the interview data, of the leadership of the National 
Gallery gathering people in Kiasma together. Nor did they know where the changes came 
from, and why were they needed. Instead, the affiliate was left struggling on its own in an 
atmosphere of fear of loosing jobs, budget cuts and an upcoming upheaval and a large-
scale organizational restructuring. Even though the skilful staff convinces that the changes 
could bring something good as well, there is an underlying tone of uncertainty and doubt 
(Miller 8.5.2012, Kivinen 8.5.2012, Laita 31.5.2012, the researcher´s personal notes).  
 
Here, judging from the data, a significantly different approach to the crisis can be seen 
between the United States and the austerity policy by the government in Finland. Even 
though there was a feeling that the crisis was threatening people´s jobs, the feeling of 
togetherness prevailed: “Yeah. I think everyone kind of, I mean I certainly didn't think that 
the economic crisis was (over), (it seemed to get) worse and worse and worse and worse, 
and..”   
 
The meetings were held on a regular basis to the staff, but the large meetings of all the staff 
of MoMA and PS1 gathering together were more scarce:  
 
“There's been a few, there was a (few during) [13:33] 2009. And then also, 
they do these all-staff meetings, I think once a quarter. But the ones last year 
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were very much focusing on where we are now.. you know, (about how -- staff 
--) and you know, that kind of stuff. 
 
The reactions of the staff to the changes were moderate, partly because the museum 
leadership managed to make the cuts without any lay-offs: 
 
           “I think they made some very good decisions, I think they made some very 
hard decisions. I think that they were realistic in reducing budgets, reducing 
staff. No-one was laid off, I thought that was amazing. They really relied more 
on just natural (--), [14:36] people retiring. And people leaving a position to 
go back to grad school or whatever, and they just made the decision not to 
replace that person. So overall I think they did, their number one priority was 
not to lay anybody off, which they didn't. And then just making the hard 
decisions based on that of.. paring down budgets a bit. I think they handled it 
really well” (McCarthy 13.1.2011). 
 
According to McCarthy, the people in charge and leading the change are the board of the 
directors, the Director and the Associate Director of MoMA: 
 
“I would definitely say it's, a lot of our Board of Directors, Agnes Gund is our 
chair (in 2011). She's phenomenal, and she's really (--) [15:26] what's going 
on, she's really great. Klaus definitely, Peter. And then, they (-) also in tandem 
with Glenn here at the Museum of Modern Art, and Kathy Halbreich is the 
Associate Director of MoMA, and she came, she was Director of the Walker 
Art Center in Minneapolis for many, many years. So she understands kind of 
what small, the challenges facing a small contemporary arts' institution. She's 
been a great, I think sounding board (for Klaus --). I would say those are the 
people that are really spearheading things” (McCarthy 13.1.2011). 
 
McCarthy tells the following about the funding, annual fundraising and budget for the 
museum affiliate, and who is in charge of it: 
“The key.. the budgets are led by the Curatorial Department and then our 
Chief Administrative Office, they're kind of in tandem to create that. But as far 
as affecting the budgets, yeah I can say if there's something that'd be hard to 
fund raise for, what would be difficult, what would be easy.. easy to (--) 
personally. There's certain (--) that it's easier to raise money for than others. 
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So I would definitely say that as they're creating budgets, just to keep in mind, 
maybe we have those extra (--) [20:07] that they might wanna do, and (I 
would say after --) raise money for the central part of it let's just see where 
we're at.”—“ For PS1 we raise about 2 million dollars” (McCarthy 
13.1.2011).”  
 
The economic crisis of 2008 hit the museum´s fundraising the hardest affecting 
the overall budget, of which, according to McCarthy half is fundraising money: 
 
 “Yeah, I would say corporate sponsorships, corporate funding has really 
dried up quite a bit. That's been difficult. Our individual donors have been 
giving less money. They're still giving, but they're giving (--) [21:06] less. The 
Board I have to say has been remarkable, they're really committed to this 
institution. And there were a number of, (--) couple of Board Members who 
said, `I was hit pretty hard, and I need a year to recover`. And they did, they 
gave less money in 2008 - 2009, but they're back up to their previous amounts. 
They're committed, (--), it's understandable, (that they have a) hard time. (--) 
Board's been fantastic. Our foundation giving is something we definitely need 
to work on, as far as strategy goes a lot of the exhibition (agenda at) MoMA 
PS1 is done very quickly, because it's contemporary art, it's kind of very fresh, 
it's very of the moment, so in the, historically exhibitions were planned with 
not a lot of (lee time, --) six months, a year, when they're application's due or 
(--). [22:05] So the way that our planning happens, doesn't always (benefit 
from --)” (McCarthy 13.1.2011). 
 
Also, the profile of the museum as a contemporary arts affiliate concentrating in living 
artists and contemporary arts does not support strategic planning on a very long term as to 
exhibition agenda. Long-term planning is needed in most cases for the funding applications 
(McCarthy 13.1.2011). The museum does not have a collection of its own, but cooperated 
more with MoMA in  exhibition-making after the crisis: 
 
“But one thing that's actually been really great, because of the relationship 
between PS1 and MoMA, is that more and more we can take the, (borrow 
from) MoMA's old collection, and they have (a large) collection. So we did 
that with a show called 1969, that was a combination between the Archives 
Department and PS1, so we went into the Archives collection and took kind of 
both art work but ephemera in different (--) and created this show, kind of 
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about what was happening in 1969, both (aesthetically) and artistically, which 
was great. And then we're doing a show that opens in two weeks (February 
2011) called Modern Women: Single Channel, and it's a group show of video 
works by female film makers, that are all in the (MoMA collection). So it's 
great to have access to that..” (McCarthy 13.1.2011). 
 
Talking more about her work at PS1, McCarthy depicts the PR work related to her work.  
The museum is also working towards easier philanthropy and donations practices online, or 
online fundraising: 
 
“So this has been interesting, 'cause it's lot more individual relationships with 
people. Some foundations stuff, but it's a lot more individual relationships. I 
would say in general, online giving, we don't do it at PS1 yet. We're working 
towards that, to update our website to have that capability. But I think that 
once we have that, (--) staff to do that would be really interesting. Just, you 
know, so that an average person who wanted to (--)..” [25:42] ” ..so you 
would just go online and say (--) tax write-off, it's (funny)” (McCarthy 
13.1.2011). 
Audience development has gone further: “Changes.. our membership groups have grown 
quite a bit, which has been good, so that definitely takes a lot more time. When I first came 
there were 25 members, and we have 75, so that's been a big growth” (McCarthy 
13.1.2011). About the economic crisis` impact on the affiliate museum McCarthy says:  
“I think we're still kind of seeing what the fallout of the economic crisis was, 
you know. People are (still losing investments), [26:46] they have to build a 
portfolio again, are really being a lot more cautious about what they invest in, 
and at the same time (more carful) what they invest in. So I see this as 
caution” (McCarthy 13.1.2011). 
 The future of fundraising McCarthy does not see very brightly: “The threats. Um.. I don't 
see corporate giving coming back in a big way at all.”, and explains that long-term 
relationships will be important for PS1 in the future: 
“I mean, I would say (--) when it comes to any kind of corporate money that 
we're gonna get, which is difficult because people'll give you money, but then 
they want (something back). I think the future is gonna be really still 
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cultivating individual relationships. Long-term relationships” (McCarthy 
13.1.2011). 
 Asked about whether PS1 has any state funding, McCarthy answers: 
“We don' t (have any). We dont' have state funding or federal funding, but 
PS1.. MoMA is a private institution, but PS1 is part of the Cultural 
Institutions' Group of New York City, so it's a consortium of art, science and 
culture organisations that are.. I guess, (--) funding from the city, and work on 
city property. And admission to our institutions is not mandatory, it's 
suggested. Because they're supposed to be kind of, (--) open public good. So 
it's, everyone from the Metropolitan Museum of Art is a CIG. We're a CIG. 
The Brooklyn Museum, Queens Hall of Science I think is a CIG. So it's a 
really different mix, by mission, by (size), [28:40] by our (--) budgets, very, all 
over the map. So I think, that's our only source of city fund-, government 
fundy, is through the city there. But I imagine that that will decrease in 
coming years” (McCarthy 13.1.2011). 
 
So how did it all actually happen, and what led where? The founder and former Director of 
PS1, Alanna Heiss, describes the situation and turmoil to which the loss of exhibition 
budget led the museum affiliate in 2008 :  
 
“It was just like within the first month -- all exhibitions to which we have to 
raise substantial money. Everybody was doing this. I wanted to do it so I could 
give the artist or the collaborator enough time so they would know it wasn’t 
just to get out of a bad situation, I was trying to give everybody time to figure 
out what they would do” – “These were the actions of any rational person, 
business or not business. Then we looked at how, the next thing was, we 
looked at ourselves and tried to decide how, this PS1, not MoMA, MoMA was 
a different matter” (Heiss 14.1.2011). 
 
The beginning was very rough. The leadership were forced to make harsh decisions that 
had long-lasting effects not only for the museum affiliate´s future, but also to the 
employees and their families. Heiss stresses that the decisions made were made so that 
none of the jobs were lost, and that was a conscious decision by the leadership, quite an 
extraordinary achievement both in the field of nonprofits as well as for-profits to which the 
direct consequences of the crisis hit the hardest. The budget cuts that the museum then had 
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to inevitably face, according to Heiss, were executed regarding the prioritization of the 
people: 
 
“The next thing we did was we tried to think what parts of the building we 
could close, and how much we would actually save. The big expenses for us at 
PS1 were guards [01:31]. We have so many shows at one time at PS1, maybe 
five, seven shows at one time. And it means the whole building, three floors, 
has guards. So we tried to analyze whether it would be smarter to close one 
floor and then keep two floors open and put the existing shows on those floors. 
These are all management issues. And the answers for us were often quite 
different from the answers for anyone else. And they were different because 
we had outsourced our guards [02:14] years before, so we had no employees 
for guards. We had a company, we didn’t have any employees. And the second 
thing which was very, very different for us is that we were only involved with 
contemporary art which is being made by living artists. So, we didn’t have to 
worry about the conservation of art that we had or storage of a collection, 
there being no collection. We had to worry instead about the actual living 
artists who we were working with and how they were going to live. So, for us 
it was a more immediate and quite frankly more interesting problem than 
worrying about dead art: we were worrying about living artists, to the extent 
that we could worry about anyone. And then the next thing we did, and MoMA 
did the same thing, was we looked at the staff. And we told everybody that we 
would try to keep the full-time staff, but that there would be absolutely no new 
hires, and no raises for a period of probably two years. And the second thing 
is we offered people who were full-time to go part-time, so that they could, if 
they wanted, take the initiative to get another part-time job that might pay 
more.” (Heiss 14.1.2011). 
 
About the changes in the agenda and curatorial practices of PS1 after the crisis, that 
changed because of the budget cuts, as well as some of the turmoil that resulted, Heiss tells 
the following:  
 
“And we found out that in fact we experimented with shows that would not 
need guarding. And these kinds of decisions have to be made by different 
people, the curators usually. You have to be able to work with the artists and 
have them explain to you what their concerns are. We put the artist in the 
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driver’s seat as much as we could. In doing so, we naturally encountered 
some artists who felt a bit threatened. But it was the only honest way to do full 
programs for the next year or so, because they had a responsibility to even 
say: “Okay, I don’t care, I’m going to change pieces to adapt to these 
limitations, or I don’t think I should do the show now”. So, thinking of your 
job for the Artists Association, you have a different way of (accepting) [06:07] 
things than a museum, or you should have” (Heiss 14.1.2011). 
 
The decisions caused naturally some internal discussion in the organization as well as 
among the artists. In the turmoil of the budget cuts, the organization was fighting for its 
existence, as well as for the artists not to run away, according to Heiss. Many other spaces 
for live art in the industry had already perished. The divided arguments went back and forth 
for a while, but an open and honest discussion was always maintained between the 
organizational leadership and the artists, according to Heiss: 
 
“There were pro arguments and con arguments. And the same argument 
would say yes, these are good people, they were doing the right thing by 
making these decisions with artists, but also say they’re wrong, they should 
tell themselves to just put the show up, it doesn’t matter (they’ve not done) any 
more shows. We were very aware that there were two sides of arguments from 
each of the decisions. We talked to them openly and we tried to figure out 
what to do and we tried to do what was right for PS1, which is a living 
institution with no collection. And our intention was to keep it alive till there 
could be some recovery. So, definitely, we had an institutional duty, I thought, 
which had to do with keeping the place going. And many places closed. Most 
of those places were performing arts places or young  galleries and so on” 
(Heiss 14.1.2011). 
 
The times that followed during the first two years were hard for PS1, can be judged from 
the interview data. Some other organizations like orchestras had already gone down, Heiss 
describes the situation (Heiss 14.1.2011). Heiss gives despite all the turmoil of the times, 
credit to her follower Klaus Biesenbach, who started in 2010 for being accustomed to 
difficult situations and in making PS1 rise from the hardship again: 
 
“And in the next two years of course there were these types of places had just 
decided not to go forward. It was especially true with musicians and 
orchestras. -- Now, what’s happy about it is that you can, I hope you’ve been 
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out to PS1 which is doing very well, is that the current director who worked at 
PS1 many years and (then) also started his own place, KW in Germany, knows 
very much about how to (do that) [08:33] with bad times” (Heiss 14.1.2011). 
 
It had never been very easy for PS1. As the budget dropped by a million USD, the 
consequences were drastic, in relation to PS1´s extensive agenda and the scope of the 
museum´s functions in presenting contemporary arts: 
 
“..Like San Francisco or MoMA or Helsinki, we had never had those good 
times, so for us it was in a funny way almost a little bit easier. And it’s not 
usually (on something) [noise], but the budget was probably dropped a 
million, almost a million in the first year, but now it’s (balanced), it was 
already a very low budget before. And it’s still a low budget. It’s (still -) real 
thing. ” (Heiss 14.1.2011). 
 
Beatrice Johnson, Assistant Curator to Alanna Heiss at PS1, tells about her role at PS1, that 
she first started as an intern at the museum affiliate: 
 
“First of all, I didn’t have any other job prospects, and second of all I really 
loved the team at PS1, I loved the staff, projects and everything, so I said that 
I would stay on for another month or so. And I ended up staying for six 
months as a non-paid employee. And by that point, Alanna had given me a few 
research projects which were very intricate, and pushed me a little bit more 
than the other interns, and (--) in November her assistant at the time Jelena 
had to go to a biennale in El Salvador and so Alanna asked me if I would 
cover for her for a few days which I was happy to do. And they actually 
needed extra help in the director’s office, so they offered me a sort of part-
time (second) assistant position which I happily took” (Johnson 16.1.2011).  
 
There were many changes going on at the museum at the time in 2008 and 2009, according 
to Johnson, and they affected her work as an Assistant Curator to the Director, as the 
decrease in sponsorship money wrecked the exhibition plans and the budget:  
 
“Well, there was everything that Alanna was telling me about closing down 
certain parts of the building, and the exhibitions had to be cut. For me there 
was a very direct impact, because I had been working on a big building-wide 
show called Spectacle, which was a show of Asian, high technology and 
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monumental art. Very sophisticated, and technically complex show. And that 
was going to take over the whole building, it was a very large exhibition, with 
equally large budget. Alanna (Heiss) had taken several trips to Asia to do 
research, and I had organized all of that research. And, after probably almost 
a year of work, our main sponsor for the project fell through. I had to go back 
to working primarily on administrative tasks, which was disheartening after 
such an investment in time, and looking forward to curatorial work on such a 
large-scale project.”.  
 
The changes in the overall agenda of the organization were large as well. Long-term plans 
had to be aborted, and project-based exhibitions replaced them, part of the building was 
closed, et cetera. Johnson stresses that the effects of the economic crisis were much deeper 
and even more dramatic in other industries, such as business and for-profits: 
 
“And we had to do a hiring freeze,, and close certain parts of the building to 
the public until we were able to absorb the overhead. I think for my colleagues 
and I the changes weren’t as drastic as for, I don’t know, friends of mine who 
were in advertising or who were in finance, because many of them were just 
being laid off. For us it was more of a reduction in exhibitions and projects”  
(Johnson 16.1.2011).   
 
The people in charge of the changes and leadership, according to Johnson, were:  
“Alanna, of course, the board of directors, and the director of the Museum of 
Modern Art. And then the senior staff and Alanna Heiss at PS1 were really 
going over all these questions and communicating with the board of directors 
to see what could be done.” – “The director of MoMA, Glenn Lowry, was on 
the PS1 board, he was very involved.” (Johnson 16.1.2011). 
The process for managing the changes that occurred after the budget was cut in practice 
was a complicated on, there was no simple change strategy, according to Johnson, that was 
implemented at the time. : 
 
“I think for exhibitions we had to become more creative with how to manage 
funds, which artists to work with, which parts of the building to use, etc. Of 
course Alanna (Heiss) had a lot of important ideas, and she was able to put 
together a curatorial programme in spite of the fact that these funds were not 
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coming through.”—“ I didn’t feel the pressure of the financial crisis directly, 
because none of the staff was laid off, none of the curatorial team had to be 
left out or anything. So, on that level PS1 felt it a lot less than other places I 
think because the budget at PS1 is always so lean. In terms of the exhibitions, 
there had to be some reworking, but there wasn’t a drastic negative impact on 
the overall vision, more of a re-envisioning” (Johnson 16.1.2011). 
 
About the cancelled large exhibition and other effects after the crisis, and the curatorial 
advisors, Johnson debates: 
 
“The curatorial program was re-evaluated and there were many smaller 
projects that were done instead of that the big planned exhibitions. And we 
had the system at PS1 of the curatorial advisors, a team of curators who 
proposed exhibitions of varying sizes and scope for the curatorial program. 
They were able to develop new projects with that system, so it was possible to 
fill in new shows with smaller budgets” (Johnson 16.1.2011). 
 
Johnson tells that she was not involved in the strategic group that the Director and the 
Executive Assistant to the Director were in, but she could nevertheless sense the changes in 
her every-day work and the atmosphere in the organization: 
 
“It was hard for the staff of course and it was also hard because of the 
general environment. There were some changes, some small daily changes 
that had to be made and some staff members suffered more than others, but I 
think as a whole it wasn’t a drastic overnight change. ” (Johnson 16.1.2011) 
 
Change in the every-day life of the museum affiliate was therefore more concrete to 
Johnson as an experience. She sees some positive sides to the changes as well, such as 
involving many people in the projects and the emphasis on young, emerging artists. 
Finally, she reflects on the change of Director in 2009, how did it make her feel, having 
worked as Assistant Curator to the Founder and Director of PS1: 
 
“Well, the same example of this big Asian exhibition was for example to have 
something that would take over the entire building, that would be a very 
unified curatorial vision as opposed to bringing many different projects 
together, to fill the many different spaces and to bring in many different 
curators. I think that was one of the changes that probably was a good thing, 
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in fact. I think that having to work with a very lean budget, to involve many 
different people, to involve younger artists is beneficial. And I, obviously I 
lived very first-hand the transition at PS1 from Alanna Heiss to first a sort of 
interim director team and then the new director, that was for me a change, 
especially because Alanna founded the place, and for many it was a very odd 
thing to happen, to not have Alanna be there, the head of PS1 anymore“ 
(Johnson 16.1.2011). 
 
About the follower, Klaus Biesenbach, Johnson talks in a pleasant tone, addressing the 
need for a change in an organization as well as the need for a good ex-Director to move on 
at some point: 
 
“It’s a very big change, because as many said, PS1 was sort of Alanna’s baby. 
But I know she is very happy with Klaus’s directorship, I think the staff is 
quite happy with his moving in as well, and I think change is most times 
positive. And for Alanna it was hard, of course, because she had spent the last 
30 years running PS1. But for her it was great to come back to the Clocktower 
(Gallery) and to feel like she could start a new project all over again, one of 
the things that she does really well. And the Clocktower (Gallery) gave her 
that opportunity, because PS1 at that point was a large institution with a large 
exhibition programme, with a large budget. So Alanna had to navigate many 
different aspects of the project whereas at the Clocktower it is a sort of clean 
slate. And I think it’s been good for her to go through that. And great for me 
as someone who works very closely with her” (Johnson 16.1.2011.) 
 
How the crisis was handled among the staff, according to Johnson? She sees a phase of 
uncertainty that followed the change, that was natural in the circumstances, but hard for the 
staff: 
 
“I don’t think it was necessarily positive or negative. I think it was just sort of 
hard for them to not know exactly who to report to, to not exactly know what 
was going on. I think it was more the state of uncertainty which was different, 
and difficult. I don’t think they were necessarily happy or unhappy with it, it 
was just sort of hard for them to not know who would be coming in, what 
would happen then, and what their future at the institution was” (Johnson 
16.1.2011). 
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Her own role in the change process was to support the Director, and to move on to the next 
project, the ARTonAIR.org and continue working there close to her: “She (ran) [17:41] 
many of these decisions, let me in to sort of ask me what I felt and I think it was important 
for her to have just someone else’s perspective on it, someone who was younger than her, 
someone who was new to the project and could bring, I don’t know, a good outside view. 
Because everyone at PS1, the senior staff at PS1 had been working with each other for so 
long that sometimes I think it’s hard to have perspective” (Johnson 16.1.2011).  
 Following the crisis in its aftermath, Johnson has a deeper point to make about the overall 
situation about the New York art scene, that resulted in a positive outcome, that PS1 was 
strongly involved in at the time, after the organizational & budget changes of the museum 
in 2008-2009: 
 
“Well, at that point the art market was such a bubble, and during the crisis, 
along with everything else, it finally burst. And a lot of my colleagues and I at 
PS1 saw that as a welcome change where younger artists who are not 
necessarily selling at auctions, or being shown at, you know, the Museum of 
Modern Art, this very large, powerful institution, felt that they would be able 
to become a more active part of the art scene and be able to produce work for 
work and not work for money” (Johnson 16.1.2011). 
 
Media sources, articles, documents and financial reports support the evidence derived from 
the principal data of the interviews. The budgets and funding structure of the affiliates PS1 
and Kiasma show that the effect of funding on the museums` agendas has been extensive 
(Agreement between the Finnish National Gallery and the state to reduce expenses 2011-
2013; Consolidated Financial Statements 2007-2008, 2008-2009, 2009-2010 and 2010-
2011 Museum of Modern Art New York; The Annual Reports of The Finnish National 
Gallery 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012). The interview data combined with Museum 
statistics in Finland shows that even though the endowment for the museum sector has 
slightly increased over the years in general, inflation and increased costs mean that, in real 
terms, the level has decreased. (Museum Statistics 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011, National 
Board of Antiquities). There is no doubt that this has had an impact on the museum field. 
In the U.S, the arts strive to find new audiences, as philanthropy and fundraising are needed 
to complement the ticket sales after endowments dropped and philanthropists fled in the 
aftermath and turmoil of the financial crisis of 2008 (NEA National Statistical Report, U.S 
2010).  
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Also Kiasma seeks to find new audiences to meet the tightening budget requirements in the 
form of a change strategy, the interview data and the museum affiliate´s documents 
combined (Kiasma - A Museum of Contemporary Art publication 118/2008, Kiasma´s 
audience development material 2/2009). Perhaps this is a result of the austerity policy by 
the state that forces the museum affiliate to work harder, to gain in ticket sales compares to 
the other affiliates Ateneum and Sinebrychoff that do much better in this field (The Annual 
Budgets of the Finnish National Gallery 2008 - 2012).  
 
Reducing museum expenses has led to many significant changes in the museum affiliates 
both in terms of funding, but also agenda and curatorial practices, as well as leadership of  
the affiliates (PS1 Reports, Museum of Modern Art New York Archives). In the media, the 
mission and values of the museum instituion have been discussed from the side of the 
visitors (Tarvainen, HS 23.1.2011), as well as the media (Järvi/ HS, 28.8.2012; Heinänen & 
Uimonen/ HS, 19.1.2011, HS leader 19.1.2011) and from the side of the museum 
institution itself (Ala-Kapee, Pirjo, Museo magazine no. 2, 2011; Ruohonen & Tanninen-
Mattila, Helsingin sanomat, 21.1.2011).  
 
In the turmoil of the economic crisis and its aftermath, what does this mean to the museum 
affiliates in question?  How did they actually survive the changes, and what can we think of 
the transformational leadership, change management, strategy and organizational theory in 
all this, through the cases and the results presented? In the following chapter 6. Conclusion, 
we take a closer look at the findings of the study critically and assess the data of the 
museum affiliates in the light of the literature presented in the beginnning of this research 
in chapter 2. 
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6.1 Main Findings of the Study 
 
In this chapter, a critical discussion of the results acquired through the collected data is 
presented together with the information acquired from the study of the two cases. A short 
look will be cast on what happened in the museum field in both countries also afterwards 
the interviews took place. In the end, we will assess further developments in the field of the 
contemporary art museum affiliates and the economic crisis debate and study possible 
further research topics on strategy, organizational theory and their implications. The 
findings presented in the Results and Analysis Chapter 5 are then compared with the 
Theoretical Framework Chapter 2, and the information acquired through the presentation of 
the two cases in Chapter 4. Description of the Cases. In the end, further suggestions on 
topics and ideas valuable to the field that have come up during the study process, are 
presented. In the light of the two cases, the Conclusion chapter looks deeper into the 
challenges of the economic crisis in affiliate contemporary art museums` leadership and 
strategy, and clarifies how was the crisis dealt with internally as well as externally in the 
organizations in question, implementing the deductive method in the research. 
 
Both Kiasma and MoMA PS1 are independent of their mother organizations artistically, 
but financially they depend on them fully. They could be described in the sense of 
Santalainen´s division as being independent units as affiliates (Santalainen 2009), but as to 
financing, they are a part of a traditional line organization. This dual position makes their 
situation difficult especially in funding and strategy negotiations. The interview data 
clearly showed  in chapter 5, that tension was experienced on both sides already before the 
Agreements to reduce expenditure between the state and the Finnish National Gallery. 
 
Some key questions arose from the cases: What was the difference between the reactions of 
U.S museum and Finnish museum affiliates regarding funding, strategy and leadership 
during the economic crisis? How did funding, strategy, curatorial processes and leadership 
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interact? And how did the two case museums handle both the direct and the indirect 
consequences of the economic crisis and its aftermath, losing sponsorship agreements, 
fearing for jobs and recycling exhibitions? 
 
In Finland, a strong state dependency has surely its advantages, such as a relatively secured 
funding for the museum field, but also its disadvantages – a dependency on the ministry 
level in budget negotiations, that varies according to the political situatio. On one hand, 
they have a relatively secured funding, but on the other, a rigidity, based on the empirical 
analysis, that does not enable reacting to the contemporary changes in the environment, 
such as Alexander describes in hes study on museums and findng (1996). 
 
In Kiasma, change takes place in five-year cycles with the directors` rule. The end of the 
era of Berndt Arell marked 2009, and the beginning of Pirkko Siitari´s leadership 2010. 
The new Director started to make strategy right away. The change strategy seemed very 
clear. The emphasis was on both the museum´s organizational strategy as well as audience 
development plan to enhance the museum´s attendance, all of which were, at the time of 
the interviews in May 2010, still in process after the Director had changed. In addition, the 
forthcoming changes related to the Privatization process of the National Gallery that at that 
time, was bound to take place already in the beginning of the year 2014, and Kiasma as a 
part of it, was also adding to the uncertainty. The future of the museum was at stake, giving 
direction to the change (Kivinen 8.5.2012). The government later in spring 2013 decided to 
put forward the plans, presumably after very tight negotiations inside the cultural ministry 
and between the ministry and the museum field. The subject of the National Gallery´s 
privatization process comes up in many interviews conducted in Kiasma, spring 2012, and 
remains and open question in the Finnish museum policy as to its purpose and mission 
(Kivinen 2012, Miller 2012, Laita 2012).  
 
Is growing museum attendance best attained by cutting the budgets of the museums in 
question? (Agreement between the Finnish National Gallery and the state to reduce 
expenses, 2011-2013). Could it be that, in fact, it acts against the change? Austerity policy 
has been debated and questioned in 2013 worldwide, but it appears, that the new discussion 
in the international cultural political field has not quite reached the ministry level in 
Finland. Turbide, Laurin, Lapierre, Laurent & Morissette, suggest in their article 
”Financial Crises in the Arts Sector: Is Governance the Illness or the Cure? That weak 
governance could be in fact ”an illness permeating the arts and culture sector”. ”Then it 
might be argued”, the authors continue, ”that many of the financial crises we are 
witnessing today could have been avoided. It is possible that through better governance the 
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stakeholders of these organizations could have anticipated the financial and organizational 
problems ” (International Journal of Arts Management: Winter 2008: 4). In Kiasma, 
austerity policy simply cuts the costs, thus prohibiting the organization to recover from the 
previous cuts and produc culture, but it does not make the leadership, or the functions of 
the museum, more efficient, it has been revealed in this study. This general 
misunderstanding of an efficient leadership equaling the cutting of expenses doesn`t make 
sense in the cultural field, since austerity policy implied to the cultural sector only 
paralyzes the targets of the policy and causes great hardship. If culture is to produce 
something valuable for a nation and the international community, here must be an 
investment by the state, and directed with a visionary leadership such as defined by John 
P.Kotter (1996), not by cost-based managemen to guoarantee profit and return logic. This 
must be clear, since according to the literature that this study refers to, if an investment is 
made by the state in culture - as in any other productive sector in the society, say business - 
the return will be guaranteed in jobs and superior acheevements. If the opposite is done, 
and the responsibility to produce culture is outsourced to the private sector, endowments 
cut and expenditure reduced, the institutions such as museums are forced to seek other 
funding that necessarily doesn`t help the agenda of the institution. In the worst case, private 
money can dictate the content, the literature suggests. To sum up - in the cultural sector, 
private money is not king, but a needed supplement when the state funding is not enough, 
the theory suggests. The data of this research strongly supports the fact that austerity policy 
in Finland should be adapted first to better meet the requirements of the cultural sector, not 
implied to it as such from other fields in society alien to it such as the business world. 
 
Trasnsformational leadership in an organization in the sense Kotter (1996) defines the 
process, can only occur when there is an organization to transfer. In PS1, the change in 
2010 was even more drastic. From budget to artistic agenda, great changes were ahead for 
the new organization. The research shows what kind of changes there were during the 
economic crisis through personal interviews with the current and former staff. Secondly, 
other media sources, documents and financial reports support the evidence derived from 
the principal data, as shown in the previous chapter. 
 
6.2 Contemporary Art Museums – Leadership in Turbulence 
 
Judging from the data, many of the effects that took place after the Economic Crisis in the 
U.S were mostly practical, such as sudden lost of endowment and other funding sources. 
However, the research data showed clearly that tey affected not only the funding but also 
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curatorial and budget decisions of the museums, as well as work contracts between the 
artists and the affiliates. The changes in the museum environment resulted in rescheduling 
of exhibitions, cancellations and  reconstructing concepts and ideas related to the artistic 
content as well as to the curatorial practices in the two museums. In accordance with 
Kotler, Kotler & Kotler (1996), external environmental scan would be perhaps needed in 
the turbulence of the museums in a crisis to direct them strategically. Santalainen´s thinking 
and acting organization can be also implied here, since the crisis set the museum affiliates` 
leadership such demands that perhaps could not be easily foreseen by traditional strategic 
management. Alexander (1996) debates on the same kind of issues in her study as to 
museum funding, its environment and the internal changes caused by the external factors in 
the organization, but  looks at the situation from a wider perspective, a sociological point of 
view rather than from a strategic marketing angle only (Kotler, Kotler & Kotler 2008). 
Therefore, the theory of Alexander can be better adjusted to the cases of PS1 and Kiasma, 
than any other theories presented in this study, especially to PS1, as the effects of the crisis 
in the affiliate were drastic, multifaceted and of a very unpredictable nature, as stated 
before. 
 
The effects of the economic crisis were both direct, such as budget cuts, and indirect ones, 
such as changes in curatorial programs, agenda and enhanced cooperation between 
collections, exhibitions and institutions. Surprisingly, some major similarities between the 
cases arose despite the differences in cultural environment and funding which could not be 
foreseen from the documents and other data. Even though the financial turmoil had a direct 
influence on  museum funding structure in the form of reduced endowments, especially in 
the U.S West Coast, conclusions can be drawn from the research that the changes were not 
always negative. They lead, in some cases, to a whole new approach of curated exhibitions 
and co-operation forms, and horizontal communication enhancing internally in the 
organizations, in the meaning of Timo Santalainen´s (2009) theory of a learning 
organization, as stated before. Decisions concerning strategy were both of a very practical 
nature, such as diminishing exhibition costs, and abstract: They affected the agenda and 
curatorial and artistic content of the museums, as the budget cuts led to the P.S.1 changing 
from mainly an exhibitions venue to MoMA PS1, a more performance-oriented arena for 
events, due to the sudden saving of costs. In Kiasma, the narrowing operative budget as 
well as the constant threat of budget cuts by the state due to austerity policy combined with 
the Finnish National Gallery´s privatizaton process in the near future, all had concequences 
in the organization. Internally, they caused great uncertainty among the staff in the fear of 
lay-offs, and the need to cooperate and recycle exhibitions more than before externally. 
The sixth force, in this case, really was the state, as argued by the theorists that followed 
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and criticized Michael Porter (1979). 
  
In Finland, the situation of the state-funded organizations was the opposite - they were 
mainly safe in terms of large-scale cuts in endowment - although the Ministry of Finance 
suggested some rather large reductions in Kiasma´s budget regarding the purchasing of 
new artworks already in 2011 and 2012. Austerity policy makes it difficult for the 
museums to both plan and execute the exhibitions. The continuous fear of annual budget 
cut threats and paralyzes the organizations but also forces them out of their shells. The 
harsh policy by the state and the threats of the forthcoming large-scale organizational 
changes in 2014 due to the privatization process of the Finnish National Gallery and 
possible lay-offs caused by the agreement between the Finnish National Gallery and the 
state to reduce expenses (2011-2013) underpin the study. The uncertainty among the staff 
of the affiliate museum was tangible. 
 
Some positive aspects of the crisis can be seen, however, as stated by Arts & 
Economic Prosperity IV:  
 
”Yet, even in a down economy, some communities saw an increase in their 
arts spending and employment. As the economy rebounds, the arts are well 
poised for growth. They are already producing new and exciting work—
performances and exhibitions and festivals that entertain, inspire, and 
increasingly draw audiences” (National Statistical Report, U.S, 2010:2).  
 
6.3 Museum Affiliates: Strategy and Survival 
 
The upcoming changes of the privatization of the National Gallery in 2014 greatly 
pressured the museum to cut its costs. This is due to the possible resulting budget cuts and 
the Agreement between the Finnish National Gallery and the state to reduce expenses 
(2011-2013) and the austerity policy followed by the government. Although the Minister 
Paavo Arhinmäki succeeded in the Spring Budget negotiations of 2013 to stop the 
privatization process and freeze the planned large-scale cuts in the overall budget of the 
museums, as well as the rest of the cultural sector, in the beginning of 2014 to the next 
governmental period of rule, the threat still remained in the air. As stated before, the 
pressure from the political turmoil of the National Gallery´s privatization process was 
clearly tangible in the research. An atmosphere of adjusting to the overwhelming future 
changes and contemplating over the possible changes in practice for the museums seemed 
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to be a dark cloud in the sky of the industry in Finland. Also direct concern on cuts on HR 
& employees` fear of losing their jobs was expressed to some extent between the lines. 
 
The economic crisis can be seen as a structural phenomenon, affecting funding mainly, but 
the research suggests that it also has an impact on the institution, consisting of dynamic 
networks, as a whole. According to Timo Santalainen, ”an organization is an organic 
entity, consisting of structure, processes and personal relations. The formal structure 
creates the static processes. Personal networks create the dynamics” (Santalainen 
2009:85). The sociological approach by Victoria D. Alexander (1996) also suggests, that 
the museum affiliate is an entity strongly affected by its environment, both internal and 
external. The economic crisis embraces both of these types of change. 
 
As to the traditional management-based leadership theories, the global financial crisis has, 
according to Santalainen, proved simply unreliable (2009). As stated in the Theoretical 
Framework Chapter 2, Stulz (2009 cited in Santalainen 2009:85) shows that in the 
environment of the hyper-competition, risk analyses and tools based on historical data 
simply do not work. Some risks rely in the complicated reports of the experts themselves, 
as well, a language which ordinary people working in the organizations do not  necessarily 
understand. Communication can also prohibit action.  
 
For the next crisis Stulz (2009 cited in Santalainen 2009:85) suggested a “what if“ scenario 
planning. Also Santalainen sees scenarios as a good strategic rehearsal for the organization 
(Santalainen 2009:85), but on the other hand, in accurate budget cut situations which 
demand quick decision-making from the leadership, they might prove inadequate. In the 
case of the economic crisis and museums, a worst-case scenario already happened during 
the 2008 turbulence in the United States, diminishing the museum budgets in terms of both 
endowments and sponsorship agreement, and austerity policy and cost reductions in 
Finland (Agreement between the state and the Finnish National Gallery, 2011-2013I. Could 
it have been foreseen through scenario planning, as Stulz suggests (2009)? It is a question 
to which this research perhaps can not find an answer. More data and more research - and 
perhaps another financial crisis - would be needed to test Stulz` arguments in real life in the 
context of museum leadership. 
 
Johnson, Scholes and Whittington (2006 cited in Santalainen 2009:86) have explored the 
advantages of matrix organizations in the business world. Judging form the data, in 
mixtures of traditional line and a unit organizations such as Kiasma or PS1, the leadership 
could possibly profit from a matrix organization´s more freer form, that of relying on more 
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up-to-date global management by networks, or a structure that combines traits from a 
matrix organization as well as a unit organization (Johnson, Scholes and Whittington 2006 
cited in Santalainen 2009:86). 
 
Kiasma Foundation, founded in 2007, can be seen as a kind of an intermediary 
organization, that is `in-between organizations`. It generates extra funding for the museum 
through donations and philanthropy to be used for the collections, yet being relatively 
independent. The purchases of larger pieces of art the museum would not otherwise be able 
to afford within the scarce resources allocated to it by the state through the National 
Gallery. These kind of organizations inside the organization are needed more and more in 
Finland, as endowment has a tendency to drop in future years due to current austerity 
policy of the government and contracts between the museums and the state such as The 
Agreement between the state and the Finnish National Gallery (2011 – 2013). The 
agreement was established to cut expenses from the museum sector in the long run (Cost 
agreement between the  State and the Finnish National Gallery 2012-2013 by reducing the 
costs of HR.  
 
Regarding the findings of this study, however, it must be emphasized that austerity policy 
may be extremely harmful to the cultural life and growth of Finland as a nation, as the 
museums are already struggling with far too few resources. At the same time, project 
money and fundraising will be an essential part of funding of the museums. The museum 
institution could also benefit from new forms of funding, such as co-funding, implemented 
in a form that would suit the museum organization. These are the possible future tendencies 
in the field of culture and funding of the arts, that are already in use for example in the 
global film and music industry. 
 
In Kiasma, teams and working groups were set to meet the organization to challenge the 
traditional line organizatio. Its weakness in communicating horizontally (Santalainen 2009) 
was hence  challenged by the new strategy-making led by the new Director Pirkko Siitari. 
Emphasis was put on the departments to co-operate more and share ideas. Information flow 
was made more efficient and agile. The traditional line organization challenges have 
therefore been met to some extent (Santalainen 2009), acknowledged and some 
improvements have been already made in the leadership, based on the findings. Special 
emphasis had been put on project management. This had, according to the data, led to a 
more open and approachable organization. Yet in new forms of funding, sponsorship 
agreements and fundraising the challenges remain, as well as the complicated bureaucracy 
of the Finnish National Gallery being the parent of Kiasma that it relies on in negotiations 
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regarding strategy. Whatever direction the Finnish National Gallery takes in its policy, 
Kiasma´s leadership must follow. The dual role of the museum as a valued contemporary 
art museum with an moderately extensive program reaching many stakeholders and fields 
in the society, and the role as an affiliate, a subordinate of the Finnish National Gallery is 
likely, based on the findings of the research, to continue to cause challenges in the future. 
 
As to Kiasma, the danger of active inertia and rigidity is, implicating Santalainen´s theory, 
always present (Santalainen 2009:92-92). In Finland, active inertia is perhaps more a 
danger than in the U.S, which is a substantially larger country with more museums, 
curators, leaders and Directors and staff. The division between an artistic Director and an 
Administrative Director is also quite rear still in Finland. 
 
During the research process I wrote an article signed by two gallerists and a cultural critic 
about the resources of purchasing artworks in Kiasma, which emphasized the lack of 
resources for contemporary arts in Finland, especially as to the purchases of new artworks, 
affecting all of the industru from artists to galleries and museums: ”The mission of a 
contemporary art museum in a historical continuum is to guarantee a multitude of 
contemporary art into the nation’s memory” (Ojamo, Hanna, Toppila, Nina & Oksman, 
Henriikka: Museoiden tulisi ostaa teoksia kaikista gallerioista, Helsingin Sanomat 
Mielipide C14, 15.2.2013). The article was written in reference to a public discussion of 
the purpose of the contemporary art museum Kiasma´s purchases. The resources are an 
essential part of Santalainen´s theory (2009), as well as this research´s primary and 
secondary data, and have a direct impact on the museum institution, the content-providing 
living artists`work conditions and income as well as the cultural field as a whole. During an 
economic crisis, and the austerity policy that follows led by the government, the resources 
of the art institutions become scarce. The results, based on this study, show that the cultural 
field suffers at large from the implications of this policy on the organizations, and creates 
the sixth threat in the meaning of the followers and criticizers of Michael Porter´s 
theoretical work. At the same time, it opens up doors for collaboration and new possible 
approaches to curating, audience development, education, museum practices and agenda. 
Organizational leadership, in terms of John P. Kotter´s transformational change strategy 
(1996), is also hit by a turmoil. 
 
The results gained from MoMA PS1, New York, and SFMOMA, san Francisco, show 
strongly, that the changes in the American museum field, both direct in the form of budget 
cuts and indirect in the form of organizational changes and changes in curating exhibitions, 
were much more dramatic than in the state-dependent Finnish equivalents. The museums is 
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the U.S are highly dependent on private money, philanthropy and fundraising. In the West 
Coast, the situation varied depending on the funding structure and decisions made after the 
crisis. For example, SFMOMA´s budget dropped dramatically, and without any previous 
notice. Institutions with larger endowments, such as the Getty and the Metropolitan 
Museum, had to make layoffs while SFMOMA did not. MOCA in Los Angeles in stead 
laid off a third of their staff.  This threat is underpinning the austerity policy in Finland as 
well. Boehm wrote recently about Museum of Contemporary Art California´s struggle to 
exist at the LA Times (Boehm/ LA Times 11.4.2013). 
 
In the case of PS1, the economic crisis lead to both direct and indirect changes in funding 
and the museum’s curatorial program. The budget was drastically cut after the crisis, 
leading to new curatorial choices made by the leadership in exhibitions based on 
collections and a new overall strategy in-the-making, in addition to the rough budget cuts. 
The research shows how large-scale and multi-dimensional the changes and challenges in 
PS1 were in general. The founder Heiss left P.S.1 in 2009 followed by a lot of media 
attention. The new Director of PS1 Klaus Biesenbach started in 2010. In the interview she 
tells frankly about the long-term financial difficulties of the museum, already before the 
crisis hit. 
 
In Chapter 5. Results and Analyses, the interviews conducted at Kiasma, Finnish Cultural 
Institute in New York and The Finnish Museums Association showed that, in general, the 
effects of the economic crisis on the contemporary affiliate museum field in Finland were 
mild and applied only on a long run. The indirect effects of the austerity policy led by the 
government, on the contrary, were strong, the data showed. One of the main effects of the 
economic crisis landing to Finland in the beginning of the year 2012 was that, for already a 
couple of years, attitudes towards state-funded institutions and policy-making had become 
much more strict. This affected the museums by creating an atmosphere of fear, where 
Kiasma, aside of having suffered for a long time of financial difficulties and lack of 
resources, now had to convince politicians to provide the museums at least the minimum 
resources needed during the turbulent recession to come. The collected data showed, in 
Chapter 5.,  that Kiasma had never recovered from its previous budget cuts in the 1990s 
recession. It had consequently survived with much smaller funding from the state that ten 
years ago. At the same time, the costs of the international artworks as well as the salaries 
and other normal expenditures in the museum´s budget were on a constant rise.  
 
In relation to the forthcoming large-scale changes of the National Gallery´s Privatization 
process, it is quite surprising that the affiliate museum was left struggling alone in the 
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atmosphere of uncertainty. In PS1, the effects of the crisis were handled with large 
meetings of the staff of the parent museum, Museum of Modern Art, and PS1. In Finland, 
the leadership of the National Gallery was hiding in its shell, as only one interview was 
given by the Director General for the press, the main newspaper Helsingin Sanomat in 
2011 to cut the gossip. This communication was everything but open, and made the 
museum affiliate´s struggle even harder in the turmoil of the austerity policy, a constant 
threat of budget cuts, and a general atmosphere of fear underneath the organization that 
was tangible for the researcher during the interviews as well. One cannot but wonder what 
kind of a strategy was behind this policy. Even in PS1, where the effects of the large-scale 
budget cuts occurred in the aftermath of the economic crisis, the staff was gathered 
together in an atmosphere of hope, to face the hardship together. Director General Risto 
Ruohonen did not reply to the interview request concerning this research. 
 
In addition, the research shows a shift in museum exhibitions: there are more projects than 
before, more cooperation and more recycling of old and joint exhibitions by the 
stakeholders in the field. The project based-thinking has surely, having been done as a 
conscious strategic move by Kiasma as found in this research, broke the ´sector thinking` 
of a traditional line organization. It has added flexibility inside the organization.  
 
However, the internal changes do not always manifest themselves to the  artworld, as the 
audience sees mainly what is on display in a museum. Daigle & Rouleau argue in 
”Strategic Plans in Arts Organizations: A Tool of Compromise Between Artistic and 
Managerial Values” that there is a great difference between traditional management and 
leadership of an arts organization: ”Because art and management are grounded in 
historically contradictory, not to say conflicting, values, this duality contributes to the 
ideological tensions that are intrinsic to arts organizations” (International Journal of Arts 
Management, Spring 2010: 13). Although accountability and cultural impact studies are a 
contemporary tendency among the strategy and museum literature, there are still some 
major challenges in bringing economy into the arts, Alessia Zorloni writes in ”Designing a 
Strategic Framework to Assess Museum Activities”, (International Journal of Arts 
Management, Winter 2012: 31).  The collection exhibitions and recycling of old material is 
clearly seen by a visitor in Kiasma in the recent years, something which is not necessarily 
only a positive thing to cut museum expenditure. In the cultural field, it is largely seen as a 
lack of imagination and sometimes even a downfall in the museum´s agenda and artistic 
integrity. The criticism therefore, derived from the results of this studies, is partly justified.  
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Andrea Hausmann reminds of the fact that although museums and marketing are important 
factors, according to many surveys, word of mouth dictates the museum visitors` habits 
(International Journal of Arts Management, Spring 2012: 32). In a competitive arena like 
museums, the institutions must provide the visitors something which beats other 
entertainment, educational and recreational activities. At the same time, to provide content 
for the international arts community can be difficult to combine with the entertainment 
goal. Kristin Demetrious argues in ”Marketing and Public Relations for Museums, 
Galleries, Cultural and Heritage Attractions” that marketing and public relations have a 
legitimate, central but transforming relationship to cultural institutions such museums and 
galleries and (International Journal of Arts Management, Winter 2012: 68).  
 
Mintzberg analyzed the turbulence in the environment (2003): ”As to the turbulence of the 
environment, strategy can not be understood beforehand. The multi-layered and 
complicated changes in the environment of an organization can take a decade to realize” 
(Santalainen 2009:17). This applies to both of the affiliate museums. The results of a 
possible recession followed by austerity policy and the turbulence that they caused in the 
environment of the arts organizations, are clearly depicted in this study. Even after the 
economic crisis,  the changes can only be seen after a decade or two. Therefore, a further 
study in the field of the arts organizations and recession might be necessary. 
 
The two different ecosystems in Finland and the United States are perhaps not directly 
comparable as such, as the results of the study show, but the economic crisis and its effects 
were global, affecting the environments in which the museum affiliates operate. Therefore, 
also the effects on culture at some level could be global, it is argued in this thesis. The 
difference between the two countries, the United States and Finland, has been taken into 
account and dealt with separately in the research. However, some similar reactions to the 
crisis in the internal organizational level of the affiliates are obvious and show strongly in 
the results despite the differences in funding structure. This clearly shows the global nature 
of the crisis as something that causes similar rections and exceeds local differences in the 
nonprofit arts organizations, such as museum affiliates. 
 
The birth of the Kiasma Foundation was not directly linked to the causes of the recession, 
the study shows, but instead answered the need of extra funding caused by the austerity 
policy of the goverment for the purchasing of new artworks to collection. The birth of the 
foundation can nevertheless be seen in a continuum of the need to enhance private funding 
in the cultural sector in the aftermath of the economic crisis and to seek new forms of 
funding for nonprofits. The budget for Kiasma´s collection purchases is not on the level of 
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the international artworks` prices. Without the foundation, some more expensive recent 
artworks would never have been purchased, like Eija-Liisa Ahtila´s video installation 
Where is Where?, that was purchased entirely with the Foundation´s money. 
 
After the interviews, many changes and turbulences occurred in the museum field in 
Finland. In the end of the interview period a new, artist-oriented museum concept, 
Checkpoint Helsinki, was developed as a result of the debate of the Guggenheim museum 
in 2012. It led to the fall of the Guggenheim when the City Council  of Helsinki turned the 
proposition down in April, 2012. Before the decision, the cultural field was strongly 
devided in two, as the main newspaper took an active role in encouraging the museum´s 
endevours whereas the opinions of the Finnish art professionals, curators, gallerists and 
artists remained mixed (Heinänen, Kaisa/ HS & Uimonen, Anu/ HS 19.1.2011; Helsingin 
Sanomat, leader, 19.1.2011). Museum policy on an international level hit the news in 
Finland in an unseen manner.  
. 
6.4 Suggestions for Further Research 	  
In “How the U.S Funds the Arts” The National Endowment for The Arts, U.S states (NEA 
2012): ”In recent years, arts managers not only have weathered an economic recession; 
they have been challenged to address evolving patterns of arts participation, which include 
a blurring of genres, categories, and traditions, as well as shifting boundaries between the 
professional and amateur arts sectors. To navigate this changing landscape, while working 
in a fiscally tough climate, U.S artists and arts organizations must rely on a network of 
allied but independent funding sources. ” In what ways have these boundaries been 
shifting, genres been blurred, and traditions challenged ? The relationship between the 
traditional institutions and the new rivalries would be of great interest for a further study. 
 
In the field of strategic management of museums, (Odile Paulus: Fall 2010: 12), another 
suggestion in the field of funding would be how the institutions of contemporary art 
balance between fiscal management, including private money that is never neutral, and the 
artistsc needs and expenses of the exhibition projects. The NEA report states: ”--Private 
sector contributions, (which) make up the lion’s share of contributed income for arts 
organizations.” ”Earned or contributed, both means of income are unpredictable. 
Consequently, arts organizations face a two-sided challenge. On the one hand, they must 
cope with rising expenditures for artists, artworks, productions, and educational projects. 
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On the other, they must forecast the revenue needed to support their program goals.”	   (NEA 
2012:8)  
 
Third, Walter Benjamin comments on the function and purpose of contemporary art 
museums as follows: “Art museums did not always exist, they are basically a recent 
invention, and it seems they have now exhausted their purpose, became obsolete, along 
side even the very notion of art.” (Benjamin 2010:23) What is the role of the museum in 
the every-day life of the artists, the living, especially? Does a museum still serve a role, and 
in what way? 
 
Based on the findings of the study, a thorough study of the effects of the economic crisis in 
relation to austerity policy in the international contemporary museum field would be 
needed. Many of the interviewees expressed their interest in the subject, but felt they had 
not thought about the connection before. The ideas and perceptions that were born out of 
the many fruitful conversations with museum directors, specialists, curators and other 
professionals during this research strongly suggest that the field and topic has not been 
thoroughly investigated. Hence, another interesting subject for further research could be 
which of the nonprofits have suffered from the loss/ reducing of sponsorship agreements 
due to the economic crisis the most  in the U.S, especially regarding large museums in the 
United States. In America, debate on the austerity policy (Turbide, Johanne; Laurin, 
Claude; Lapierre, Laurent & Morissette, Raymond, 2008:4) and the ethics of fundraising 
continues. The role of fundraising, philanthropy and private patrons in effecting exhibition 
content causes discussion and has its roots in the old and familiar theme of patrons versus 
public institutions (Chong, Derrick 2002:44; Paul DiMaggio 1983:61-8).  
 
Another subject that would possibly need closer examination is the dilemma of the artists in  
contemporary art museums. In Alexander´s work, contingency theory in the organizational 
approach suggests the idea of the different factions inside the organization enhancing 
conflict (Alexander 1996:13). In which way are the artists received, generally, in the 
museum, a home to the art they present? Are they on the last ladder of the food chain as 
freelancers and workers providing the  or genuinely welcomed and seen as an essential 
content-supplying force, a core asset without which the contemporary are museum could not 
simply survive? What kind of aspects and possible confrontation has there been? How does 
the austerity policy and the cutting down of the museum budgets affect the artist´s work in 
the museums? Nathalie Moureau & Dominique Sagot-Duvauroux state in ”Four Business 
Models in Contemporary Art”, highlight the importance of the involvement of artists in 
cultural projects in the development of theis careers (International Journal of Arts 
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Management, Spring 2012:44).  This interaction is beneficial for the institutions as well as 
the artists, the authors debate. 
 
The findings of the study suggest that the turbulence followed by the economic crisis at the 
contemporary art museum field affected the museum affiliates strongly both in the U.S as 
well as in Finland. The consequences were direct, such as in the form of budget costs, lost 
jobs and organizational changes, as well as indirect, in the form of austerity policy that 
affected the museum´s leadership throughpout, forcing the museums to redefine strategy, 
funding and curatorial processes and enhance cooperation between the stakeholders and 
peers in the industry. It also led, in the case of PS1, to a whole new approach of presenting 
contemporary living arts challenging leadership as well as the phenomenon of recycling 
existing collection exhibitions to cut museum expenditure in Finland. The impact of the 
global conomic crisis on culture in the long run, however, is yet to be understood. 
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Appendix 1. List of Interviews 
 
The interview Guide  
•    The list of the personal interviews conducted between May 2010 and April 2013 in 
Finland and in The United States, the research questions and procedure have been 
specified in Chapter 3.“Description of the Research Process and Method.” 
• All the telephone interviews were recorded in New York City in January, 2011. 
 
Finland 
Preliminary interviews at Kiasma, May 2010 
• Senior Researcher Leevi Haapala, May 2010, 15 min. 
• Head of  Development Sanna-Mari Jäntti, May 11th, 2010, 30 min. 
Interviews at Kiasma (February 2011 – April 2013) 
• Curator Kati Kivinen, May 8th , 2012, 38 min. 
• Chief Curator Arja Miller, Collections, May 8th, 2012, c. 45 min. 
• Communications Manager Piia Laita, May 31st , 2012, via email  
       In addtition, Pirkko Siitari, Director of Kiasma, read the final text in April, 2013.  
 
Interviews at the Finnish Museums Association 
• Senior Specialist Marja-Liisa Pohjanvirta,  25th May, 2011, 45 min. 
 
The United States of America 
Interviews at the SFMOMA, San Francisco (October 2010) 
• Assistant Curator at Painting & Sculpture dept. John Zarobell, on October 8th, 2010, c. 45 
min. 
 
Interviews at the Finnish Cultural Institute in New York (2011) 
• Project Manager and Interim Director Essi Rautiola, The Finnish Culture Institute in New 
York, January 10th, 2011, 22 min. 
 
Interviews at MoMA and PS1, New York ( January 2011): 
• Development Officer Jane McCarthy, MoMA PS1, interviewed at MoMA New York, 
January 13th, 2011, 33 min. 
• Founder and Former Director Alanna Heiss, P.S.1, telephone interview, January 14th, 2011, 
15 min. 
• Assistant Curator to Alanna Heiss Beatrice Johnson, telephone interview, MoMA PS1, 
January 16th, 2011, 20 min. 
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Appendix 2. An Example of the Interviews 
 
Example 1. Former Development Officer Jane McCarthy,  MoMA P.S. 1, 13th 
January, 2011 
Interviewed at the MoMA New York premises, administrative floor. 
Number of transcription:  24262/1 
Name of interview file: Haastattelu_13012011 
Length of interview: 33 min 
Transcribed on: Tutkimustie Oy June 3, 2011 
Indicators used: I: Interviewer(s) 
R: Respondent(s) 
Other notations: , (Micro) pause 
.. Interrupted or continued statement 
(-) Omitted word or part of word  
(--) Omitted part of speech 
(word) Unclear word or uncertain spelling 
underlined Word or part of speech with particular emphasis 
[brackets] Transcriber’s comment 
Comments:  Due to ambient noise, there are significantly more omitted parts of speech than 
usual. 
I: Can you define some kind of drastic changes that have happened after 2008 crisis, in general? 
 
R: We definitely revised our organisational budget, and we reduced it. Which was good, there was a lot of staff 
turnover happening that wasn't related necessarily to the economic crisis, but it was a good opportunity to kind 
of rethink the budget, (--) [00:35] budget for exhibitions, the amount of money that we were able to raise. So 
that was a good chance to kind of streamline operations. It also made us think very, on the curatorial side, 
which I don't work for, but it definitely made them think more about what the focus of their exhibitions would 
be, and really kind of what the primary programs and shows that they wanted to do, so I think in effect it was 
difficult for a lot of people, but I think the benefit was it made people very focused about what was possible, 
what messages you're really trying to get across at the museum, it was an opportunity to become a very lean 
operation.  
 
I: So it also made people sort of come together or something like that? 
 
R: A bit, yeah. 
: Could you (--)? [01:24] 
R: Sure.  (extract from interview 33 min) 
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Example 2. Marja-Liisa Pohjanvirta, Senior Specialist, 25th May, 2011, the 
Finnish Museums Association 
Litteration numero:  24261/1 
Haastattelun nimi: Haastattelu_25052011 
Haastattelun kesto: 45 min 
Litteroitu:  Tutkimustie Oy 31.5.2011 
Puhujien merkinnät: K: Kysyjä(t) 
V: Vastaaja(t) 
Muut merkinnät: , Lyhyt tauko puheessa 
.. Puheenvuoro jää kesken, jatkaa puheenvuoroa 
  (-) Pois jäänyt sana tai sanan osa 
  (--) Pois jäänyt jakso 
  (sana) Epäselvä sana tai jakso 
  alleviivaus Erityisen painollinen sana tai jakso 
  [hakasulkeet] Litteroijan kommentti  
Huomautukset: -- 
V: ..strategioita museoille, että meillä on tehty Museoliiton strategia viimeksi 2007–2013, sen tyyppinen 
strategia. Ja sitä on päivitetty helmikuussa 2009. Se oli ikään kuin tämän kyseisen 2008 vuoden jälkeen 
sitten. Mutta sitten tässä myöskin on otettu aika voimakkaasti esiin tämä kestävä kehitys, se tuli 
oikeastaan samaan aikaan, osittain. Toisaalta seurauksena siitä, että tuli taloudellisia ongelmia ja tuli 
sitten tämmösiä säästötavotteita ja yritettiin keksiä sitten keinoja, millä selvitä. Kestävä kehitys tuli kuin 
tilauksesta tavallaan tähän, että se on järkevä muutos toimintamalleihin. 
 
K: Voiko sanoa, et se oli jonkinlainen seuraus tästä kriisistä? 
 
V: Sitä voisi tulkita niinkin, joo. Ainakin käytännössä voisi ajatella. Saatettiin pukea tämä kriisi positiiviseen 
asuun [naurahtaen]. 
 
K: Minkälaisia muutoksia museostrategiassa olet huomannut vuoden 2008 jälkeen, muita kuin tämän 
kestävän kehityksen? 
 
V: Sikäli tämä taloudellinen puoli on vähän kaksisuuntainen, koska toisaalta valtion avustukset museoille ovat 
kasvaneet koko ajan. Samoin Museoliiton valtionavustus on pysynyt suunnilleen samana, että meillä ei ole 
kuitenkaan vähentynyt se. Ja missään muuallakaan tämä avustus ei ole vähentynyt, mutta sitten toisaalta niin 
kunnallisissa museoissa kunnan rahoitus on pienentynyt ja muu rahoitus on yleensä pienentynyt. Esimerkiksi 
sponsorointirahotuskin on etsinyt yhä tarkemmin ne väylät, mihin sijoitetaan. Ja sillä tavalla niin, tämä 
museoiden ja meidänkin itse hankkima rahoitusosuus on siten laajentunut. Tietenkin, kun meillä on näitä 
projektiavustuksia, jotka tulevat myöskin opetusministeriöltä, niin niiden osuus on laajentunut tai suurentunut. 
Ja myöskin museot ovat hakeneet enemmän tämmösiä projektiavustuksia. Ja myöskään henkilöstössä ei ole 
varsinaisesti ollut tämmösiä, että olisi vähennetty henkilöstöä muutoin kuin siten, että jos on ollut 
työllistämistuella olevia projektityöntekijöitä, niin niitä ei ole pystytty ottamaan moneenkaan paikkaan. Mutta 
vakituisen henkilömäärän pieneneminen, niin sitä ei ole tapahtunut. 
K: Aivan. (extract from interview 45 min) 
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Appendix 3. Budgets from the Annual Reports & Documents from MoMA, 
Kiasma & The Finnish National Gallery 
	  
Financial Statements of the Museum of Modern Art, New York 2007-2011. Source: 
Consolidated Financial Statements, MoMA 2007-2008, 2008-2009, 2009-2010 & 2010-2011. 
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Museum of Contemporary Art Kiasma: Key Budget Figures 2008 -2012. Source: Annual 
Reports of The Finnish National Gallery 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 & 2012 
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Functional Efficiency of the Finnish National Gallery. Source: Agreement between the 
Finnish National Gallery and the state to reduce expenses, 2011-2013. 
 
• Table IV, Left column from top down: Overall attendance, paying customers, percentage of 
paying customers. On the righ: Goal 2011, Goal 2012, Goal 2013.   
• Table V, income & expenses. Left column: Overall income & expenses, direct costs.  
     On the right: same as above. 
• Table VI, Left column: Financial Goals. Lef column top down: income per visit, average price 
oper visit, sold publications, the percentage of administrative costs of overall costs.  	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Appendix 4. Photographs.  Kiasma, The Finnish National Gallery, SFMOMA, 
MOCA, PS1 and research material. 
	  
Kiasma 
	  
Photograph 1. Agenda, Spring 2013, Museum of Contemporary Art Kiasma, 2013. Photo: ©Hanna Ojamo 
 
 
Photograph 2. Presentation Book, Museum of Contemporary Art Kiasma, 2008. Photo: ©Hanna Ojamo 
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Photograph 4. Presentation Book, Museum of Contemporary Art Kiasma, 2008. Photo: ©Hanna Ojamo 
 
Photograph 5. Kiasma shop, Museum of Contemporary Art Kiasma, 2012. Photo: ©Hanna Ojamo 
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Photograph 6. Kiasma´s Audience Development Material 2/2009, Museum of Contemporary Art Kiasma 
2009. Photo: ©Hanna Ojamo 
 
 Photograph 7. Kiasma´s Audience Development Material 2/2009, Museum of Contemporary Art Kiasma 
2009. Photo: ©Hanna Ojamo 
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Photograph 8. Kiasma´s Audience Development Material 2/2009, Museum of Contemporary Art Kiasma 
2009. Photo: ©Hanna Ojamo 
 
The Finnish National Gallery 
 
Photograph 9. Annual Report, The Finnish National Gallery, 2009. Photo: ©Hanna Ojamo 
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Photograph 10. Newspaper clipping: ”Away from Museum Bureaucracy!”.  Interview of the Director 
General Risto Ruohonen about the National Gallery´s future changes. Helsingin Sanomat, Cultural pages C1, 
28. August, 2012 . Photo: ©Hanna Ojamo    
  
Photograph 11. Finnish Museum Statistics 2009, National Board of Antiquities, Finland.  Annual Report of 
The Finnish National Gallery, 2008. Photo: ©Hanna Ojamo 
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SFMOMA & MOCA 
 
 Photograph 12. Interview and exhibition material from SFMOMA, San Francisco, October 5th-8th, 2010. 
Photo: ©Hanna Ojamo 
 
   
Photograph 13. View from the corridor to SFMOMA´s rooftop sculpture garden on the 5th floor. Interviews 
at SFMOMA, San Francisco, October 8th, 2010. Photo: ©Hanna Ojamo 
	   124	  
 
 
 
 
Photograph 14 & 15. MOCA exhibition brochures, posters & booklets, Los Angeles, California. Source: 
MOCA, October 2010. Photos: ©Hanna Ojamo 
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Photograph 16 & 17. MOCA, exhibiton brochures, posters & booklets, Los Angeles, California. Source: 
MOCA, October 2010. Photos: ©Hanna Ojamo 
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Photograph 18 & 19. MOCA. exhibition brochures, posters & booklets, Los Angeles, California. Source: 
MOCA, October 2010. Photos: ©Hanna Ojamo 
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Photograph 20 & 21. MOCA, exhibition brochures, posters & booklets, Los Angeles, California. Source: 
MOCA, October 2010. Photos: ©Hanna Ojamo 
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MoMA PS1 & the Museum of Modern Art  
 
Photograph 22. Advertisement of MoMA PS1 at the Museum of Modern Art New York, January 2011. 
Photograph 23. MoMA PS1, main entrance, 22-25 Jackson Ave, Long Island City, New York 11101,  
January 2011. 
Photograph 24. MoMA PS1, main building seen from Jackson Avenue, New York, January 2011. 
Photos: ©Hanna Ojamo	  
	   129	  
 
Photograph 25. Interviews at the Museum of Modern Art, New York, January 13th, 2011. 
  
Photograph 26. View from the exhibition space, Museum of Modern Art, New York,  
January 13th, 2011. Photos: ©Hanna Ojamo 
 
